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The number of domestic and cross border bank mergers and acquisitions (M&A) has 
increased over the last decade with a resultant impact on the bank dividend.  This study 
examines the effect of M&A on the dividend policy by comparing the abnormal returns, 
profitability and dividend policy of the domestic and cross border bank acquirers. The study 
focused on EU mega-bank mergers and acquisitions within 1997-2007 involving only 
commercial-to-commercial banks. The sample consists of a total of 62 mega-M&A with a 
minimum deal value of €500 million. Three hypotheses were formulated specifically to test: 
(i) the wealth effect and geographical diversification of the M&A between domestic and 
cross border acquirers; (ii) the effect on in the financial performance of both acquirers and 
(iii) the M&A impact on dividend policy on banks after bank M&A. Two strands of the 
literature were reviewed focusing on M&A and dividend policy.  
The event study methodology was used to calculate the abnormal returns of both the domestic 
and cross border acquirers which were standardised. A long window of 61 days was applied 
to capture a satisfactory length of pre and post merger events that could capture the behaviour 
of the abnormal returns and consequent effect on dividend policy.  The hierarchical 
regression model was used to estimate the impact of the variables on the profitability and 
dividend policy of the acquirer banks.   
In comparison with the domestic acquirers, the cross border abnormal returns showed a trend 
of significant negative results following the M&A announcement. The domestic acquirers 
showed no significance but, on average have higher cumulative total standardised abnormal 
returns (CTSAR) than the cross border acquired banks. The result of the financial 
performance showed that CTSAR of the cross border acquirers is significantly affected by the 
profitability of the banks but insignificant with domestic acquirers. However, the cost-to –
income ratio (CIR) significantly affects the performance of both bank acquirers. CIR and 
RISK (measured by the ratio of the loan provision to net interest revenue of the banks) highly 
correlated with profitability of both the domestic and cross border acquirers. The 
management of costs and loans risks were found to be significant variables in the 
achievement of profitability among domestic acquirers. 
The dividend policy hypothesis result indicated that CTSAR has a weak correlation and 
insignificant effect on the dividend policy variables.  Infact, the Causality test result 
confirmed that the CTSAR does not Granger cause dividend policy. However, the study 
provides strong support to previous studies that beta, liquidity, taxes, and the finance 
structure of the acquirers are significant variables in the formulation of the dividend policy of 
the merged banks.  The beta, which a proxy for risk, is the most significant factor affecting 
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1.0 Background of the Study 
The issue of corporate dividend policy has dominated finance studies over the decades. The 
interest in dividend theories of organisations by scholars can be justified by the crucial role of 
dividend in investment and financing decisions. Such decisions are hardly made on the whim   
particularly by banks. The banks, like other organisations, are usually faced with the 
challenge of what decisions to make with generated profits of the organisation. The decision 
has to be made between investing all or proportion of the earned profits in the form of 
dividends to the shareholders, or to plough it back into the business. The best decision 
however is one that maximises the wealth of the shareholders and exerts a positive impact on 
its share price. 
The dividend policy decision of a bank is anchored on a number of factors such as; liquidity, 
the composition of the bank, the tax implications, the growth and future investments of the 
bank, the capital structure etc.  Most corporate organisations realise the role of dividend 
payments in satisfying shareholders expectations. In fact, dividend decision has been 
intrinsically linked with the improvement of shareholders wealth. The 1960‟s witnessed the 
surge on the dividend policy debates among finance scholars which was pioneered by 
Modigliani and Miller (1961). The theory, also known as M&M, among other issue posits 
that dividend was irrelevant in increasing the value of a firm.  Several other theories had 
since then flooded the finance literature either in support or in opposition of the theory. Some 
others have even taken a different view, thus making dividend policy an ongoing issue.   
The foregoing argument underscores the overwhelming sensitivity of dividend decisions on 
the image and corporate existence of organisations. As a result, any strategic alliance or 
measure to consolidate dividends with the aim of improving the shareholders wealth by banks 
would be ultimately considered. Most banks have considered mergers and acquisition (M&A) 
as a strategic option, not only for expansion but also to improve the returns accruable to their 
shareholders. In the European Union countries, M&A deals have become a common trend 
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particularly during the period 1997 -2007.  While different banks may have various missions 
in pursuing a merger strategy, the ultimate aim is to improve the returns to shareholders and 
therefore strengthen their dividend policy. This study attempts to link the issue of M&A 
announcements to the dividend policy and profitability of domestic and cross border 
commercial bank acquirers. 
A huge number of studies in the realm of bank mergers and acquisitions (M&A) have   
focused on the returns accruable to the target versus acquirer shareholders.  An overwhelming 
majority of the studies confirm that the shareholders of the targets benefit more than those of 
acquirers from M&A activities. The evidence is often based on event studies with a limited or 
short window around the announcement date and using the banks and market returns to 
estimate the abnormal returns to the target or the acquirer shareholders.  
While these studies have produced different results, most of them have given less attention to 
the geographical implications of the M&A deals on the shareholders, particularly of the 
acquirers. Since the general notion is that the acquirers‟ shareholders have little or no benefits 
in a M&A, dissecting the returns into cross border and domestic shareholders would be 
insightful in determining the underlying factors why the acquirer shareholders benefit less. 
The focus of this study is therefore on the dividend policy implications of the M&A on the 
acquirer banks, distinguishing between cross border and domestic bank acquires. 
It is important to state that M&A studies on cross border and domestic M&A are quite vast. 
However, most of the studies are limited by short event windows which do not capture 
significant events and performance of the merged entities before and after the event. They 
have often focused on the abnormal returns to the target banks eg Rad & Beek, 1999; Cybo-
Ottone & Murgia, 2000; Kane, 2000. This study expands on the event window and uses a 
long estimation period to capture the „behind the scene‟ performance of the domestic and 
cross border entities and seeking to obtain a clue as to why the acquirer shareholders gain less 
in M&A. The 61 days used in the study is considered sufficient and appropriate to make 
deductive observations which short event windows are unlikely to capture. Becker (2000) 
confirms that the choice of window is very crucial to the expectant result of the returns 




In addition, geographical factors could reveal vital causes on why the acquirer shareholders 
returns are often in the negative. Environmental factors such as country‟s legislations, attitude 
of citizens towards foreign acquisitions, knowledge of the local market, size and capital can 
have a considerable effect on the acquirer banks in cross border deals. 
The methodology in most studies has followed the traditional Capital Assets Pricing Model    
(CAPM) and the application of the market model in the estimation of the cumulative 
abnormal returns (CARs) to measure shareholders returns. This study makes a departure from 
existing studies by using the cumulative total standardized abnormal returns (CTSAR) to 
cater for the different degree of event impact rather than using the traditional CARs. This is 
done by weighing each abnormal return by the standard deviation. The purpose of the 
standardization is to ensure that each abnormal return has the same variance (Serra, 2002).  
Thus, by dividing each firm‟s abnormal residual by the standard deviation over the estimation 
period, each residual has an estimated variance of 1. Rarely have studies in cross border and  
domestic M&A applied this technique in combination of a long window to determine M&A 
effect on bank dividends. The method also helps to mitigate any bias in the abnormal returns 
of both acquirers. Cornett & Tehranian (1992) applied the standardized abnormal returns 
technique but in a 2 day window, to measure the post-merger performance of 30 large bank 
acquisitions with the pre-merger performance of the merging banks. 
Shareholders‟ wealth and returns should be seen as a generic concept rather than being 
limited to the increase and decrease in the abnormal returns. The use of a single variable in 
the measurement and estimation of shareholders wealth and abnormal returns may not be 
sufficient in analysing the robustness of results.  Thus, in addition to the abnormal returns, 
this study also uses the dividend payout as a measure of M&A gains to the acquirers‟ 
shareholders.  
Although studies in dividend policy have invoked contentious debates in finance, there is a 
dearth of research into its relationship with M&A. In fact, no known study has examined the 
effect of M&A on dividend policy particularly in the EU banking industry. Studies such as 
Olson & Pagano (2005), Page, Jahera & Pugh (1996), Rozeff (1982), Brook,   Hendershott & 
Lee (1998), Casey & Dicken (2000), Johnson et al (2006) and Pattenden & Twite (2008) 
have considered various facets of dividend policy both for banking and other industries. This 
study is unique in that it examines the issue of dividend policy among cross border and 
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domestic acquirers. It assesses the impact of profitability on dividend policy and uses the 
CTSAR in combination with other variables to evaluate the factors affecting banks dividend 
policy. The concept of dividend policy in the present study is measured in terms of the 
dividend yield and payout. The term can also be applied to include either one or more of the 
two elements (yield and payout) and others, such as the earnings per share (EPS)
1
.  
Dividend yield and payout have been interchangeably used in various dividend policy studies 
though the yield offers more significant result. This is not surprising as the concept is even 
more encompassing.  The dividend payout ratio represents the proportion of the earnings that 
the banks pay out to shareholders in the form of dividends. It is usually the net profit after 
taxation and after the preference dividends announced during the period; expressed as a 
percentage. The dividend yield relates the cash return from a share to its current market value 
which is often stated at the grossed up rate (Reuters, 2008). 
 
1.1 Previous Studies 
Studies in dividend policy including Rozeff (1982); Casey & Dickens (2000); La Porta (2000); 
Fama & French (2001); Grullon et al (2003); Gugler & Yurtoglu (2003); Brunarski, Harman & 
Kehr (2004); Johnson et al (2006) have analyzed the various aspects of dividend policy but 
none have examined banks dividend policy in relation to the abnormal returns to the 
shareholders of cross border and domestic bank acquirers in mergers and acquisitions.  
Rozeff (1982) and Casey & Dickens (2000) examined the effects of tax and regulatory changes 
on commercial banks dividend policy. Both studies used only dividend payout as a measure of 
dividend policy and applied the value line beta as proxy for bank leverage. They found that the 
estimation of the leverage by value line can be precarious as the bank leverage ratio would 
merely provide better picture of its level of debts.  
Gugler & Yurtoglu (2003) applied the cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR) to 
evaluate the structure of ownership of majority controlled firms in Germany using the rent 
                                                          
1
 See chapter three for the elaborate concept of dividend policy. However, the above three measures (yield, 
payout and EPS) are commonly used in part or jointly to describe dividend policy.  Chen et al (2005) used 
payout and yield; Gugler and Yurtoglu (2003) used payout; while La- Porta et al (2000) used a series of 
dividend ratios such as dividend to sales, dividend to earning  etc as instruments of measuring a firm‟s dividend 
policy.   
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extraction hypothesis. But the study does not focus on cross border cum domestic acquires; in 
particular a window of -/+ 2days was used which may be too short to capture the long run 
performance of the firms. Furthermore, the study only concentrated on the dividend payout and 
does not consider the yield.  
In an international setting, La Porta, et al (2000) examined the substitute and outcome dividend 
models for a cross section of 4000 companies from 33 countries and upheld that the outcome 
model is more in support of the minority rights. Their study considered a series of legal and 
regulatory frameworks facing dividend policies in relation to the insiders‟ shareholdings. In the 
same vein, Page, Jahera & Pugh (1996) considered the effect of anti-takeover amendment laws 
on the dividend policy using 6 variables as proxies for dividend policy. It used a window of -/+ 
5days but failed to focus on the impact on the acquirer firms.  
Several recent studies in M&A have been undertaken in assessing the shareholders wealth and 
profitability of cross border and domestic mergers. Some studies have also examined target 
and acquirers banks in various dimensions. 
Hernando, Nieto & Wall (2008) examined the characteristics of domestic and cross border 
targets and found that both have similar returns for their shareholders and also share common 
features.  Lensink & Maslennikova (2008) used 41 days window period to compare the 
shareholders wealth incidental to the mergers of the cross border and domestic banks. Their 
findings show that domestic deals create more value than the cross border deals. Infact, their 
evidence shows that cross border mergers destroy shareholders value. 
The above findings concur with Mangold et al (2008) who studied the shareholder wealth 
effect of German banks and attest that the cross border mergers destroy shareholders wealth 
while the domestic mergers create wealth. But the evidence are also contradicts some past 
studies.  Anand, Capron & Will (2005), for example, found cross border acquirers with 
multinational scope are more wealth creative. The highlight of this finding is that, not only 
cross border banks undertaking an acquisition create wealth but also banks with a multinational 
profile. Further, Conn et al (2005) find that cross border acquirers have lower announcement 
period and long run returns than the domestic acquirers. However, they add that while 
domestic mergers yield negative shareholders returns, cross border mergers yield zero 
abnormal returns and tend to remain negative after the mergers.   
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1.2 The Contribution of Thesis 
The novelty of the present study lies in the methodology adopted in the event study and in its 
examination of the effects of M&A and dividend policy.  The study uses the total standardised 
cumulative abnormal returns (CTSAR) as opposed to the traditional abnormal returns.  The 
uniqueness of the CTSAR is that it standardizes the abnormal returns (ARs) to cater for the 
different degree of event impact. This is done by weighing the abnormal returns by the 
standard deviation. The purpose of the standardization is to ensure that each abnormal return 
has the same variance (Serra, 2002).  Thus, by dividing each firm‟s abnormal residual by the 
standard deviation over the estimation period, each residual has an estimated variance of 1. 
The event window of the methodology employed in the present study is also extended. An 
estimation period of 100 days and an event window of -/+ 30days are applied.  Some studies 
favour short windows of 1-5 days ( Andrade, Mitchell & Stafford, 2001; Bruner, 2005; 
Mulherin & Boone, 2000; Campa & Hernando ,2004), which are prone to insensitivity to the 
chosen model for the expected returns; whereas a longer window takes into consideration a 
possible bid revision and competitions (Conn et al, 2005). It also ensures that all possible 
factors that may influence the abnormal returns such as pre and post merger events and the 
response of the market thereafter are captured. Aw & Chatterjee (2004) opined that a longer 
window and thus estimation period ensures the sufficient observations for statistical accuracy 
without running any risk of being far from the test period is achieved.  
There are a handful of studies that have used long event windows in estimating the abnormal 
returns in M&A. The table below provides a synopsis of some known M&A studies and the 
event windows applied. Note that 60 days have are not commonly used in cross border versus 










Table 1.1 Some M&A Studies and the Length of the windows 
Study 
Domestic/ 





Aw & Chatterjee(2004) Cross border UK/Europe 1991-96 24 
Campa & Hernando 
(2006) Both Europe 1998-2002 30 
Ang & Kohers (2001) Domestic USA 1984-96 36 
Moeller et al. (2004) Domestic USA 1980-2001 36 
 Rad &  Beek (1999) Both Europe 1989-96 40 
Black et al (2003) Cross border USA 1985-95 60 
Gregory & McCorrison 
(2004) 
Cross border Europe 1985-94 60 
 Goergen & Renneboog 
(2004) 
Both UK/Europe 1989-99 60 
Baradwaj et al (1990) Both USA 1980-87 60 
Lowinski, Schiereck & 
Thomas (2004) 
Both Swiss/Europe 1990-2001 63 
 
The current study covers the period 1997 - 2007 and favours a long estimation period. These 
years are significant because many EU mergers and acquisitions have occurred over the 
periods. Moreover, the 11 years assessment period is necessary to properly capture any 
economic events that could impact on the M&A results. Olson and Pagano (2000) argued that 
the success or failure of the banks M&A should not be solely judged on the estimation and 
announcement period but on the long term performance of the acquirers.  
Although the CTSAR methodology is not new, no study has so far been undertaken in 
conjunction with dividend policy. The current study estimates the abnormal returns of the 
domestic and cross border bank acquirers and applies the CTSAR as a variable in the 
dividend policy regression. The purpose is to determine the significance of the CTSAR in the 
dividend policy formulation of the acquirer banks. The same technique is used in the 
evaluation of the financial profitability of the acquirer banks where the CTSAR is used as a 
proxy for shareholders wealth but correlated with the profitability variables. 
8 
 
In considering the dividend policy, two proxies are used: the dividend payout and the 
dividend yield. The significance of both proxies is evaluated in the regressions. The study 
therefore offers a unique triangulation involving the dividend payout, yield and the CTSAR 
associated with bank M&A. 
This research is very important as it makes a contribution to the ongoing M&A and dividend 
policy puzzles. The findings are particularly useful for banks considering mergers as it 
produces an empirical basis for restructuring   dividend policy. The study lays further basis 
for research into the both M&A and   dividend policies as it attempts to capture a best fit 
dividend model for banks. 
Investors and shareholders would readily grasp and understand in concise terms, recent issues 
relating to M&A and its dividend policy implications. As a result, they would be better 
informed of the fundamental issues associated with M&A and its attendant impact on their 
investments; whether in the domestic or foreign bank investments. 
 
1.4   Research Objectives & Hypotheses 
In summary, the study aims to assess the impact of bank Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A) 
on the dividend policy of the cross border and domestic acquirer banks by investigating the 
effect on their shareholders‟ wealth, financial performance and the dividend hypothesis.  
The main research objectives are to: 
1. Conduct empirical analysis using event windows and regression analysis to examine the 
abnormal returns to shareholders of cross border merged banks relative to domestic 
merged banks, based on a sample of 62  EU domestic and cross border bank mega M&A . 
 
2. Review critically the literature on the performance effects of bank M&A and on the 
dividend policy model for cross border and domestic acquirer banks. 
 
3. Examine the theoretical linkage between M&A, shareholder return and dividend policy  




4. Determine the factors affecting dividend policy and the most significant dividend policy 
variables/measures for both the cross border and domestic acquirers. 
 
 The research is guided by a set of research questions and hypotheses which are formulated in 
line with the research objectives.  The following research questions are posed for the purpose 
of guiding the research. 
1) To what extent do the M&A announcement affect the shareholders returns of  cross 
border and domestic acquirers? 
 
2) What effects do mergers and acquisitions have on the performance of cross border 
and domestic bank acquirers? 
 
3) What is the impact of mergers and acquisitions on the different dividend policy 
measures of cross border and domestic bank acquirers and to what extent does this 
geographical diversification affect the shareholders returns of the affected banks? 
 




Three research hypotheses which relate to the impact of M&A on the shareholders 
wealth, performance and dividend policy of cross border and domestic acquirer banks, 
are formulated and tested. One of the objectives of the present research is the 
examination of the effect of M&A on abnormal returns.  However, despite the 
conflicting and mixed evidence in the literature concerning the impact of abnormal 
returns on merged banks, the resulting impact is expected to be significant.  
 
Therefore, a test of following hypotheses is to further examine the significance of the 
M&A on shareholders returns, banks profitability and dividend policy. It is important 
to note that the behaviour of abnormal returns reflects investor expectations about 
profitability and dividends.  Thus, the profitability and dividend regressions test the 




HI : The wealth effect and geographical diversification hypothesis: In contrast to domestic 
acquisition, cross border mergers and acquisitions will not create more value.  
Where diversification and possible reduction in cost is achievable, foreign acquisitions are 
not expected to outperform domestic acquirers.   
 
H2: The financial performance of cross border acquirers is significantly correlated with 
M&A, and significantly higher than domestic acquirers.  
Given their access to capital through foreign partners and investments, cross border bank 
acquirers are expected to outperform the domestic acquirers. 
H3. The dividend policy hypothesis: There is no significant difference in the shareholders 
perception of dividend policy of cross border and domestic bank acquirer following a merger 
or acquisitions.    
 
It is expected that there would be a significant difference in the dividend policy, measured by 
the dividend yield and payout, of both acquirers after the mergers and acquisitions.  
 
 
1.4 The Organisation of the Study 
The thesis is organised into eight chapters. The first chapter has provided a well coverage of 
the background to the research, leading to the formulation of the objectives of the study; 
including the research questions, hypotheses and justifications for the present study.  The 
next three chapters offer different strands of the broad literature that encompasses this stride. 
Chapter 2 reviews the literature on dividend policy while chapter 3 discusses the various 
theoretical debates and dividend hypotheses. Both chapters cover various forms and concepts 
of dividend policy and review of the empirical studies. They also review the literature on 
dividend policy as it relates to M&A. Chapter 4 reviews the literature on mergers and 
acquisitions, abnormal returns and other contemporary issues associated with mergers and 
acquisitions.    
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Chapter 5 covers the methodological framework of the study.  It discusses the different 
research techniques, data analysis and sampling issues and economic models applied in the 
study. It describes the event windows methodology and other statistical tools such as 
regression models, estimation methods and test statistics as used in the research.  
Chapter 6 presents the first part of the data analyses and discussion of the results. It discusses 
the research results based on the event window methodology. It also examines the domestic 
and cross border M&A impact on bank financial performance. The first two hypotheses are 
tested in this chapter. Chapter 7 provides further empirical analysis of the dividend policy 
using both the dividend yield and payout. It uses hierarchical regression analysis to test the 
dividend policy hypothesis.  The effects exerted by the total standardized cumulative 
abnormal returns (CTSAR) and other dividend policy variables are discussed and analysed in 
the chapter. 
Chapter 8 summarises the research findings, evaluates the results and offers 
recommendations. The conclusions are drawn based on the findings of the study and are in 
line with the objectives of the research. In addition to the recommendations, the chapter 













  Chapter Two 
 
Literature Review I 
 
2.0 Introduction 
The debate on dividend policy has remained an area of intense research in finance. Different 
arguments and theories have been put forward to explain the different facets of dividend 
policy. This chapter therefore explains the meaning and various interpretations of the 
concept, factors determining dividend policy and theoretical models of dividend. 
 
2.1 The Meaning and Types of Dividend Policy 
In discussing the meaning of dividend policy, it is important to define a dividend. Various 
definitions abound in the literature on the definition of dividend. A dividend is simply the 
money that a company pays out to its shareholders from the profits it has made (Doughty, 
2000). Such payments can be made in cash or by issuance of additional shares as in scrip 
dividend.  Davies & Pain (2002) however define it as the amount payable to shareholders 
from profit or distributable reserves.  
Companies that are listed in the stock exchange are usually obligated to pay out dividends on 
a quarterly or semi annual basis. The semi annual or quarterly payment is referred to as the 
interim dividend. The final payment, which is usually paid at the end of the financial year of 
the company, is known as the final dividend. Dividends are normally paid after the corporate 
tax has been deducted.  
Dividend policy is primarily concerned with the decisions regarding dividend payout and 
retention. Lease (2000) described it as the practice adopted by managers in making dividend 
payout decisions. It details the amount of cash to be distributed to the shareholders and what 
is to be retained by the bank for further investment. It is a decision that considers the amount 
of profits to be retained and that to be distributed to the shareholders of the bank (Watson & 
Head, 2004). The objective of a firm‟s dividend policy is to be consistent in the overall 
objective of maximising shareholders wealth since it is the aim of every investor to get a 
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return from their investment. Economists, psychologists and the sociologists have all 
attempted to explain investor behaviour in a number of ways and to relate the various 
corporate dividend policies to the theories on the behaviour of individual investors. 
Theoretically, there are different types of dividend policies. These include constant payout, 
progressive policy, residual policy, zero policy and non- cash policy. Investors are seen to 
belong to a particular group or clientele. This is because they tend to pitch their tent with a 
particular policy that might suite them. This is referred as the clientele effect of dividend 
policy (Hutchinson, 1995; Kolb & Rodriguez, 1996). 
The amount of dividend to be paid out by firms could be influenced by the size of the firm. 
Companies that are large in size are more than likely to pay dividend more often than small 
firms. Larger firms also have higher agency costs and a relatively lower transaction cost than 
the small firms. Dividend payout is inversely related to intrinsic business risk. Kalay (1980) 
opined that companies with unstable earnings pay less in dividends in attempt to maintain a 
stable dividend payout and to avoid the cost of borrowing from external sources. 
 
2.2 Types of Dividend Policy 
Constant or fixed policy: The Company pays out a fixed amount of its profit after tax as 
dividend. Thus, the company maintains a fixed payout ratio of dividend. A company may as a 
matter of policy, decide to constantly payout sixty percent of its after tax profit as dividend to 
its shareholders and retain the remaining fraction. This type of policy allows the shareholders 
the opportunity to clearly know the amount of dividend to expect from their investments in 
the company. However as noted by Watson & Head (2004), the policy could be traumatic to 
companies experiencing a volatile or fluctuating profit earning. This is because of the 
uncertainty of its profit. If there are viable capital projects, the policy can be chaotic. 
Progressive policy: Payments on dividend is on a steady increase usually in line with 
inflation. This could result in increasing dividend in money terms. The firm uses the policy as 
a ratchet. Every effort is made to sustain the increase even though marginal. Seldom, the 
company may be constrained to cut down on dividend payout. This is to enable it sustain its 
operations. This though is not a frequent action as it sends a wrong signal to investors. Firms 
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operating this policy will opt to avoid paying dividends during the period rather than 
consistently cut down on the dividend (Kolb & Rodriguez, 1996).  
Residual policy: Dividends are just what is left after the company determines the retained 
profits required for future investment. This policy gives preference to its positive NPV (Net 
Present Value) projects and paying out dividends if there are still left over funds available. 
Dividend becomes a circumstantial payment paid only when the investment policy is 
satisfied. There is a tendency therefore that this type of policy could give rise to a zero 
dividend structure. Firms may need to modify this policy to ensure that investors of the 
different clienteles are not chased out by a strict application of the policy (Kolb & Rodriguez, 
1996). 
Zero dividend policy: Some firms may decide not to pay dividend. This is especially 
common in newly formed companies that rather require capital to execute its projects. All the 
profit is thus retained for expansion of the business. Investors who prefer capital gains to 
dividends because of taxation will naturally be lured by this kind of policy. This type of 
policy is quite easy to operate and avoids all the costs associated with payment of dividends 
(Watson & Head, 2004). 
Alternative policies to paying cash: In order to give shareholders a choice between 
dividends or new shares, the banks might choose to buy back shares. This is share or stock 
repurchase. This has a significant advantage in terms of tax to the shareholder. While the 
dividend is fully taxed just as ordinary income, the stock repurchase or buyback is not taxed 
until the shares are sold and the shareholder makes a profit or capital gain (Ross, Westerfield 
& Jordan, 2001). There is also the policy of stock dividends and splits. Shareholders are 
given additional shares in lieu of cash as dividend (Brealey, Myers & Marcus, 1999). 
 
2.3 Some Factors Determining Dividend Policy 
The choice of a particular dividend policy by a bank is not usually accidental. It is tailored to 
either meet the bank‟s need or the shareholders‟. Shareholders have different choice of 
dividend depending on their needs. Firms also adopt policies that suite their peculiarity. Thus 
some identifiable factors affecting dividend policy include but are not limited to the 
following: reinvestment required for new capital projects, availability of other sources of 
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funds, existing cash levels and liquidity, market reaction to a change in dividend, tax, 
shareholders preference for income or capital gain etc. 
Market reaction to a change in dividend: Management often sticks to a pattern of dividend 
payout. This can be explained by the signal conveyed by an alteration in dividend payment of 
the company. A cut in dividends will give a negative signal to investors on the future 
prospect of the company (Hutchinson, 1995). This might affect the share price of the 
company. Thus, since management cannot afford to give such weak impression about its 
company, it is likely to stick to its dividend policy that does not attempt to cut down on the 
current payout. 
Shareholders preference for income or capital gain: Investors are classified according to 
their preferences. They are grouped into clienteles, „defined by their current income needs‟. 
The wealthy investors may not have an immediate need for cash dividend. Others groups may 
have strong need to receive cash as dividend. By targeting a particular clientele or group, 
management may wish to tailor its dividend policy to suit the needs of its target investors 
(Hutchinson, 1995).  
There are reasons why an investor may wish to avoid or seek dividends other than cash. An 
investor who is concerned about taxes will opt for little or no dividend to be paid to him. This 
is because of the tax levied on dividend income. In attempt to avoid tax, some will prefer not 
to receive dividend but to pay a capital gain tax at a later time when their shares are sold and 
profit made. Thus, a firm will structure its policy to suit its investors (Kolb & Rodriguez, 
1996). 
Existing cash and liquidity level: The tendency to pay dividend is strictly based on 
availability of funds. This is a residual dividend model, which holds that companies will 
usually base their dividend policy on its cash flow and capital structure. Thus, where the 
banks require capital for investment for a project, the retained earning is utilised and the 
amount left for dividend will be affected. Only the residual earnings are used for the payment 
of dividends (Samuels & Wilkes, 1987). 
There are however, other issues that are crucial in the dividend policy of any business 
organizations. These include the clientele effect, signalling hypothesis, dividend stability, 
dividend extras, residual dividend model, share prices etc. Some investors prefer no 
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dividends while others may prefer large dividends. Investors will therefore invest in 
companies that have suitable policy for them. A change in the amount of dividend sends a 
signal to the investors. When dividend increases, it is a signal of growth and a reduction in 
dividend signals otherwise. Thus, companies that have stabled or predictable dividend enjoys 
the goodwill of investors. 
Bank dividend policy is distinct and unique from other industries as it does not react to the 
Rozeff model elements such as past growth rate, beta, and other acute factors (Casey and 
Dicken, 2000). In a similar study, Baker, Powell and Veil (2001) segmented the factors 
influencing dividend policy of financial and non-financial firms. Their findings include 
pattern of past dividends, concern about maintaining a target capital structure, current degree 
of financial leverage, shareholders need for dividend income, legal rules and constraints; such 
as impairment of capital, the desire to send favourable signals to investors, the desire to 
conform to the industry‟s dividend payout ratio, investment considerations such as the 
availability of profitable investments, expected rate of return on firm‟s assets etc. Their 
findings corroborate some of the factors under discussion, which depicts the congruence and 
agreement of the dividend factors, irrespective of the industry.  
Some firms have an established low dividend payout pattern even though their operating and 
financial leverage increases. Dividend payout can thus serve as a quasi- fixed charge that can 
replace the interest rate of borrowing or high fixed cost. Thus, as the fixed costs increases, the 
dividend must reduce to avoid the additional cost of external borrowing. Moh‟d, Perry & 
Rimbley (1995) argue that increases in dividend payout are often observed if a low 
percentage of the firms‟ shares are held by the management of the company and and the 
outsider shareholders become more dispersed.  
In other words, higher dividend payouts are established when there is an increase in 
institutional ownership of the firm. These views are in agreement with Rozeff (1982), 
Easterbrook (1984) and Shleifer & Vishny, (2003) who argue that shareholders seek higher 
dividend payout as they perceive the diminishing level of their control and that small 
shareholders will want a high dividend payout as a compensation as well as attraction to 




2.4 Some Theoretical Dividend Models  
Corporate dividend policy has captured the interests of financial economists and has been 
an issue of intensive theoretical models and empirical examinations over the last few 
decades (Frankfurter & Wood, 1997). The controversy probably began with the 
Modigliani & Miller (M&M)(1961) theory, which classified investors into dividend 
clientele. It was later found in a later research that tax is responsible for marginal 
alterations in the portfolio composition rather than the major differences predicted by 
Miller & Scholes (1978). At the onset, when the M&M theory was postulated, most 
financial practioners and many academics greeted the conclusion that tax had a marginal 
effect on dividend policy with surprise (Baker, Powell & Veit, 2001).  
Where dividends are taxed more heavily than capital gains, and where capital gains are not 
taxed until realised, a bank that pays no dividends will be more attractive to taxable 
individuals than a similar bank that pays dividends. This is because corporate investors are 
taxed more providing a substantial incentive for investors to generate income by selling 
their shares than to receive dividends. 
Other models such as tax adjusted model which groups investors into tax dividend clienteles; 
Masulis & Trueman (1988) Model of cash payments, Farrar & Sewlyn (1967) model of after 
tax income of investors classifies investors into two clienteles. This is based on their 
preference for dividend or capital gains.  Auerbach‟s (1979) model of shareholder wealth and 
Akerlof‟s (1970) signalling model, information asymmetric theories, Jensen (1986) free cash 
flow hypothesis, Feldstein and Green (1983) theoretical dividend behavioural models and 
Shefrin & Statman (1984) theory of self control are all measures to unmask firms‟ dividend 
policy. 
The strategy of tax sheltering of income especially by high tax investors was instrumental to 
the Miller & Scholes (1978) and Miller (1986) attempt to inject rationality into the tax-
adjusted model. Scholes (1982) attributed any significant relationship between profit and 
dividend to „dividend information effect‟ rather than the effect exerted by tax (Watson and 
Head, 2004).  
The shareholder wealth model assumes that the shareholders are the main priority in wealth 
maximization rather the firm. Where there is an option of capital gain or tax on dividends, the 
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idea of wealth maximization seizes to be on the company‟s market values. Auerbach (1979) 
in this model sees dividend as a child of circumstance; which results from a long-term under 
valuation of capital of the firm and a reinvestment of the earnings after deducting the 
expected returns of the firm and investors. 
Akerlof (1970) came up with the signal model of corporate dividend policy. The crusaders of 
the signal model affirm that when dividend is used as a method of presenting the message of 
a firm‟s quality it bears a lower cost than other available alternatives. This implies that other 
methods of putting across good performance of the firm are not reliable, thus the use of 
dividend. This is possible because of the asymmetric nature of information regarding the 
firm. The asymmetric of information between the owners of the business and the 
management warrants the payment of dividends to restore dividend and adds value to the 
firm‟s equity (Frankfurter & Lane, 1992). It is an aid to allay investors‟ fears and helps the 
firm to remain competitive in the industry. 
Other writers of the asymmetric information have developed thought on applying the agency 
cost in modelling the dividend policy. This is exponential on the reduction of costs incurred 
by management. It is firmly believed that huge dividend payment reduces the amount of 
capital at the disposal of the managers. Thus, requiring management to seek fund in the 
capital market to finance investment projects. This thus ensures that funds are effectively 
monitored by the capital market and to ensure prudence in spending by management 
(Easterbrook, 1984).  
 In line with this thought, Jensen (1986) postulated the free cash flow hypothesis, which is an 
extension of the agency cost model and the signalling model. It hinges on the prudence of 
managers on the use of funds available after financing the capital projects of the firm. The 
remaining fund, he assumes, can lead to conflict of interest between the shareholders and the 
management. Thus, the separation of the ownership and management affords the managers 
the opportunity to demonstrate their worth. However, the funds left after dividend and 
interest payments may become too marginal that unscrupulous managers have little to squash.    
Feldstein and Green (1983) formulated a theoretical behavioural model of dividend in an 
attempt to prove that dividend is a product of several factors. The model asserts that the tax 
liability of dividends is marginal if compared with the transaction costs of trading shares 
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when the firm‟s profits are retained. Dividend payment reaffirms trust and confidence in 
management and thus serves as a signal factor. 
The theory of self-control is used by Shefrin and Statman (1984) to explain the investor‟s 
preference for dividends to capital gains. The model posits that capital gains and dividends 
are not close substitutes. Investors are less patient when dividend is delayed. This can be 
verified when dividends are reduced. Thus dividend payout provides more checks on 
spending level of management. Dividend provides opportunity to spend rather than save but 
the opposite applies to the capital gains when earnings are retained. 
The catering theory of dividend has become a front runner in the dividend model theories. 
The principle behind the theory is that decisions to pay dividends are usually driven by 
investors demand. Management therefore „cater‟ for investors by paying dividends to 
shareholders who require it and not paying when the investors do not require dividends. 
Baker and Wurgler (2004) argue that investors have uninformed and time varying demand for 
dividend paying shares.  This demand is not influenced by any arbitrage as the prices of the 
payers and non-payers remain unperturbed.  
Management would pay dividend when investors place higher prices on payers but avoid 
payments if investors prefer nonpayers. The study used the catering dividend dynamics to 
support that argument that managers cater for time varying investors in an attempt to 
maximise share prices. Their results suggest that dividends are highly relevant to share values 
but in different directions and times. Once dividends are initiated, any changes are influenced 
by the level of profitability rather than the relative valuations of payer and nonpayers. 
In a similar study of banks dividend payout, Casey and Dickens (2000) employed the Rozeff 
(1982) model to examine dividend payout factors in which he found five variables to be very 
significant in dividend payout policies of firms. The variables include beta, percentage of 
insider ownership, past revenue growth rate, forecasted revenue growth and the number of 
common stockholders. Those variables are equally useful in articulating dividend policies of 
banks. Chang and Rhee (1990) added that financial leverage is a crucial factor in dividend 
policy of firms. A firm that has a high financial leverage tends to have a high dividend payout 





2.5 The Dividend Irrelevance Theory   
The theory of the irrelevance of dividends was promulgated by Miller and Modigliani         
(1961) in which they asserted that a firm does not let its dividend policy affect its 
investment decisions, and if taxes and transaction costs are ignored, a firm‟s dividend 
policy should have no impact on the value of its shares. This implies that the dividend a 
bank pays does not affect the value of its shares or the returns to investors because the 
higher the dividend paid, the less the investor receives in capital appreciation no matter 
how the corporation‟s business decisions turn out. 
Share valuation according to Miller and Modigliani is a function of the level of corporate 
earnings which reflects a company‟s investment policy rather than a proportion of a 
company‟s earnings paid out as dividends. The firm‟s choice of dividend policy given its 
investment therefore is a choice of financing strategy. The basis of this proposition is 
based on the assumption of a perfect capital market and no tax world; perfect only on the 
assumption of a rational individual. 
The importance of this argument is that investors will always prefer more wealth to less 
and are indifferent as to whether a given increment to their wealth takes the form of cash 
payment or an increase in the market value of their holdings. Perfect certainty implies 
complete assurance on the part of every investor as to the future investment programme 
and the future profits of the business. They propose that in a perfect capital market, no 
buyer or seller of securities is large enough for their transaction to have an appreciable 
impact on the ruling price.  
However, there have been other scholars whose opinion and findings are in sharp contrast 
with the irrelevance dividend theory.  Gordon (1959) and Lintner (1964) have argued that 
investors are very keen and happy with today‟s dividend as against a future gain that may 
not be certain. The contention is that dividend policy is positively relevant to the valuation 
of firms and shareholders will prefer a high dividend today to a highly uncertain capital 
gain from a questionable future investment. This is often referred to as the „Bird in Hand‟ 
theory, since the gains from dividends are certain more than capital gains. If dividend is 
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preferred to capital gains then the dividend policy has an intrinsic role to play in the 
valuation of a bank.  
The behavioural life cycle propagated by Shefrin and Stateman (1984) which is based on 
self control argues that investors would want to restrict themselves from consuming too 
much in the present in order to enjoy future income. Investors do not want to dip their 
hands into their capital and therefore allow themselves to consume current income such as 
dividends. Investors therefore prefer to consume from dividends rather than capital gains 
as such the issue of dividend is of relevance to investors. 
Another dimension of the dividend puzzle is the proposition that dividend payout reduces 
the market value of a company particularly whenever dividends are taxed more heavily 
than capital gains. According to Brealey (1997), the fact that investors pay taxes at 
different rates on their income relative to capital gains provide an incentive to hold 
portfolios with different exposures to dividend yield even though this results in a less well-
diversified portfolio. Various studies have however refuted this argument that heavy 
taxation on dividend is a strong incentive for individuals to prefer capital gains over 
dividend distribution. 
There is also the clientele effect of dividend policy. This effect makes management 
reluctant to alter established payout ratios because of fear that such changes might incur 
unwanted transaction costs to current shareholders. Shareholders are indifferent to whether 
they receive dividends or capital gains (Watson and Head, 2004). Some types of 
shareholders require dividends as a source of regular income and others solely prefer 
capital gains or dividends due to the difference in tax treatment. Shareholders may prefer 
firms to supply them with a pattern of dividend that fits their consumption pattern thereby 
relieving them from the problem of having to change their cash flow especially where 
pensioners are involved. 
Thus, investors would prefer to consider in isolation their investments and invest in a way 
that gives the highest opportunity to meet their particular goal with the lowest risk of 
failure as defined by the investor. A significant change in a company‟s dividend policy 




2.6 Corporate Governance, Agency Theory and Dividend Policy Decision 
The main idea behind the agency theory approach is that dividend payment reduces the 
amount of cash held in the firm and consequently lowers the cost to investors. Miller and 
Modigliani (1958) think of firms as collections of investment projects and the cash flows 
these projects create, and hence naturally interpret securities such as debt and equity as 
claims to these cash flows.  Shleifer and Vishny (1997) found that the ownership structure, 
along with a country‟s legal protection, is one of the most important determinants of 
corporate governance.  
In both the contractual framework of Jensen and Meckling (1976) and the residual control 
rights framework of Grossman, Hart, and Moore (1986), the rights of investors are 
protected and sometimes even specified by the legal system. In different jurisdictions, 
rules protecting investors come from different sources such as company and security. 
Other laws include bankruptcy and takeovers, competition, and also from stock exchange 
regulations and accounting standards. It is argued by most writers that payment of 
dividend is highly correlated with the type of governance structure. 
In a study carried out by La Porta et al (2000), they argue that dividend policies vary across 
legal regimes in ways consistent with a particular version of the agency theory of dividends. 
Specifically, firms in common law countries where investor protection is typically better, 
have higher dividend payouts than firms in civil law countries. Moreover, in common but not 
civil law countries, high growth firms have lower dividend payouts than low growth firms. 
Shareholder protection gives an investor the right to vote against a non performing 
management in terms of mismanagement of the assets of the business.   For example contract 
law deals with privately negotiated arrangements, whereas company, bankruptcy, and 
securities laws specifically describe some of the rights of corporate insiders and outsiders. 
These laws and the quality of their enforcement by the regulators and courts are essential 
elements of corporate governance and finance.    
Jensen and Meckling (1976) define an agency relationship as a contract under which one or 
more persons (the principal(s)) engage another person (the agent) to perform some service on 
their behalf which involves delegating some decision making authority to the agent.  Agency 
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costs arise with the separation of ownership and control of the firm because managers and 
shareholders have different objectives. Agency cost is thus the sum of the monitoring of 
expenditures by the owners, the bonding expenditures by the managers and a residual loss. 
This residual loss results from the divergence between the agent decisions and those intended 
by the principal that persists after the monitoring.  
According to Jensen (1986), the conflicts of interest between shareholders and managers 
about payout policies are especially severe when the firm generates substantial free cash 
flow. The free cash flow is the cash flow in excess of that required to fund all projects that 
have positive net present values when discounted at the relevant cost of capital. Therefore 
with dividends, managers have fewer resources under control and the fact that capital markets 
punish dividend cuts with large stock price reductions is consistent with the agency costs of 
free cash flow. 
Different shareholders have varying characteristics to influence the policies of the firm 
especially if they have a role in management to limit the availability of funds to invest in 
unprofitable projects. The investment policy of the firm based on this premises is therefore no 
longer independent of its dividend policy. Conflicts of interest between corporate insiders, 
such as managers and controlling shareholders on one hand, and outside investors such as 
minority shareholders on the other hand, are central to the analysis of the modern corporation 
(Cornett et al., 2008). Insiders can divert corporate assets to themselves through outright theft 
dilution of outside investors through share issues, excessive salaries, asset sales to themselves 
or other corporations they control at favourable prices, or transfer pricing with other entities 
they control. Alternatively, insiders can use corporate assets to pursue investment strategies 
that yield them personal benefits of control such as growth or diversification without 
benefiting outside investors. 
As pointed out by La Porta et al (1998), the extent of legal protection of outside investors 
differs enormously across countries. Legal protection consists in both the content of the laws 
and the quality of their enforcement. Shareholders, both insiders and outsiders through 
corporate and other laws, are able to protect their investment against expropriation by 
insiders. This right by shareholders cover a range of activities such as the right to vote on 
important corporate matters and election of directors, the right to receive the same dividend 
per share with insiders and the right to sue the company for default of contract. The idea is 
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that shareholders buy certain rights to the company once they invest although in most cases 
these rights are effective when acted upon jointly.  
In effect, common law countries appear to have the best legal protection of minority 
shareholders, whereas civil law countries, and most especially the French civil law countries, 
have the weakest protection. Evidence also suggests that good investor protection contributes 
to the efficiency of resource allocation and to economic growth. Developing countries can as 
such use shareholder protection as a means of attracting investors since an inflow of 
investment opportunities lead to increased growth and high per capita income.  
Dividend policy has been applied in an attempt to reduce agency cost.   Rozeff (1982) found 
that higher dividend payouts are constituted when a low proportion of the firm‟s equity is 
held by insiders and non growth firms are found to pay greater dividend than firms in their 
growth stage (Gaver & Gaver, 1993). The main idea behind the agency theory approach is 
that dividend payments reduce the amount of cash held in the firm and consequently lowers 
the cost to investors. By paying dividends, the insiders (management) are thus no longer in 
position to use the corporate earnings to benefit themselves as such earnings are inversely 
returned to the investors. 
 The theory of free cash flow seeks to expose the likely conflict of interest between the 
shareholders and management. This is an integral aspect of the agency theory. Some frugal 
managers who have the best interest of the shareholders are ordinarily expected to invest only 
in profitable projects. Frankfurter & Wood (2002) alleged that the separation of the business 
owners from the management of the firm offers the mangers the choice of making wrong 
investments and possibly wasting funds. 
The theory of free cash flow is predicated on the inefficient use of funds available to 
managers after investing in projects with high positive net present values (NPV). The 
assumption is that the funds remaining after the execution of profitable projects could cause 
conflict of interest between the managers and shareholders. The free cash flow hypothesis is 
predicated on the forgone findings that such funds are usually used to appease the 
management interest rather than shareholders.  
Another dimension of dividends is that it can be used as an upshot of legal protection of the 
shareholders. La Porta et al. (2000) stated in their work that dividends serve as a substitute 
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for legal protection of shareholders in countries where shareholder protection is weak. Since 
firms will have to come to capital markets to raise funds to finance their projects, they have to 
create a reputation for good treatment of shareholders. Where there exist significant problems 
between corporate insiders and outsiders, dividends can play a useful role since dividends are 
better than retained earnings and the latter might never mature as dividends in the future.  
This reputation is necessary in countries where shareholder protection is weak unlike in 
countries with strong forms of protection.  
Minority shareholders with the right to vote for directors under an effective system might use 
their legal powers to force companies to pour-out cash, thus preventing insiders from using 
too high a fraction of company‟s earnings to benefit themselves. Good investor protection 
makes it possible for shareholders to vote for directors who offer better dividend policies by 
selling shares to potential hostile raiders who then gain control over non dividend paying 
companies. Insiders also get attracted to dividends since good investor protection make it 
risky and costly to divert company assets  
This assumption is however a contestable fact in countries with good shareholders protection 
and where there are both good investment prospects and growth. If there are banks but with a 
poor investment opportunities and growth, shareholders who feel unprotected will accept low 
dividend payouts and high reinvestment rates from the banks with better investment 
opportunities because they know that banks will have the potential of paying a higher 
dividend. The shareholders of the companies with poor investment and growth will not feel 
happy and protected under similar circumstances. Thus, with good investment and growth 
potential, shareholders will feel protected to accept low dividend payout. This concurs with 
La Porta et al‟s (2000) outcome agency model of dividends, which argues in favour of the 
„bird in the bush‟ and not necessarily the „bird in hand‟ theory of dividends.    
Other studies have attempted to examine the doctrine that dividends serve as a mechanism 
for reducing agency costs and thus offer a rationale for the distribution of cash resources to 
shareholders. Companies that are attempting to maximize shareholder wealth often seek to 
reduce the agency problem by incurring additional costs, which helps to align the 
managers to act in the interest of the outsider shareholders. Moh‟d, Perry & Rimbey 
(1995) propose that the dividend mechanism provides an incentive for managers to reduce 
the costs associated with the principal and agent relationship. Thus, distributing resources 
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in the form of cash dividends pushes managers to explore outsourcing in the capital 
market, causing them to reduce agency costs as they subject themselves to the scrutiny of 
the capital market.  
Under this scenario, the optimum level of dividend payout is that which minimizes the 
agency cost structure relative to the cost of raising the required capital. If the firm is forced 
to raise external capital to replace the funds used in the payment of dividend, then 
managers must reduce agency costs and reveal some new information as a prerequisite for 
securing such loans. This argument which was initially proposed by Rozeff (1982), was 
tested by Moh‟d et al (1995) by employing a cross sectional model of dividends which 
regressed dividend payout against proxies for the agency cost and the transaction cost 
trade off. Their result supports the position that an optimum dividend payout ratio can 
exist even without any consideration for tax implications. 
In a similar vein, Easterbrook (1984) argues that outside shareholders are active in seeking 
to draw capital from the company to ensure that managers are subjected to examination by 
the capital market as a way of measuring up with the requirement of loans. The payment 
of dividend is thus considered to be a measure of causing the firm to undergo a cross 
examination by the capital market or third party audit in order to secure such needed 
capital. The implication of such is that the managers are forced into revealing relevant 
information and reduce agency costs in order to secure such loans. Thus, shareholders are 
happy to bear the cost implications of such new funding to realize the greater benefits 
associated with agency cost and information asymmetries. 
 
2.7   Taxation and Dividend Policy Theories  
The relationship between taxes and dividend policy has attracted much academic interest. 
Financial theorists such as Brennan (1970), Masulis & Trueman (1988) have stipulated that 
taxes affect organizational corporate dividend policy. Under this scenario, changes in 
corporate dividend payout would be expected whenever the government changes its income 
tax policy (Wu, 1996). However, this does not always apply especially in the banking 
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business. Linter (1956) had asserted that the major determinants of dividend policy are the 
anticipated level of future earnings and the pattern of past dividend. 
This discrepancy may have underpinned Modigliani & Miller‟s (1961) theory, which 
provided a platform for the debate and research on dividend policy. The banking sector is of 
interest in this research because of the structure of its dividend policy as will be revealed in 
the study.  
Dividends are usually paid to owners or shareholders of business at specific periods. This is 
apparently based on the declared earning of the company and the recommendations made by 
its directors. Thus, if there are no profits made, dividends are not declared. But when profits 
are made, the company is obligated to pay corporate tax including other statutory taxes to the 
government. This is an essential corporate responsibility particularly with profit making 
companies. The taxes no doubt reduce the profits available at the disposal of the 
organizations, either to be retained or distributed as a dividend to shareholders of the 
company. 
For decades, several postulations and assumptions have been made regarding whether such 
taxes paid by organizations actually affect their pattern of dividend policy. Dividend policy is 
the trade-off between retaining earnings and paying out cash or issuing new shares to 
shareholders. Some firms may have low dividend payout because management is optimistic 
about the firm‟s future and therefore wishes to retain their earnings for further expansion. It is 
hard to deny that taxes are important to investors. Although, dividend affects the shareholders 
tax liability, it does not in general alter the taxes that must be paid regardless of whether the 
company distributes or retains its profit (Brealey, Myers & Marcus, 1999, and Nnadi & 
Akpomi, 2008).  
The tax adjusted model
2
 groups investors into tax dividend clienteles. It purports that 
investors are happy with shares that offer higher returns but will accept lower value for shares 
due to the tax liability of the dividend. However, because investors have different tax 
liabilities, their choice of investment based on company‟s dividend policy will be at variance 
with each other. This agrees with the propositions of Modigliani (1982) and Masulis and 
Trueman (1988) models of grouping investors into tax clienteles. It is believed that dividend 
                                                          
2
 The dividend policy hypotheses, including the tax adjusted model are fully discussed in the next chapter. 
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payment decreases or increases in opposite direction with tax liability (Frankfurter & Wood, 
1997). 
The strategy of tax sheltering of income especially by high tax investors was instrumental to 
the Miller & Scholes (1978) and Miller (1986) attempt to inject rationality into the tax-
adjusted model. An investor can choose to either buy or decline to buy shares with high 
dividend as a technique of avoiding the apparent tax liability on such shares.  Investors could 
turn to tax free shares to counter balance it with the tax incidental on dividend paying shares.  
However, DeAngelo & Masulis (1980) disagree on the effective effect of the tax sheltering 
strategy but rather advanced personal tax shelters to minimize or totally avoid tax. The study 
reaffirms Bradley, Capozza and Seguin (1998) hypothesis on dividend policy and cash flow 
uncertainty. They assert that when a shareholder is confronted with a greater tax rate on 
dividend rather than capital gain, then the coefficient associated with dividends will be 
significantly affected. 
However, the finding of Black and Scholes (1974) which sets out to examine the impact of 
profit on the dividend policy of companies fell short of any concrete findings as no 
correlation was established in the two variables. This contrasted with a later finding of 
Ramaswamy (1979) in which a significant relationship was established. But Miller and 
Scholes (1982) attributed any significant relationship between profit and dividend to dividend 
information effect‟ rather than the effect exerted by tax (Watson and Head, 2004). . 
The after tax income model of investors also classifies investors into two clienteles. This is 
based on their preference for dividend or capital gains. Farrar & Selwyn (1967) argue that 
share repurchase rather than dividend should be implored in distributing the company‟s 
profits to shareholders. This model was further investigated by Brennan (1970) into an 
equilibrium framework. But as stated by Frankfurter & Wood (1997), equilibrium with 
dividend paying firms is not consistent with a zero required return per unit of dividend yield. 
Financial theorists such as Wu (1996) opined that evasion of taxes by companies is a key 
factor in the determination of the extent to which its dividend policy is affected by tax. Miller 
& Scholes (1982) however admit that taxes weigh tremendous influence on corporate 
dividend structure. In turn, they contend the effects of dividend policy on company‟s share 
price. What implications taxes have on dividend policy is a matter of intense debate. The 
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dividend irrelevant theory of Modigliani & Miller (1961), which assumes a perfect market, is 
still very much held in contention but its principles underlines most dividend policies. 
Three contemporary schools of thought have emerged with theories all attempting to explain 
the dividend structure and the impact of taxation. The tax preference theorists agree that an 
increase in dividend payout reduces value. They reason that since dividends are taxed as 
ordinary income and capital gains, investors will prefer capital gains to dividends. These 
groups strongly assert that whenever dividends are taxed more heavily than capital gains, the 
firms would pay the lowest cash dividend they can get away with. The available cash would 
be retained and reinvested or used to repurchase the shares. 
The dividend irrelevance theory assumes the absence of brokerages or taxes. This may be 
seen as presumptuous and unrealistic in practice, as taxes are inevitable in the business world. 
The seemingly popular theory led by Modigliani & Miller (M&M) claims that dividend 
policy makes no difference in a world without taxes, transaction costs, or other market 
imperfection. They further postulated that companies can raise shares whenever they need 
capital to finance the business. 
Several studies aimed at correlating tax and dividends have been conducted with inconclusive 
results. Miller and Modigliani‟s (M&M) theory assumes that taxes do not affect dividend 
policy of the firm in a perfect market. Thus, investors‟ decisions are independent of dividend 
considerations. However, when the tax on dividend is higher than that of the capital gain of 
the investor, the issue of dividend policy of the firm becomes a concern to the investors. Chu 
(1996)  studied the effect of tax on personal income and posits that dividend tends to expose 
investors to more tax liability than capital gains. Therefore, they will opt for lower dividend 
to minimize the tax liability on investment. The findings also shows that the after tax income 
of shareholders is greater when the firm pays no dividends, where the capital gains is lower 
than the tax consequential on the dividend.  
In the US, several studies have been undertaken to examine the effect of the various tax 
reforms on corporate dividend policy. Bolster & Janjigian (1991) researched on the 1986 tax 
laws in US but found no concrete evidence of any correlation of any increase in dividend 
following the reform. However, Papaioannou and Savarese (1994) found an increase in the 
dividend payout for the average firms after such reforms. This is attributed to the reduction in 
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income tax injected in the tax system and thus aligns with the preposition that tax has a 
tremendous effect on the dividend policy of firms. 
One identifiable problem of inferring the tax effect on dividend is the variation in tax rates 
faced by different investors. For investors whose personal tax liabilities are less than their 
capital gain tax liability (which underscores their interest in dividend rather than capital 
gains), the tax effect does not apply (Hutchinson, 1995). Different tax situations would ignite 
diverse effects on the share price of the firm. The rise in dividend can inversely be attributed 
to the tax provisions on such dividends.  
   
2.8 The dividend Signalling hypothesis 
A major factor in the dividend payout strategy is the belief that the payout has a potential 
effect of passing information to the public.  Presumably, managers possess vital information 
about the organisation that may not be in the domain of the public. Such information gap 
between the insiders and outsiders could cause an inaccurate valuation of the firm and thus 
renders the share price as an inappropriate measure of the firm‟s value.  
In order to close this information gap, managers might opt to disclose the information to the 
public to paint a measurable value of their organizations. Baskin and Miranti (1997) assert 
that dividend can play the role of providing a veritable tool in conveying the private 
information they hold on the organization to the market. Since investors use cash flows to 
equity as measure of valuing a firm, dividend might give implicit information about the 
banks‟ prospect. 
The argument surrounding the dividend hypothesis was postulated by M&M (1961) in which 
they argue that when markets are imperfect, the share prices may respond to changes in 
dividends. This implies that dividend announcements may be an indication of the banks‟ 
future earnings. Investors can draw inferences from the information conveyed by the 
dividend announcements. This signal can be detected by the sustainability or the changes in 




For the signalling hypothesis or information content of dividends to be realistic, two 
conditions are very vital. First, the bank managers must possess private information about the 
future potentials of the organization which they are happy to convey to the market. Second, 
the signal conveyed must be correct. False or wrong information about poor prospect of the 
banks must not be falsified to deceive the public by increasing dividends. Koch and Shenoy 
(1999) emphasized the importance of the public trust and the reliance on insider information 
in making decision about their investments.  
Thus an increase in dividend may be seen as signal of profitability by investors and could 
increase the share price of the firm. A cut in dividend would be perceived as a bad signal of 
the firm which can adversely affect the share price. This perception concurs with Lintner 
(1956) model which suggests that firms increase dividend when there is a steady increase in 
earnings. Thus dividend increase signals a long term profitability of the firm. This 
assumption is consistent with the dividend smoothing theory which asserts that firms will 
smooth dividends over time and not make substantial increase in dividend payout except 
where such increase is sustainable in the future ( Lipson et al, 1994). 
 
2.9 Summary of Literature 
 
The chapter has examined some debates in the finance literature supporting various concepts 
of dividend policy and their implications. The dividend irrelevance argument led by 
Modigliani & Miller (1961) has also been discussed; though this will be further debates on 
the theory will be reviewed in the next chapter. 
Corporate governance, agency theory and its impact on the dividend decisions have also been 
examined. Various studies and the theories underpinning their consideration by firms in their 
dividend policy are considered important variables, for instance, Rozeff (1980), La Porta et 
(2000). The implications of taxation in dividend as well as the signalling effect of dividend 








Theoretical Debates and Dividend Policy Hypotheses 
  
 3.0 Introduction 
Organisations are generally faced with two critical operational decisions: investment and 
financing decisions. The investment or capital budgeting decision is concerned with what 
assets the firm should acquire while the financing decision is concerned with how these assets 
should be financed. However, when the firm begins to generate profits, there may a be need 
to consider whether the firm should distribute all or a proportion of earned profits in the form 
of dividends to the shareholders, or whether it should be ploughed back into the business. 
Presumably, in taking any course of action, managers should concentrate on how to maximise 
the wealth of shareholders for whom the firm is being managed. Managers must not only 
consider the question of how much of the company‟s earnings are needed for investment, but 
also take into consideration the possible effect of their decisions on share prices (Bishop et 
al., 2000). 
 
The term „dividend policy‟ refers to “the practice that management follows in making 
dividend payout decisions or, in other words, the size and pattern of cash distributions over 
time to shareholders” (Lease et al., 2000, p.29). The concept of dividend policy has engaged 
managers since the birth of the modern commercial corporation and has yet remained among 
the most contested issues in finance. The study of dividend policy has captured the attention 
of finance scholars since the middle of the last century. They have attempted to solve several 
issues pertaining to dividends and formulate theories and models to explain corporate 
dividend behaviour. 
 
The dividend enigma has not only been an enduring issue in finance, it also remains 
unresolved. Over thirty years since Black (1976) described it as a “puzzle”, an enormous 
amount of research has been undertaken in an attempt to unravel the puzzle. Allen, Bernardo 
and Welch (2000) summarised the prevailing consensus view when they concluded that 
despite the number of theories that have been put forward in the literature to explain their 
pervasive presence, the issue of dividends remains one of the thorniest puzzles in corporate 
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finance. This chapter can only give a broad overview of the main issues, debates and 
hypothesis relating to dividend policy.   
 
3.1 Brief History of Corporate Dividend Policy 
 
The issue of corporate dividends has a long history and, as Frankfurter and Wood (1997) 
observed, is bound up with the development of the corporate status. Corporate dividends date 
back at least to the early 16th century in Holland and Great Britain when the captains of 
sixteenth century sailing ships started selling financial claims to investors, which entitled 
them to share in the proceeds of the voyages
3
. At the end of each voyage, the profits and the 
capital were distributed to investors, liquidating and ending the venture‟s life. By the end of 
the 16th century, these financial claims began to be traded on open markets in Amsterdam 
and were gradually replaced by shares of ownership. It is worth mentioning that even then 
many investors would buy shares from more than one captain to diversify the risk associated 
with this type of business. 
 
At the end of each voyage, the enterprise liquidation of the venture ensured a distribution of 
the profits to owners and helped to reduce the possibilities of fraudulent practice by captains 
(Baskin, 1988). However, as the profitability of these ventures was established and became 
more regular, the process of liquidation of the assets at the conclusion of each voyage became 
increasingly inconvenient and costly. The successes of the ventures increased their credibility 
and shareholders became more confident in their management (captains), this was 
accomplished by, among other things, the payment of “generous dividends” (Baskin, 1988). 
As a result, these companies began trading as going concern entities, and distributing only the 
profits rather than the entire invested capital. The emergence of firms as a “going concern” 
initiated the fundamental practice of firms to decide what proportion of the firms‟ income 
(rather than assets) to return to investors and produced the first dividend payment regulations 
(Frankfurter and Wood, 1997). Gradually, corporate charters began to restrict the payments 
of dividends to the profits only. 
 
                                                          
3 This type of business was called Commenda. Under the commenda, the commendator provided the 




The ownership structure of shipping firms gradually evolved into joint stock companies. But 
it was chartered trading firms that adopted the joint stock status. By 1613, the British East 
India Company issued its first joint stock shares with a nominal value without any distinction 
made, between capital and profit of the firm (Walker, 1931). In the 17th century, the success 
of this type of trading company attracted others and thus spread to include other activities 
such as mining, banking, clothing, and utilities. Indeed, in the early 1700‟s, excitement about 
the possibilities of expanded trade and the corporate form saw a speculative bubble form, 
which collapsed spectacularly when the South Sea Company went into bankruptcy. The 
Bubble Act of 1720 effectively slowed, but did not stop, the development of the corporate 
form in Britain for almost a century (Walker, 1931). 
 
In the early stages of corporate history, managers realized the importance of high and stable 
dividend payments. In some ways, this was due to the analogy investors made with the other 
form of financial security then traded, namely government bonds. Bonds paid a regular and 
stable interest payment, and corporate managers found that investors preferred shares that pay 
regular dividends. For example, Bank of North America in 1781 paid dividends after only six 
months of operation, and the bank charter entitled the board of directors to distribute 
dividends regularly out of profits. Paying consistent dividends remained one of paramount 
importance to managers during the first half of the 19th century (Frankfurter & Wood, 1997). 
 
In addition to the importance placed by investors on dividend stability, another issue of 
modern corporate dividend policy to emerge early in the 19th century was that dividends 
came to be seen as an important form of information. The scarcity and unreliability of 
financial data often resulted in investors making their assessments of corporations through 
their dividend payments rather than reported earnings. In short, investors were often faced 
with inaccurate information about the performance of a firm, and used dividend policy as a 
way of gauging what management‟s views about future performance might be. Consequently, 
an increase in divided payments tended to be reflected in rising stock prices. 
 
 As corporations became aware of this phenomenon, it raised the possibility that managers of 
companies could use dividends to signal strong earnings prospects and to support a 
company‟s share price because investors may read dividend announcements as an indication 
of growth in the firm‟s earnings. Frankfurter and Wood (1997) describe how in the 1920‟s 
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and 1930‟s corporate managers increasingly responded to the recognition that investor 
behaviour is affected by dividend policy. Managers thus used dividend policy to affect share 
prices through investor reactions to payout ratios and to signal expected future earnings. 
 
Thus in summary, the development of dividend payments to shareholders has been tied up 
with the development of the corporate entity. Corporate managers realized early the 
importance of dividend payments in satisfying shareholders expectations. They often 
smoothed dividends over time believing that dividend reductions might have unfavourable 
effects on share price and therefore, used dividends as a device to signal information to the 
market. Moreover, dividend policy is believed to have an impact on share price. Since the 
1950‟s, the effect of dividend policy on firm value and other issues of corporate dividend 
policy have been subjected to a great debate among finance scholars. The following section 
discusses the various theoretical and an empirical arguments of dividend hypotheses. 
 
3.2 Dividend Policy Theories 
 
The previous section has established that dividend policy was bound up with the development 
of the corporate entity. It was seen that the emergence of dividend policy as important to 
investors was, to some extent, driven by the evolving state of financial markets. Investing in 
shares was initially seen as analogous to bonds, so regularity of payments was important. It 
was also seen that in the absence of regular and accurate corporate reporting, dividends were 
often preferred to reinvested earnings, and often even regarded as a better indication of 
corporate performance than published earnings accounts. However, as financial markets 
developed and became more efficient, it was thought by some that dividend policy would 
become increasingly irrelevant to investors. Why dividend policy should remain so evidently 
important has been theoretically controversial. 
 
Three main contradictory theories of dividends can be identified. Some argue that increasing 
dividend payments increases a firm‟s value. Another view claims that high dividend payouts 
have the opposite effect on a firm‟s value; that is, it reduces firm value. The third theoretical 
approach asserts that dividends should be irrelevant and all effort spent on the dividend 
decision is wasted. These views are embodied in three inter-related theories of dividend 
policy: high dividends increase share value theory (or the so-called „bird-in-the- hand‟ 
36 
 
argument), low dividends increase share value theory (the tax-preference argument), and the 
dividend irrelevance hypothesis. Dividend debate is not limited to these three approaches, 
however, several other theories of dividend policy have been presented, which only serve to 
increase the complexity of the dividend puzzle. Some of the more popular of these arguments 
include the information content of dividends (signalling), the clientele effects, and the agency 
cost. These issues are discussed later in this chapter following the three main theories. 
 
  3.3 Dividend Irrelevance Hypothesis (DIH) 
3.3.1 Background & Implications 
 
Before the emergency of the Miller and Modigliani (1961) theory (M&M, hereafter) on 
dividend policy, a common belief was that higher dividends increase a firm‟s value. This 
belief was mainly based on the so-called “bird-in-the-hand” argument, discussed in more 
detail in the next section. Graham and Dodd (1934), for instance, argued that “the sole 
purpose for the existence of the corporation is to pay dividends”, and firms that pay higher 
dividends must sell their shares at higher prices (cited in Frankfurter et al., 2002 p201). 
However, as part of a new wave of finance in the 1960‟s, M&M demonstrated that under 
certain assumptions about perfect capital markets, dividend policy would be irrelevant. 
 
Given that in a perfect market, dividend policy has no effect on either the price of a firm‟s 
stock or its cost of capital, shareholders wealth is not affected by the dividend decision and 
therefore shareholders would be indifferent between the choice of dividends and capital 
gains. The reason for this indifference is that shareholder wealth is affected by the income 
generated by the investment decisions a firm makes, not by how it distributes that income. 
Therefore, in M&M‟s world, dividends are irrelevant. M&M argued that regardless of how 
the firm distributes its income, its value is determined by its basic earning power and its 
investment decisions. They opined that given a firm‟s investment policy, the dividend payout 
policy it chooses to follow will affect neither the current price of its shares nor the total 
returns to shareholders.  
 
This implies that investors calculate the value of companies based on the capitalised value of 
their future earnings which is not affected by whether firms pay dividends or not and how the 
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firms set their dividend policies. M&M go further and suggests that, to an investor, all 
dividend policies are effectively the same since investors can create “homemade” dividends 
by adjusting their portfolios in a way that matches their preferences. 
 
M&M based their argument upon idealistic assumptions of a perfect capital market and 
rational investors. The underlying assumptions of a perfect capital market for the dividend 
irrelevancy hypothesis to hold can be summarized as follows: (1) no differences between 
taxes on dividends and capital gains; (2) no transaction and flotation costs incurred when 
securities are traded; (3) all market participants have free and equal access to the same 
information (symmetrical and costless information); (4) no conflicts of interests between 
managers and security holders (i.e. no agency problem); and (5) all participants in the market 
are price takers.   
Miller and Modigliani (1961) point out that if the firm does not let its dividend policy 
affect its investment decisions, and in absence of taxes and transaction cost, a firm‟s 
dividend policy should have no impact on the value of its shares. The dividend a company 
pays do not affect the value of its shares or the returns to investors because the higher the 
dividend paid, the less the investor receives in capital appreciation no matter how the 
corporation‟s business decision turn out (Black 1976 ). The firm‟s valuation follows the 
principle that the price of each share must be such that the rate of return (dividends plus 
capital gains per dollar invested) on every share will be the same throughout the market 
over any given interval of time otherwise arbitrage will set in (Miller and Modigliani 
1961).  
Share valuation according to Miller and Modigliani is a function of the level of corporate 
earnings which reflects a company‟s investment policy rather than a proportion of a 
company‟s earnings paid out as dividends. The firm‟s choice of dividend policy given its 
investment therefore is a choice of financing strategy. The basis for this proposition is 
based on the assumption of a perfect capital market, no tax world, and perfect certainty 
and on the assumption of a rational individual.  
Investors always prefer more wealth to less and are indifferent as to whether a given 
increment to their wealth takes the form of cash payment or an increase in the market 
value of their holdings. Perfect certainty implies complete assurance on the part of every 
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investor as to the future investment programme and the future profits of every corporation. 
In a perfect capital market, no buyer or seller of securities is large enough for his 
transaction to have an appreciable impact on the then ruling price.  
However, some studies have found that dividends are not irrelevant in the way Miller and 
Modigliani proposed. Prior to M&M, Gordon (1959) suggested that dividend policy is 
positively relevant to the valuation of firms and argues that shareholders prefer a high 
dividend today to a highly uncertain capital gain from a questionable future investment. 
This is known as the “Bird in Hand” fallacy, since the gains from dividends are certain BY 
more than capital gains. If dividend is preferred to capital gains then the dividend policy 
has an intrinsic role to play in the valuation of a company. 
Another proposition on the issue of dividend policy points out that, an increase in the 
dividend payout reduces the market value of a company whenever dividends are taxed 
more heavily than capital gains. According to Brealey (1997), the fact that investors pay 
taxes at different rates on their income relative to capital gains provide an incentive to hold 
portfolios with different exposures to dividend yield even though this results in a less well-
diversified portfolio. Various studies have, however, refuted this argument that heavy 
taxation on dividend is a strong incentive for individuals to prefer capital gains rather than 
dividend income (Nnadi & Akpomi, 2008, Poterba, 2004, Poterba & Summers, 1984). 
 
 3.3.2 Proof of Irrelevancy
 
 and Empirical Evidence 
 
 The basic valuation model of common stock, that is, the dividend discount model (DDM) 
would be a necessary step towards understanding the M&M proposition of dividend 
irrelevancy. Generally, the DDM states that the value of a stock is a function of future 
dividends (as a proxy for earnings) and the required rate of return on the stock. For example, 
the value of a share at time zero (today) is simply the present value of all future dividends 
discounted at an appropriate discount rate. This can be expressed as follows: 
39 
 
                                        
…………………………………………………………………………………………………….1 
        
 
Where, P0 is the current share price; t is the time of the dividend; Dt is the dividends paid at 
period t; and rt is the required rate of return for period t. The DDM suggests that future 
discounted dividends (Dt) are the underlying determinant of the value of the current share 
price (P0), and not any future share price. The share price is the critical determinant of the 
firm value (V0). Accordingly, more dividends increase the value of the firm, other things 
being equal. This intuition was generally accepted by most of the economists until M&M 
published their paper, initiating a new direction of research in the dividend policy literature. 
 
In a perfect capital market the required rate of return for an investor on equity shares (r) is 
equal to dividends plus capital gains. This assumes one period world. For simplicity of the 
exposition,  
 
     r = D1 + (P1 +P0)      …………………………………………………2 
                      P0 
  
where, P0 is the current market price of shares; P1 is the expected market price at the end of 
period one (the ex-dividend price of the share); D1  is the dividend at the end of the period. 
The above equation can be re-arranged to give the current market price of shares as:  
 
 P0 =    DI + P1 …………………………………………………………..3 
          (1+r) 
 
Note that the above equation can be derived also from the basic valuation model (eq.1 
above). Now, if we let n be the number of shares outstanding at time zero, then the current 




 nP0 = V0 = nD1 + nP1 ……………………………………………………………………….4 
                        (1+r) 
  
Recall that M&M stated that in a perfect capital market, firm value is independent of 
dividend policy. To illustrate, we can employ the sources and uses of funds equation. Given 
the assumption that the market value of the firm is independent of capital structure 
(Modigliani and Miller, 1958), debt financing is excluded from the analysis. On one hand, the 
firm‟s sources of funds are cash flow from operations (CF1) and any new equity financing 
(mP1), where m is number of shares issued at time one. On the other hand the uses of funds 
are dividends payments (nD1) and investment made during the period (I1). Since sources must 
equal the uses of funds, thus: 
 
   CF1 + mP1 = nD1 +I1 …………………………………………………………………5 
 
Rearranging the above equation, we obtain 
 
nD1 = CF1 + mP1 –I1 ……………………………………………………………………6 
 
Substituting equation (6) into equation (4), for D1 gives: 
   VO = CF1 +nP1 –I1 +nP1  ………………………………………………….7 
                        (1 +r) 
 
 
VO = CF1 – I1 + (n +m) P1 ………………………………….8 
                 (1 + r) 
 
Since,   (n+m) P1 = V1  hence; 
 
 V0 = CF1 –I1 + V1 .........................................................................................9 
                 (1+r) 
 
As dividends do not appear in the equation (9), and since operating cash flows (CF1), 
investments (I1) and required rate of return (r) are not functions of dividend policy (either by 
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their nature or by assumption), the value of the firm is thus independent of its current 
dividend policy (M&M, 1961). This analysis can be repeated for more periods and the results 
will remain the same; i.e., the value of the firm is unaffected by dividend policy.  The notion 
that in perfect capital markets dividend policy should be irrelevant is a logical extension of 
the neoclassical proposition of perfect competition into financial economics. Its elegance and 
simplicity were recognised by M&M.  
 
The above discussion suggests that the firm‟s investment policy is the key determinant of its 
value and dividend policy is the residual. Operating cash flows depend on investments. In 
other words, the firm‟s investments in positive net present value (NPV) projects will increase 
the cash flows from operation, which is the only way to increase the value of the firm. In 
summary, given the assumptions of perfect capital markets, the firm‟s future cash flow from 
investment activities is the sole determinant of the value of the firm. The firm‟s payout policy 
must therefore be independent of its value (Bishop et al., 2000). 
 
The M&M dividend irrelevance proposition has provided the foundation for much 
subsequent research on dividend policy. However, as argued by Ball et al. (1979), the 
empirical tests of M&M‟s dividend irrelevance theorem have proven difficult to design and 
to conduct. Recall that M&M built their conclusions on a certain set of assumptions of perfect 
capital markets. Relaxing one or more of these assumptions has formed the basis for most of 
theoretical and empirical studies. 
 
In line with the dividend irrelevance hypothesis, Black and Scholes (1974) examined the 
relationship between dividend yield and stock returns in order to identify the effect of 
dividend policy on stock prices
4
. They constructed 25 portfolios of common stocks listed on 
the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), extending the capital asset pricing model (CAPM)
5
  
to test the long run estimate of dividend yield effects. The study employed the following 
regression model: 
                                                          
4 It is worth pointing out that Black and Scholes‟ study tested the tax-effect hypothesis, but it is presented here 
because its conclusion strongly supports the M&M‟s irrelevance proposition. 
5
 The CAPM was developed alongside M&M‟s work on efficient markets and forms an integral part of the 
framework of modern finance theory. The CAPM is expressed as E(Ŕi) =Rf + { E(Ŕm) - Rf} βi;  where E(Ŕi) is 
the expected  return for security I, Rf  is the risk free interest rate, E(Ŕm) is the expected  return on the market 
portfolio and βi   is the beta for security i. 
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         E(Ŕi) = γ0 + {E (Ŕm) – γ0}βi + γ1 (∂I -∂m) + εi ………………………………………………………10 
                                                               ∂m 
where, E(Ŕi) is the expected return on portfolio i, E (Ŕm) is the expected return on the market 
portfolio, γ0 is an intercept to be compared with short-term risk free rate R, βi is the 
systematic risk of portfolio i,  γ1 is the impact of dividend policy, δ1 is the dividend yield on 
portfolio i, δm  is the dividend yield on the market, and εi is the error term. 
 
Black and Scholes used a long-term definition of dividend yield (previous year‟s dividends 
divided by the year-end share price). Their results showed that the dividend yield coefficient 
(γ1) is not significantly different from zero either for the entire period (1936-1966) or for any 
of shorter sub-periods. This implies that the expected returns either on high or low yield 
stocks are the same. They were therefore unable to prove that differences in yield lead to 
differences in stock prices. That means that neither high-yield nor low-yield payout policy of 
firms seemed to influence stock prices. Their conclusion lent important empirical support to 
M&M‟s dividend irrelevance argument. Other studies by leading financial economic 
researchers such as Miller and Scholes (1978, 1982), Hess (1981) Miller (1986), and 
Bernstein (1996) provided evidence in support of the dividend irrelevance hypothesis (DIH). 
 
While some empirical research supported the DIH, other are unsupportive or provided 
evidence directly challenging the irrelevance hypothesis
6
. Building on Black and Scholes‟s 
work, Ball et al. (1979) examined the effect of dividends on firm value using Australian data 
over the period 1960 to 1969. They however, failed to find conclusive evidence to support 
M&M‟s irrelevance proposition. Baker, Farrelly and Edelman (1985) surveyed the chief 
financial officers (CFOs) of 562 firms listed on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) from 
three industry groups (150 utilities, 309 manufacturing, and 103 wholesale/retail). Based on 
318 responses, they found that respondents strongly agreed that dividend policy affects 
common stock prices.  
 
                                                          
6 A representative sample of that debate would include: Lintner (1962), Gordon (1963) Walter (1963), Baumol 
(1963), Brigham and Gordon (1968), and Van Horn and McDonald (1971).  See e.g. Baker, Veit, and Powell 




In another survey study, Partington (1985) found that Australian senior managers viewed 
dividend payments as a way to satisfy shareholders and support the share price.  Baker and 
Powell (1999) surveyed 603 CFOs of US firms listed on the NYSE, and observed that 90% of 
respondents believed that dividend policy affects a firm‟s value as well as its cost of capital. 
Further studies by the same authors tend to confirm that dividend policy actually matters in 
the determination of firm value. Other studies including Siddiqi (1995) and Casey and 
Dickens (2000) have provided evidence inconsistent with dividend irrelevance hypothesis. 
 
Little evidence on the M&M dividend irrelevance hypothesis exists for emerging markets. 
Ben, Naceur and Goaied (2002) used unbalanced panel data to estimate a random effects 
Probit model to test whether the probability of creating future value of the firms relates to 
dividend policy, financial policy, and profitability. The dividend policy (measured by payout 
ratio) and financial structure (measured by debt to total assets) were found to be insignificant. 
They concluded that their evidence supported the M&M irrelevance propositions of dividend 
hypothesis. In contrast, Omet and Abu-Ruman (2003) provided evidence inconsistent with 
the DIH. Omet and Abu-Ruman surveyed the CFOs of 47 manufacturing companies and 
identify their views about dividend policy. Based on 33 responses, the researchers observed 
that most of the Chief Finance Officers ( CFOs) questioned strongly agreed that dividend 
policy affects share prices.  However, given the small sample size in both the Omet and Abu-
Ruman (2003), and the Ben, Naceur and Goaied (2002) studies, their results should be treated 
with caution. 
 
Despite all the empirical work testing the DIH, the impact of dividend policy on the value of 
a firm remains unresolved. In an earlier section, it was noted that the proposition of dividend 
irrelevancy was based on several binding assumptions about the nature of perfect capital 
markets. This is an „a priori‟ model of how markets should work if they were perfect. 
Naturally, once we depart M&M‟s world of prefect capital market and relax one or more of 
the assumptions of perfect capital markets, the issue of dividend policy becomes more 
complicated. Introducing market imperfections might change the view that dividend decision 
is irrelevant. Importantly, if dividend policy is relevant it may interact with other decisions 
made by the firm about investment and financing. In other words, there may be a range of 





  3.4 Bird-In-The-Hand Hypothesis (High Dividends Increase Stock Value): 
      Empirical Evidence 
  
One alternative and older view about the effect of dividend policy on a firm‟s value is that 
dividends increase firm value. In a world of uncertainty and imperfect information, dividends 
are valued differently to retained earnings (or capital gains). Investors prefer the “bird in the 
hand” (BIH) of cash dividends to the “two in the bush” of future capital gains. Increasing 
dividend payments, ceteris paribus, may then be associated with increases in firm value.  
 
As a higher current dividend reduces uncertainty about future cash flows, a high payout ratio 
will reduce the cost of capital, and hence increase share value. That is, according to the so-
called “bird-in-the hand” hypothesis, high dividend payout ratios maximize a firm‟s value.  A 
pound of dividends has, on average, four times the impact on stock prices as a pound of 
retained earnings and many studies supported the BIH hypothesis (Diamond, 1967. See also 
Gordon and Shapiro, 1956; Gordon, 1959, 1963; Lintner, 1962; Walter, 1963). 
 
M&M (1961) criticized the BIH hypothesis and argued that the firm‟s risk is determined by 
the riskiness of its operating cash flows, not by the way it distributes its earnings. 
Consequently, M&M called this argument the bird-in-the-hand fallacy. Further, Bhattacharya 
(1979) suggested that the reasoning underlying the BIH hypothesis is fallacious. Moreover, 
he suggested that the firm‟s risk affects the level of dividend not the other way around. That 
is, the riskiness of a firm‟s cash flow influences its dividend payments, but increases in 
dividends will not reduce the risk of the firm.  
 
The notion that firms facing greater uncertainty of future cash flow (risk) tend to adopt lower 
payout ratios seems to be theoretically plausible (see, for example, Friend and Puckett, 1964). 
Empirically, Rozeff (1982) found a negative relationship between dividends and firm risk. 
That is, as the risk of a firm‟s operations increases, the dividend payments decrease (see also 
Jensen, Solberg, and Zorn, 1992). 
Gordon (1959) hypothesized three reasons why investors would buy a certain stock. First, to 
obtain both dividends and earnings, second, to obtain dividends, and finally to get the 
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earnings. He examined these hypotheses by estimating different regression models using 
cross-section sample data of four industries (chemicals, foods, steels, and machine tools) for 
two years 1951 and 1954. The dividend hypothesis was tested using a linear regression, 
which is similar to the following equation, 
 
Pit = α0 + α1Dit + α2Rit + εit…………………………………………………………………………   11 
 
where, for firm i and period t, P,D, & R are the share price, dividends, and the retained 
earnings, respectively. The reciprocal of the dividend coefficient α1 is the estimated required 
rate of return on common stocks without growth, and the coefficient on retained earnings α2 
is the price for growth. Gordon (1959) found that dividends have greater influence on share 
price than retained earnings. In addition, he argued that the required rate of return on a share 
increases with the fraction of retained earnings because of the uncertainty associated with 
future earnings. Similarly, Gordon (1963) argued that higher dividend payouts decrease the 
cost of equity or the required rate of return on equity. Using British data for the period 
between 1949 and 1957, Fisher (1961) reached a similar conclusion that dividends have 
greater impact on share prices than retained earnings. 
 
The above regression (equation 11) was subject to several criticisms. Firstly, it does not take 
into account the risk variation among firms drawn from different industries, and this may lead 
to an upward bias in the coefficient on dividends α1. That is, high risk associated with a stock 
may result in low price and low payout, while low risk associated with a stock may result in 
high payout and low price. Secondly, the equation accounts only for the growth coming from 
investments that are financed with retained earnings, while it ignores the growth that may 
come from the use of external financing.  
 
This may bias the coefficient of retained earnings α2. Thirdly, since dividends are more stable 
than reported earnings, the short-run fluctuations in income will be mainly reflected in 
change in retained earnings. If share prices and dividends are related to normal rather than 
reported income, the equation is biased in favour of dividends. Finally, dividends are 
measured more precisely than retained earnings because the estimated retained earnings 
depend on the accounting procedure followed to measure total earnings, which will place an 
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additional downward bias on the retention coefficient α2 (see Friend and Puckett, 1964, and 
Diamond, 1967). 
 
To correct for the potential bias resulting from the criticisms mentioned above (especially 1 
and 2), Diamond (1967) introduced into the regression equation (11) the average three-year 
earning-price ratio centred on t -1. He examined the impact of dividends and retained 
earnings on share prices for a sample of 255 US firms from eight industries for 1961 and 
1967. He found only weak support for the notion that investors have preference for dividends 
over retained earnings. The study found that in industries where rates of growth were 
relatively high, retained earnings were marginally preferred more than dividends, whereas in 
mature industries with low growth rate a dollar of dividends is slightly preferred to a dollar of 
retained earnings. This suggests a negative relationship between a firm‟s growth and dividend 
payout. The results obtained by Diamond (1967) are consistent with earlier findings of Friend 
and Puckett (1964). Recently, Fama and French (2001) also found that firms with higher 
growth and investments tended to have lower payouts. 
 
Baker, Powell and Veit (2002a) surveyed managers of NASDAQ firms to assess their view 
about dividend policy issues including the BIH hypothesis. Their questionnaire contains one 
statement about the BIH hypothesis, stating “investors generally prefer cash dividends today 
to uncertain future price appreciation”. Based on 186 responses, only 17.2 percent agree with 
the statement, 28 percent no opinion, and 54.9 percent disagree. Therefore, they conclude, 
“…this finding does not provide support for the bird-in-the-hand explanation for why 
companies pay dividends” (p.278). In an earlier survey, Baker and Powell (1999) also found 
a similar rate of agreement (17.7 percent) about the bird-in-the hand explanation of dividend 
relevance. 
 
Empirical support for the BIH hypothesis  as an explanation for paying dividends is generally 
limited, and the argument has been challenged especially by M&M (1961) who argued that 
the required rate of return (or the cost of capital) is independent of dividend policy, 
suggesting that investors are indifferent between dividends and capital gains. Indeed, based 
on the tax-preference explanation, discussed shortly, researchers such as Litzenberger and 
Ramaswamy (1979), among others, developed an explanation of dividend policy that reaches 
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the opposite result. That is, investors are disadvantaged in receiving cash dividends. The next 
section examines the argument that low dividends are preferred to higher dividends. 
 
3.5.   Tax-Effect Hypothesis and Evidence on whether Low Dividend increases  
         Stock Values. 
  
The M&M assumptions of a perfect capital market exclude any possible tax effect. It has 
been assumed that there is no difference in tax treatment between dividends and capital gains. 
However, in the real world taxes exist and may have significant influence on dividend policy 
and the value of the firm. In general, there is often a differential in tax treatment between 
dividends and capital gains, and, because most investors are interested in after-tax return, the 
influence of taxes might affect their demand for dividends. Taxes may also affect the supply 
of dividends, when managers respond to this tax preference in seeking to maximize 
shareholder wealth (firm value) by increasing the retention ratio of earnings. 
 
The tax-effect hypothesis suggests that low dividend payout ratio lowers the cost of capital 
and increase the stock price. In other words low dividend payout ratios contribute to 
maximising the firm‟s value. This argument is based on the assumption that dividends are 
taxed at higher rates than capital gains. In addition, dividends are taxed immediately, while 
taxes on capital gains are deferred until the stock is actually sold. This tax advantage of 
capital gains over dividends tend to influence investors, to prefer companies that retain most 
of their earnings rather than pay them out as dividends, and are willing to pay a premium for 
low-payout companies. Therefore, a low dividend payout ratio will lower the cost of equity 
and increases the stock price. Note that, this prediction is almost the exact opposite of the 
BIH hypothesis, and of course challenges the strict form of the DIH. 
 
In many EU countries and the US, a higher tax rate is applied to dividends as compared to 
capital gains taxes
7
. Therefore, investors in high tax brackets might require higher pre-tax 
                                                          
7
 Note that in the US, the Tax Reform Act of 1986 substantially eliminated the preferential tax treatment of 
capital gains over dividends. Prior to the Act, dividends were taxed at a higher rate than capital gains, whereas 
following the Act, dividends and capital gains were taxed at the same rate (see,  Rozeff, 1982 and Casey & 




risk-adjusted returns to hold stocks with higher dividend yield. This relationship between pre-
tax returns on stocks and dividend yields is the basis of a posited tax-effect hypothesis. 
 
Brennan (1970) developed an after-tax version of the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) to 
test the relationship between tax risk-adjusted returns and dividend yield. Brennan‟s model 
maintains that a stock‟s pre-tax returns should be positively and linearly related to its 
dividend yield and to its systematic risk. Higher pre-tax risk adjusted returns are associated 
with higher dividend yield stocks to compensate investors for the tax disadvantages of these 
returns. This suggests that, a stock with higher dividend yield will sell at lower prices because 
of the disadvantage of higher taxes associated with dividend income. The Brennan model can 
be described as: 
 
   E (Rit – Rft) = γ0 + γ1βit + γ2(Dit – Rft)…………………………………………….12 
 
Where, Rit is the return on stock i in period t, Rft is the risk-less rate of interest, βit is beta 
coefficient for stock i in period t (systematic risk), Dit and is the dividend yield of stock i in 
period t. It is assumed that the coefficient γ2 is interpreted as an implicit tax bracket and is 
independent of the level of the dividend yield D. If the coefficient of dividend yield (γ2) is 
statistically different from zero and positive, the results are interpreted as evidence of a tax 
effect. That is, higher pre-tax risk-adjusted returns are necessary to compensate investors for 
holding high-dividend-paying stocks because of the disadvantage associated with dividend 
income.   
 
A large body of empirical research has been devoted to testing Brennan‟s model and to 
understanding the relationship between dividend yields and stock returns. For example, Black 
and Scholes (1974) tested Brennan‟s model and found no evidence of a tax effect and 
concluded that low or high-dividend yield stocks do not affect the returns of stocks either 
before or after taxes. 
 
 However, Litzenberger and Ramaswamy (1979) strongly challenged the results of Black and 
Scholes and criticised their methods, especially their definition of dividend yield. Recall that 
Black and Scholes used a long-term dividend yield definition (previous year‟s dividends 
divided by previous year‟s closing share price). Litzenberger and Ramaswamy extended 
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Brennan‟s (1970) model and used a monthly dividend yield definition in classifying stock 
into yield classes, a positive dividend-yield class and zero dividend-yield class. 
 
The results of Litzenberger and Ramaswamy show that the coefficient on dividend yield 
variable (γ2) is positive and highly significant. Blume (1980) reported positive and significant 
dividend yield coefficient, using long-run measure of yield and therefore, provides empirical 
support for Brennan (1970) model. Litzenberger and Ramaswamy (1979) thus conclude that 
every dollar increase in return in the form of dividends, investors requires an additional 23 
cents in before tax returns. The dividend coefficient (γ2) obtained by Litzenberger and 
Ramaswamy is consistent in magnitude with that reported by Black and Scholes (1974). The 
implication of Litzenberger and Ramaswamy‟s findings is that firms could increase their 
share prices by reducing dividends. However, if this prediction holds, one may raise a 
question about why corporations pay dividends at all. 
 
Miller and Scholes (1982) challenged Litzenberger and Ramaswamy‟s conclusion, and 
criticised their short-term (monthly) definition of dividend yield. They suggested that tests 
employing a short-term dividend yield definition are inappropriate for detecting the impact of 
differential tax treatment of dividends and capital gains on stock returns. Furthermore, Miller 
and Scholes argued that the positive yield-return relation was caused by information bias. The 
reason for this argument is that Litzenberger and Ramaswamy ignored the information effect 
of dividend omissions. An announcement of dividend omissions (perceived as bad news) may 
result in an upward bias in the dividend yield coefficient, since it reduces the return of the 
zero yield-dividend class. Miller and Scholes attempted to correct the information bias and 
then retest the Litzenberger and Ramaswamy result. They found that the dividend yield 
coefficient was not statistically different from zero. Hess (1981) found similar results to 
Miller and Scholes. In his study, Hess tested the relation between the monthly stock returns 
and dividend yield over the period of 1926 to 1980. He found mixed results and concluded 
that the work reinforces the findings of Miller-Scholes study and lends further empirical 
support to the original M&M proposition. 
 
Litzenberger and Ramaswamy (1982) re-examined the relationship between dividend yield 
and stock returns after adjusting the dividend yield coefficient for any potential information 
effects. Their results, consistent with their previous findings, were that the yield coefficient is 
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positive and statistically significant. Kalay and Michaely (2000) re-examine the Litzenberger 
and Ramaswamy (1979) experiment using weekly data. They attempt to find whether the 
positive dividend yield obtained by Litzenberger and Ramaswamy is due to tax effects or to 
the information effects as conjectured by Miller and Scholes (1982). Kalay and Michaely 
exclude all weeks containing dividend omissions. They find a positive and significant 
dividend yield coefficient, inconsistent with Miller and Scholes‟s conjecture that the positive 
yield coefficient is driven by information biases. Also, Morgan (1982) had shown evidence 
inconsistent with the Miller and Scholes conjecture. Furthermore, using daily and monthly 
British data, Poterba and Summers (1984) provide evidence that strongly supports the tax-
effect hypothesis. 
 
Along the lines of Litzenberger and Ramaswamy (1979) and Blume (1980), Keim (1985) 
used the Sharpe-Lintner CAPM to estimate the relation between long-run dividend yields and 
stock returns among US firms. He used a sample of 429 firms in January 1931 and 1289 
firms in December 1978. In his study, Keim constructed six dividend-yield portfolios. The 
first portfolio contained all zero-dividend firms, and the other five ranked from lowest to 
highest positive dividend-yield firms. He documented a non-linear relation between dividend 
yields and stock returns, and his results rejected the hypothesis that average returns are equal 
across portfolios.  
 
In addition, Keim (1985) tested the impact of firm size and stock return seasonality on the 
relationship between stock returns and dividend yields. He found a positive and significant 
yield coefficient. However, much of the non-linear relation was concentrated in the month of 
January for small firms. Nonetheless, the same result was obtained even after controlling for 
firm size. In addition, he reported an inverse relationship between positive yield and firm size 
as measured by market capitalization and concluded that the results suggest the observed 
relation between long-run dividend yields and stock returns may not be solely attributable to 
difference in marginal tax rates for dividends and capital gains. His results suggest a yield-
related tax effect. However, because of the significant effect of the month of January 
(seasonality) on the relation between dividend yields and stock returns these findings are not 
totally consistent with the after-tax CAPM. This conclusion deepens the puzzle surrounding 




In the UK, Morgan and Thomas (1998) examined the relationship between dividend yields 
and stock returns over the period 1975 to 1993. Drawing on Keim‟s (1985) methodology, 
they tested the tax-based hypothesis in which dividend yields and stock returns are positively 
related. However, they pointed out that under the 1973 imputation tax system capital gains 
received a disadvantaged tax treatment when compared to dividend income. Consequently the 
tax-based hypothesis, in the UK, predicted a negative relation between dividend yields and 
risk-adjusted stock returns. Stocks with low yields are expected to produce higher returns to 
compensate stockholders for the increased tax burden associated with capital gains, and vice 
versa.  
 
Contrary to prediction, Morgan and Thomas find a positive relationship between dividend 
yields and stock returns. Moreover, their results suggest a non-linear relation between risk-
adjusted returns and dividend yield, which is inconsistent with Brennan‟s model. Also, the 
firm size and seasonality seems to influence the relationship between dividend yield and 
stock returns. Morgan and Thomas were therefore unable to provide support for the tax-effect 
hypothesis. In a previously mentioned study, Baker et al. (2002a) surveyed the managers of 
630 NASDAQ firms and found weak or no support for the tax-preference theory. 
 
The tax-effect hypothesis (TEH) is therefore based on a simple proposition. Many investors 
are faced with dividends being taxed at a higher rate than capital gains. In addition, dividends 
are taxed immediately, while taxes on capital gains are deferred until the gains are actually 
realized. Therefore, the TEH suggests that taxable investors will demand superior pre-tax 
returns from stocks that pay a large proportion of their income in the form of highly taxed 
dividends. In other words, investors will value the dollar of capital gains greater than a dollar 
of dividends, resulting in lower dividend-stocks selling at a relative premium to their higher-
dividend counterparts. From the argument above, the evidence with respect to the TEH 
appears to be inconclusive.  
 
In all of the studies discussed above the TEH has been addressed from one perspective: the 
relationship between dividend yields and the stock returns (CAPM-based studies). The 
literature, however, has also provided a vast amount of empirical research on the TEH by 
examining the behaviour of stock prices around the ex-dividend day (ex-dividend day 




3.6 Clientele Effects of Dividends Hypothesis 
  
In their seminal paper M&M (1961) noted that the pre-existing dividend clientele effect 
hypothesis (DCH) might play a role in dividend policy under certain conditions. They pointed 
out that the portfolio choices of individual investors might be influenced by certain market 
imperfections such as transaction costs and differential tax rates to prefer different mixes of 
capital gains and dividends. M&M argued that these imperfections might cause investors to 
choose securities that reduce these costs. M&M termed the tendency of investors to be 
attracted to a certain type of dividend-paying stocks a „dividend clientele effect‟. Similarly, 
Pettit (1977) describes the net tendency of an individual investor to hold portfolios of 
securities that have particular dividend paying characteristics as „dividend clientele effect‟. 
 
Nonetheless, M&M maintained that even though the clientele effect might change a firm‟s 
dividend policy to attract certain clienteles, in a perfect market each clientele is “as good as 
another”. Hence the firm valuation is not affected as the dividend policy remains irrelevant. 
In practice, investors often face different tax treatments for dividend income and capital 
gains, and incur costs when they trade securities in the form of transaction costs.  
 
For these reasons and based on different investors‟ situations, taxes and transaction costs may 
create investor clienteles, such as tax minimisation induced clientele and transaction cost 
minimisation induced clientele respectively. Another possible dividend clientele effect is 
related to risk clienteles. High-payout stocks tend to be less risky than low-payout stocks;   
and based on the risk factor, dividends may attract certain clientele investors ( Scholz, 1992). 
 
These clienteles will be attracted to firms that follow dividend policies that best suit their 
particular situations. Similarly, firms may tend to attract different clienteles by their dividend 
policies. For example, firms operating in high growth industries that usually pay low (or no) 
dividends attract a clientele that prefers price appreciation (in the form of capital gains) to 
dividends. On the other hand, firms that pay a large amount of their earnings as dividends 




Allen, Bernardo and Welch (2000) suggest that clienteles such as institutional investors tend 
to be attracted to invest in dividend-paying stocks because they have relative tax advantages 
over individual investors. These institutions are often subjected to restrictions in institutional 
charters which, to some extent, prevent them from investing in non-paying or low-dividend 
stocks. Similarly, good quality firms prefer to attract institutional clienteles (by paying 
dividends) because institutions are better informed than retail investors and have more ability 
to monitor or detect firm quality. This prediction is consistent with the signalling hypothesis. 
In fact, Allen, Bernardo and Welch (2000) proposed a model that links signalling and agency 
arguments with the clientele effects of dividend hypothesis. Allen et al, (2000) conclude with 
the proposition that the clientele effects are the very reason for the presence of dividends. 
 
3.6.1   The Tax-Induced Clientele-Effects 
Since most of the investors are interested in after-tax returns, the different tax treatment of 
dividends and capital gains might influence their preference for dividends or capital gains. 
This is the essence of the tax-induced DCH. For example, ceteris paribus, investors in low 
tax brackets who rely on regular and steady income will tend to be attracted to firms that pay 
high and stable dividends. In addition, some corporate or institutional investors tend to be 
attracted to high-dividend stocks (Han, Lee and Suk, 1999 and Dhaliwal, Erickson and 
Trezevant, 1999).   
Short, Zhang and Keasey, (2002) used UK data to provide strong evidence in support of the 
notion that payout ratios and institutional ownership are positively related. However, they did 
not link their results to the clientele hypothesis. On the other hand, investors in relatively high 
tax brackets might find it advantageous to invest in companies that retain most of their 
income to obtain potential capital gains, all else being equal. Some clienteles, however, are 







3.6.2 The Transaction Cost-Induced Clientele and the Empirical Evidence 
Another argument of the DCH is based on the proposition that dividend policy may influence 
different clienteles to shift their portfolio allocation, resulting in transaction costs. For 
example, small investors (such as retirees, income-oriented investors, and so on) who rely on 
dividend income for their consumption needs, might be attracted to (and even may pay a 
premium for) high and stable-dividend stocks, because the transaction costs associated with 
selling stocks might be significant for such investors. On the other hand, some investors (e.g. 
wealthy investors), who do not rely on their share portfolios to satisfy their liquidity needs, 
prefer low payouts to avoid the transaction costs associated with reinvesting the proceeds of 
dividends, which they actually do not need for their current consumption (Bishop et al., 
2000). Note that for both groups of investors, transforming one financial asset to another 
incurs a transaction costs. Thus, the M&M‟s notion of homemade dividends is not costless 
and the existence of such costs may make dividend policy not irrelevant. 
 
The other effect of transaction costs on dividend policy is related to the fact that firms may 
need to restore cash paid out as dividends with new equity issues (or debt financing) to take 
advantage of new investment opportunities. If issuing costs are significant, then firms are 
most likely to rely on retained earnings rather than external financing. This is reinforced by 
the empirical fact that retained earnings constitute the  major source of firm finance not just 
in developing but also even in developed capital markets.  
 
Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988) reported that, over the period of 1970 to 1984, the 
retained earnings amounted to 71.1 percent of the total source of funds of US manufacturing 
firms with an average retention ratio of 60 percent
8
. In these cases, there is a negative 
relationship between transaction costs and dividend payments. Firms can reduce or avoid 
such expenses by lowering dividend payments or not paying them at all. However, in 
practice, many firms continue to pay cash dividends, while at the same time issuing new 
equity and debt, suggesting that other factors may also be at work in influencing dividend 
policy. 
                                                          
8





An important implication of the DCH is that, by changing its dividend policy, a firm‟s 
ownership structure might also change. Another implication of clientele theory is that firms 
should attempt to adopt a stable dividend policy to avoid inducing shareholders to modify 
their portfolios, entailing transaction costs (Scholz, 1992 and Soter, Brigham and Evanson, 
1996). However, whether these changes have an impact on firm value remains unanswered. 
In a competitive equilibrium, it would be expected that one clientele is good as another and 
that the clientele effect of dividend policy is irrelevant to a firm‟s value. To date, evidence on 
the link between clientele effects and firm value is inconclusive. 
 
The theoretical plausibility of dividend clientele hypothesis is relatively ambiguous. On the 
one hand, transaction costs and taxes may influence demands for dividends. But the mere 
existence of transaction costs or differential taxes is not enough rationale for a general 
theoretical explanation of the determination of dividend policy. Not surprisingly, therefore, 
most of the literature on the DCH has produced mixed results. Miller (1977) and Auerbach 
(1983) have presented theoretical models that are consistent with the presence of clientele 
effects.   
  
A number of empirical studies discussed have examined investors‟ portfolios, and their 
demographic attributes including taxes. Pettit (1977) provided empirical evidence for the 
existence of a clientele effect by examining the portfolio positions of 914 individual 
investors. He found a significant positive relationship between investors‟ ages and their 
portfolios‟ dividend yield, and a negative relationship between investors‟ incomes and 
dividend yield. Pettit suggested that elderly low-income investors tend to rely more on their 
portfolios to finance their current consumption, and avoid the transaction costs associated 
with selling stocks. Consequently, they have more of a tendency to invest in high-dividend 
stocks. Pettit also showed that investors whose portfolios have low systematic risk prefer 
high-payout stocks, and thus found evidence for tax-induced clientele effect.  
 
However, using a sample constructed from the same database used in Pettit‟s (1977) study, 
Lewellen et al. (1978) found only very weak supportive evidence of the clientele effect 
hypothesis. In a later study, Scholz (1992) developed an empirical model to test the DCH 
directly by examining individual investor portfolio data. He found that differential tax 
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treatment of dividends and capital gains influences investors‟ decisions in choosing between 
higher-or-lower-dividend yield portfolios, consistent with dividend tax–clientele hypothesis. 
 
Another strand of empirical testing has examined the relationship between dividend changes 
and clientele effect. Richardson, Sefcik and Thompson (1986) tested a sample of 192 US 
firms that initiated dividends for the first time during the period of 1969 through 1982. They 
attempted to investigate whether the observed (post-dividend-initiations) increase in firms‟ 
stocks trading volume is due to the signalling effect or a product of investors in various tax 
clienteles adjusting their portfolios. They found that the increased trading volume associated 
with dividend policy changes was mainly related to the information contained in the dividend 
announcement, and only a small part was related to clientele adjustment. They concluded that 
the evidence supporting the existence of clientele trading is somewhat weak. This concurs 
with Asquith and Krasker (1985) who had similar findings. 
 
 Dhaliwal, Erickson and Trezevant (1999) examined institutional shareholding changes 
following dividend initiations. Based on the theory of tax-induced clienteles, they expected 
an increase in institutional ownership subsequent to dividend initiations. Using a sample of 
133 dividend initiators from the 1982 to 1995 period, the results obtained are consistent with 
their prediction. They reported an 80% significant increase in their sample firms who 
experienced an increase in institutional shareholders following dividend initiation.  They 
concluded that the dividend/tax-clientele effect is strong enough to influence investors‟ 
decisions.  
 
Seida (2002) also provided evidence consistent with the DCH findings. Earlier research by 
Bajaj and Vijh (1990), Ang, Blackwell and Megginson (1991), and Denis, Denis and Sarin 
(1994) provided empirical support for the existence of the dividend clientele hypothesis. 
Michaely, Thaler and Womack (1995), however, found weak or no empirical support for this 
notion. For example, they tested the possible changes in shares turnover rate for firms 





Finally, another strand attempts to infer the tax characteristics of a firm‟s marginal investors 
by examining the movements of stock prices around the ex-dividend days
9
, and therefore 
provides an indirect test of the DCH. The basic intuition of the relation between stock price 
and ex-dividend day is that, in a rational capital market, and in a world of certainty, share 
prices should drop by approximately the amount of dividend per share on the day the stock 
goes ex-dividend. Any other share price behaviour suggests arbitrage opportunities ( Kalay, 
1982 and Lease et al., 2000). When the stock goes ex (without)-dividend the investor has no 
claim to dividend payments, and thus will not pay the same amount as if the stock traded cum 
(with)-dividend. The stock price on the ex-dividend day should therefore be lower than in the 
cum-dividend period to reflect the lost dividend (Lease et al., 2000). 
 
This notion, however, may not perfectly hold in some circumstances, because dividends are 
usually taxed more heavily than capital gains. Investors in high tax brackets will therefore be 
better off receiving their income in the form of capital gains rather than dividends. The tax 
effect may mean that the drop in stock price may be less than the dividend because investors 
value dividends less than capital gains. Elton and Gruber (1970) had presented empirical 
evidence about the tax-induced clientele hypothesis by observing the share price behaviour 




They examined the shares listed on the NYSE paying a dividend between April 1, 1966 and 
March 31, 1967, Elton and Gruber found that share prices fell by less than the amount of the 
dividend on ex-dividend days. This is because the positive relationship between the dividends 
yields of a stock and the proportionate size of its ex-dividend price drop. They interpreted 
their results as evidence that differential taxes induced a preference for capital gains relative 
to cash dividends, therefore supporting the tax clientele hypothesis (that is, investors in high 
tax brackets invest in low-dividend yield stocks and vice versa). They thus concluded that 
                                                          
9
 The ex-dividend day is the first day in which the stock is traded “without” dividends, i.e. the current dividend 
is earmarked for the seller, not the buyer. The cum-dividend day is the last business day the stock is traded 
“with” dividend i.e. the stock‟s buyer is entitled to receive a declared dividend 
10 Several empirical studies have analysed ex-dividend day behaviour of share prices for US firms. A partial 
listing includes Kalay (1982, 1984), Elton, Gruber and Rentzler (1984), Eades, Hess and Kim (1984), Barclay 
(1987), Karpoff and Walkling (1988, 1990), Grammatikos (1989), Bali and Hite (1998), Koski and Scruggs 
(1998), and Elton, Gruber and Blake (2003). 
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firms do not only seem to attract a clientele but they attract a rational clientele (one which 
should prefer their dividend policy). 
 
Kalay (1982) criticised Elton and Gruber and argued that the marginal tax rates of the 
investors cannot be inferred from the ex-dividend day price-drop-to-dividend ratio (price-
drop ratio)
11
, and the observed positive relationship between price-drop ratio and dividend 
yield may not be due to tax induced clientele effects. He presented another explanation, 
known as the “short-term traders” hypothesis. Kalay argued that, assuming certainty, if the 
ex-dividend price ratio drop is less than one (less than the amount of dividends), short-term 
traders who face the same tax rate on dividends and capital gains could make arbitrage 
profits. That is, investors can buy a stock before it goes ex-dividend and sell it soon after. 
This practice is known as dividend capture (Karpoff and Walkling, 1990). 
  
However, this arbitrage process could be hampered by transaction costs
12
. Kalay suggests that 
transaction costs are insignificant for broker dealers who are the potential short-term traders, 
while Elton, Gruber and Rentzler (1984) argue that it matters even for broker dealers. Karpoff 
and Walkling (1988, 1990) show that excess ex-dividend-day returns are positively correlated 
with transaction costs (measured by bid-ask spread), and this relationship increases for stocks 
with high-dividend yields. They  suggest that short-term trading around ex-dividend days is 
higher for high-yield stocks (see also Michaely and Vila, 1996), implying that short term 
trading (or dividend capture) may influence the ex-dividend day stock price changes, and 
hence any clientele effects may not be the only explanation for these changes. 
 
Examination of the ex-dividend day behaviour of share prices has also been extended to 
different stock markets, including Australia (Brown and Walter 1986), Canada (Lakonishok 
and Vermaelen, 1983 and Booth and Johnston, 1984), Finland (Hietala, 1990), Greece 
                                                          
11
 The price-drop ratio can be defined as (PB-PA)/D, where, PB is the stock price cum-dividend, PA is the stock 
price on the ex-dividend day, and D is the amount of dividends. 
12 The arbitrage profit can also be inhibited by the risk or the uncertainty of ex-dividend price. For further 
details on this issue see for example, Heath and Jarrow (1988), Grammatikos (1989). More recently, Michaely 




(Milonas and Travlos 2001), Japan (Kato and Loewenstein, 1995), and New Zealand 
(Bartholdy and Brown, 1999). These studies have found mixed support for the ex-dividend 
day effect. 
 
It is worth noting that dividend clientele hypothesis predictions, to some extent, may 
contradict other explanations of dividend policy such as the signalling and agency costs 
hypotheses, discussed above. For example, according to the signalling hypothesis, dividends 
convey information about a firm‟s future prospects, and in that sense investors with 
preferences for capital gains (for tax reasons) may still prefer firms with high-payout ratios, 
contradicting the prediction of the tax-induced clientele hypothesis. Also, based on agency 
theory, dividends may mitigate the free cash in hand of managers and reduce the agency 
problems, and for these reasons investors may also prefer high-dividend stocks even though 
they are tax-disadvantaged.   
 
 
  3.7 The Signalling Hypothesis and the Empirical Evidence 
  
The signalling hypothesis (hereafter referred to as information content of dividend 
hypothesis) is another reason why M&M‟s DIH is inadequate as an explanation of financial 
market practice. The ICD hypothesis explains the asymmetric information between insiders 
(managers and directors) and outsiders (shareholders). M&M assumed that managers and 
outside investors have free, equal and instantaneous access to the same information regarding 
a firm‟s prospects and performance. But managers who manage the firms usually possess 
information about its current and future prospects that is not available to outsiders. This 
informational gap between insiders and outsiders may cause the true intrinsic value of the 
firm to be unavailable to the market. If so, share price may not always be an accurate measure 
of the firm‟s value.  
 
In an attempt to close this gap, managers may need to share their knowledge with outsiders so 
they can more accurately understand the real value of the firm. Historically, due to a lack of 
complete and accurate information available to shareholders, the cash flow provided by a 
security to an investor often formed the basis for its market valuation (Baskin and Miranti, 
1997). Thus, dividends provide a useful tool for managers in which to convey their private 
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information to the market because investors used visible (or actual) cash flows to equity as a 
way of valuing a firm. Many academics and financial practitioners also suggest that dividends 
might have implicit information about a firm‟s prospects.  
 
Interestingly, M&M (1961) suggested that when markets are imperfect share prices may 
respond to changes in dividends. This implies that dividend announcements may be seen to 
convey implicit information about the firm‟s future earnings potential. The proposition has 
since become known as the “information content of dividends” or signalling hypothesis. 
However, M&M dismissed the possibility that this occurred by suggesting that the empirical 
evidence does not support the notion that investors prefer dividends to retained earnings. 
 
According to the signalling hypothesis, investors can infer information about a firm‟s future 
earnings through the signal coming from dividend announcements, both in terms of the 
stability of, and changes in, dividends. However, for this hypothesis to hold, managers should 
first possess private information about a firm‟s prospects, and have incentives to convey this 
information to the market. Second, a signal should be true; that is, a firm with poor future 
prospects should not be able to mimic and send false signals to the market by increasing 
dividend payments. Thus the market must be able to rely on the signal to differentiate among 
firms. If these conditions are fulfilled, the market would react favourably to the 
announcements of dividend increase and unfavourably if otherwise (Ang, 1987, and Koch 
and Shenoy, 1999). 
 
As managers are likely to have more information about the firm‟s future prospects than 
outside investors, they may be able to use changes in dividends as a vehicle to communicate 
information to the financial market about a firm‟s future earnings and growth. Outside 
investors may perceive dividend announcements as a reflection of the managers‟ assessment 
of a firm‟s performance and prospects. An increase in dividend payout may be interpreted as 
the firm having good future profitability (good news), and therefore its share price will react 
positively. Similarly, dividend cuts may be considered as a signal that the firm has poor 
future prospects (bad news), and the share price may then react unfavourably.  
 
Accordingly, it would not be surprising to find that managers are reluctant to announce a 
reduction in dividends. Lintner (1956) argued that firms tend to increase dividends when 
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managers believe that earnings have permanently increased. This suggests that increase in 
dividend implies long-run sustainable earnings. This prediction is also consistent with what is 
known as the “dividend-smoothing hypothesis”. That is, managers will endeavour to smooth 
dividends over time and not make substantial increases in dividends unless they can maintain 
the increased dividends in the foreseeable future. Lipson, Maquieira and Megginson (1998) 
observed that, managers do not initiate dividend increase until they believe those dividends 
can be sustained by future earnings. Fama and Babiak (1968), Baker, Farrelly, and Edelman 
(1986), DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Skinner (1992), and Baker, Veit and Powell (2001) find 
support for Lintner‟s argument of dividend smoothing. 
 
It is worth noting that, although management can use changes in dividends as a signal to 
convey information to the market, in some cases dividend changes may be an ambiguous 
signal. The most cited dividend signalling models can be found in Bhattacharya (1979), John 
and Williams (1985), and Miller and Rock (1985). The literature of dividend signalling has 
produced other models to represent the theory of asymmetric information (see, for example, 
Ambarish, John and Williams, 1987, Ofer and Thakor, 1987, Kumar, 1988, and Bernheim, 
1991, Allen, et al., 2000).  
 
In general, these models are based on several assumptions. There is asymmetric information 
between corporate insiders (managers) and outside investors (shareholders). Dividends 
contain information about the firm‟s current and future cash flows, and managers have 
incentives to convey their private information to the market through dividend payments in 
order to close the information gap. The announcement of a dividend increase will be taken as 
good news and the market will bid up share prices accordingly. Similarly, an announcement 
that a dividend will be cut suggests unfavourable prospects and will tend to see the firm‟s 
share price fall (Asquith and Mullins (1983) Kalay and Loewenstein (1985), Denis et 
al.,1994, Yoon and Starks, 1995, and Bali,2003). 
 
Dividends are considered a credible signalling device because of the dissipative costs 
involved. For example, in Bhattacharya (1979) model the cost of signalling is the transaction 
cost associated with external financing. In Miller and Rock (1985) model the cost is the 
distortion in the optimal investment decision, whereas in the John and William (1985) model, 




Therefore, only good-quality firms (under valued) can use dividends to signal their prospects, 
and poor-quality firms cannot mimic by sending a false signal to the market because of the 
costs involved in that action. A major criticism addressed to these models is that firms choose 
dividends to signal their prospects while other less costly means are available such as share 
repurchases (Allen and Michaely, 2002). 
 
In the preceding section, the theory of dividend signalling was developed around the 
proposition that corporate insiders are more informed about the firm‟s current performance 
and future prospects than outsiders. This suggests that the market perceives dividends (and 
repurchases) as signals of a management‟s view about the firm‟s fortunes, and therefore share 
prices react to that signal. The empirical work on dividend signalling has examined two main 
issues. First, whether share prices move in the same direction with dividend change 
announcements. Second, whether dividend changes enable the market to predict future 
earnings. 
 
Finance scholars have addressed these issues extensively, but once again the results have 
been mixed and inconclusive. The first question has received much attention in the literature, 
because if the announcement of dividend changes does not have the predicted impact on 
share prices this will cast doubt on the validity of the information content of dividend 
hypothesis. Pettit (1972) observed that dividend announcements communicate valuable 
information, and showed that the market reacts positively to the announcement of dividend 
increases (significant increase in stock prices), and negatively to the announcement of 
dividend decreases (significant drop in stock prices).  
 
He argued that dividend announcement, when forthcoming, may convey significantly more 
information than the information implicit in an earnings announcement. Aharony and Swary 
(1980) suggest that dividend and earning announcements are not perfect substitutes and a 
proper test for the signalling hypothesis needs to take into account the effect of earnings 
announcements. They found support for the results obtained by Pettit even after controlling 
for contemporaneous earnings announcements. Woolridge (1983) also found significant 





Asquith and Mullins (1983) examined the market‟s reaction to dividend announcements for a 
sample of 168 firms that initiated dividends either for the first time in their corporate history 
or resumed paying dividends after at least a ten-year period. They tested the average daily 
excess stock returns ten days before and ten days after the announcement of dividend 
initiation. For the two-day announcement period, their result shows that there is an excess 
return of about +3.7 percent. Moreover, using cross-sectional regression Asquith and Mullins 
found a positive and significant relationship between the magnitude of initial dividends and 
the abnormal returns on the announcement day. This suggests that the size of dividend 
changes may also matter. In another empirical study, Asquith and Mullins (1986) reinforce 
their earlier findings and offer more support to the information content of dividend 
hypothesis. 
 
Michaely, Thaler and Womack (1995) have gone further by examining the impact of both 
initiations and omissions of cash dividends on share prices reaction. They observed 561 
dividend initiation events and 887 dividend omission events over the period of 1964 to 1988. 
They documented that, during three days surrounding the announcements, the average excess 
return was about –7.0 percent for omissions and +3.4 percent for dividend initiations. Note 
that the market reactions to dividend omissions are greater than for dividend initiations.  
 
This implies that the market reacts optimistically toward dividend initiations (or increases); 
however, the market is more pessimistic in response to the announcements of dividend 
omissions (or decreases). They found significant long-run drifts in stock prices in response to 
dividend initiations and omissions and reported +7.5 percent excess returns after one year of 
initiation announcements and +24.8 percent after three years. For dividend omissions they 
reported abnormal returns of –11.0 percent in the first year and –15.3 percent after three 
years. Bali (2003) presented evidence consistent with the preceding results. He reported an 
average 1.17 percent abnormal return for dividend increases and -5.87 percent for decreases. 
In addition, he examined the long run drifts of stock prices reaction to dividend increases and 
decreases and reinforced the findings of Michaely et al. (1995). 
 
From the empirical findings of these studies there seems to be general agreement that share 
prices follow the same direction as the dividend change announcements. Dividend increases 
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and dividend initiations (decreases and omissions) are associated with subsequent significant 
increases (decreases) in share prices. Moreover, the reaction of share prices in the event of 
dividend decreases and dividend omissions is found to be more severe. 
 
The signalling power of dividends, however, may vary in different markets. For example, in a 
comparison study of dividend policies between Japanese and US firms, Dewenter and 
Warther (1998) revealed that the influence of dividends as a signalling mechanism in Japan is 
significantly lower as compared to the US. They studied 420 US firms and 194 Japanese 
firms. The results of Dewenter and Warther‟s study show that the 2-day event window         
(0, +1)
13
 in the event of dividend omissions gives a mean returns of -2.53 percent and -4.89 
percent, while for dividend initiations +0.03 percent and +2.38 percent for Japanese and US 
firms respectively. For a wide 62-day window (-60, +1) average returns are –6.48 percent and 
-17.03 percent, while for dividend initiations +0.1 percent and +10.24 percent for Japanese 
and US firms respectively.  
 
The results indicate that the impact of dividend omission and initiation announcements on US 
stock prices is significantly larger than on Japanese stock prices. Moreover, Dewenter and 
Warther conclude that Japanese firms are subject to less information asymmetry especially 
among keiretsu (industrial groups) member firms. These differences in the findings are 
attributable to the differences in corporate governance structures between Japan and the US, 
and moreover to the nature of corporate ownership in Japan. Conroy, Eades and Harris (2000) 
provide evidence consistent with Dewenter and Warther‟s (1998) study for Japanese firms. 
 
Using a sample of 200 German firms listed on Frankfurt Stock Exchange, Amihud and 
Murgia (1997) found support for the notion that dividend changes convey information about 
firms‟ values. They examined the stock price reaction to dividend announcements using 255 
events of dividend increase and 51 events of dividend decrease for the period of 1988 to 
1992, and compared the results with findings of studies based on US data. They reported that 
the average abnormal return (AR) of stock prices is 96.5% percent for dividend increase and 
–1.73 percent for dividend decrease.  
                                                          
13
 Chapter two of the literature review on mergers and acquisitions and the research methodology (chapter 5), 




In addition, they observed that though the earnings news preceded dividend change 
announcements, dividends still have significant information. However, the finding of their 
study was inconsistent with tax-based signalling models (for example, John and William, 
1985, and Bernheim, 1991) because dividends in Germany are not tax-disadvantaged. Recall 
that the tax-based signalling models propose that higher taxation on dividends makes them 
informative about a firm‟s value. Thus, according to these models, if dividends do not suffer 
from a tax penalty (as in the case Germany) share prices should not react to dividend 
changes. 
 
Travlos, Trigeorgis and Vafeas (2001) provided evidence from an emerging market in favour 
of the dividend signalling hypothesis. They used a sample of 41 announcements of cash 
dividend increase and 39 announcements of stock dividends for firms listed on the Cyprus 
Stock Exchange for the period of 1985 to 1995, and examined market reaction to the 
announcement of cash dividend increases and stock dividends. They found positive and 
significant abnormal returns for both cash dividend increases and stock dividend 
announcements and interpreted their results as consistent with the signalling hypothesis. 
  
Numerous studies have addressed another question of the information content of dividends 
hypothesis; that is, whether dividend changes enable the market to predict the future earnings 
of a firm. Empirical work that addresses this issue has yielded puzzling results. For example, 
Watts (1973) used a sample of 310 firms for the years 1946 to 1967, and annual definitions of 
dividends and earnings to test the hypothesis that current and past dividends provide more 
information to predict future earnings than that contained in current and past earnings. He 
tested the relationship between annual future earnings in year and the level of dividends   and 
also examined the association between the abnormal increase/decrease in stock prices and 
unanticipated changes in dividends.   He found that the average estimated coefficients of 
current dividends (across firms) are found to be positive but the average significance level are 
too small and concluded that the information content of dividends are only be trivial.   
 
Using a sample of 1025 firms listed on the NYSE and on the American Stock Exchange 
(AMEX) between 1979 and 1991, Benartzi, Michaely and Thaler (1997) studied the 
relationship between firms‟ future earnings and dividend changes. They did not find evidence 
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to support the notion that changes in dividends have the power to predict changes in future 
earnings. They found that dividend changes are strongly linked to contemporaneous and 
lagged earnings changes. And pose a challenge to the signalling hypothesis. Their results lend 
support to the earlier findings of Watts (1973) and those of DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and 
Skinner (1996) who also found no evidence that dividends provide valuable information 
about future earnings. 
 
Further, Nissim and Ziv (2001) found that dividend changes and earnings changes are 
positively correlated, and provide support for the signalling hypothesis. However, their 
results were not the same for dividend increases and decreases. They did not find an 
association between dividend decreases and future profitability after controlling for current 
and expected profitability, and they assumed that this result is possibly due to the accounting 
conservatism. Note however that  the proposition that dividend changes transmit information 
about future earnings seems to have weak support. 
 
Mixed support exists about issues relating to the information content of dividends hypothesis 
which is a common concept in the dividend literature.  Firms often use dividend policy to 
communicate information about their future prospects to the market, and this provides 
another possible explanation of why firms pay dividends. Moreover, signalling could play a 
pivotal role in determining firms‟ dividend policies and their values.   
. 
The signalling hypothesis makes an important assumption that managers want to signal the 
proper value of the firm via dividends. However, another school of thought has been 
developed on the suspicion that managers may have incentives not to pay dividends and will 
therefore need to be forced (or given incentives) to pay dividends.   
 
 3.8 Agency Costs and Free Cash Flow Hypothesis of Dividend Policy and the 
          Empirical Proof  
  
One of the assumptions of M&M‟s perfect capital market is that there are no conflicts of 
interests between managers and shareholders. In practice, however, this assumption is 
questionable where the owners of the firm are distinct from its management. In these cases 
managers are always imperfect agents of shareholders (principals). This is because managers‟ 
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interests are not necessarily the same as shareholders‟ interests, and they might carry out 
actions that are costly to shareholders, such as over-investing in managerially rewarding but 
unprofitable activities. Shareholders therefore incur (agency) costs associated with 
monitoring managers‟ behaviour, and these agency costs are an implicit cost resulting from 
the potential conflict of interest among shareholders and corporate managers. The payment of 
dividends might serve to align the interests and mitigate the agency problems between 
managers and shareholders, by reducing the discretionary funds available to managers 
(Rozeff, 1982, Easterbrook, 1984, Jensen, 1986, and Alli, Khan and Ramirez, 1993). 
 
Another source of the agency costs problem that may be influenced by dividend policy is the 
potential conflict between shareholders and bondholders. Shareholders are considered as the 
agents of bondholders‟ funds. In this case, excess dividend payments to shareholders may be 
taken as shareholders expropriating wealth from bondholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
Shareholders have limited liability and they can access the company‟s cash flow before 
bondholders. Consequently, bondholders prefer to put constraints on dividend payments to 
secure their claims. Conversely, for the same reasons, shareholders prefer to have large 
dividend payments (Ang, 1987). 
 
Easterbrook (1984) argued that dividends could be used to reduce the free cash flow in the 
hands of managers and hypothesised that dividend payments will oblige managers to 
approach the capital market to raise funds. In this case investment professionals such as 
bankers and financial analysts will also be able to monitor managers‟ behaviour. Therefore, 
shareholders are able to monitor managers at lower cost (and minimise any collective action 
problems). This suggests that dividend payments increase management scrutiny by outsiders 
and reduce the chances for managers to act in their own self-interest. However, Easterbrook 
suggested that increasing dividend payments might force managers to take undesirable 
actions like increasing firm leverage, which may sometimes increase the riskiness of the firm. 
 
Along the lines of Easterbrook‟s argument, Jensen (1986) contended that firms with excess   
cash flow give managers more flexibility for using the funds in a way that benefit themselves 
but not shareholders‟ best interests. He defined free cash flow as the cash not needed to 
finance positive NPV projects and argued that managers have incentives to enlarge the size of 
their firms beyond the optimal size. This is to amplify the resources under their control and 
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moreover to increase their compensation, which is often related to firm size (see also Gaver 
and Gaver, 1993).  
 
Thus, if a firm has a substantial surplus of cash the overinvestment problem will be more 
pronounced, and managers may undertake negative NPV projects. Extracting the excess 
funds of free cash flow that management controls can reduce this overinvestment problem. 
Increasing dividend payouts may help to mitigate the free cash flow under managers‟ control, 
thereby preventing them from investing in negative NPV or poor projects. As a result, paying 
more dividends will reduce the agency costs between managers and shareholders. Moreover, 
Jensen has pointed out that debt might play a similar role to dividends in reducing the agency 
costs of free cash flow by reducing the funds under management control. 
 
As noted earlier, M&M suggested that a firm‟s dividend policy is independent of its 
investment policy. By contrast, the free cash flow hypothesis implies that dividend policy and 
the investment decision are interrelated. It is argued that an increase in dividend payments 
will reduce the “overinvestment” problem, which will have a positive impact on the market 
value of the firm (Lang and Litzenberger, 1989). However, accepting the notion that 
increasing dividends will reduce the funds available to managers and force them to be in the 
market to acquire funds means that shareholders should be willing to tolerate the risk of the 
firm being more indebted and also accept paying higher personal tax rates on dividends. In 
other words, shareholders have to trade off between the costs and benefits of acquiring more 
dividends. 
 
The issue of agency costs hypothesis as an explanation of corporate dividend policy has been 
widely addressed in empirical research. Rozeff (1982), for instance, was one of the first to 
formally model agency costs using a large sample of US firms. Rozeff‟s regression model 
and the hypothesised signs of the variables can be described as follows: 
 
PAY = β0 + β1INS – β2GROW1 – β3GROW2 – β4BETA +β5STOCK + ε………………….13 
 
where, PAY is the average payout ratio over a seven year period, INS is the percentage of 
common stock held by insiders over the seven year period, GROW1 is the realized average 
growth rate of a firm‟s revenues over a five year period, GROW2 is the forecasted growth of 
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sales over the five year period, BETA is the firm‟s estimated beta coefficient reported in the 
Value Line Investment Survey, and STOCK is the natural log of the number of shareholders 
at the end of the seven year period.  
 
The key idea of Rozeff‟s (1982) model is that the optimal dividend payout is at the level 
where the sum of transaction and agency costs are minimised, therefore the model is called 
“cost minimisation model”. Rozeff‟s model contained two proxies for agency costs, namely 
INS and STOCK. Note that the hypothesised signs of these variables (INS and STOCK) are 
negative and positive, respectively. This indicates that there should be a negative relationship 
between the percentage of stock held by insiders (insider ownership) and the payout ratio, 
and a positive relationship between the number of shareholders (dispersion of ownership) and 
the dividend payout ratio. Rozeff suggested that the benefits of dividends in reducing agency 
costs are smaller for companies with lower dispersion of ownership and higher for insider 
ownership. He found the agency costs variables significant and consistent with their 
hypothesised sign. Rozeff‟s (1982) results provide empirical support for the agency costs 
hypothesis. A decade later, Dempsey and Laber (1992) updated the work of Rozeff using an 
extended period over the years 1981-1987 and strongly supported Rozeff‟s findings (see also 
Lloyd, Jahera and Page, 1985). 
 
Using factorial analysis to model the determinants of corporate dividend policy Alli et al. 
(1993) found the ownership dispersion factor insignificant in relation to dividend decision, 
inconsistent with Rozeff (1982). However, the insider ownership variable was found to be 
significant and negatively related to dividend payouts. The overall results of their study 
support the agency cost hypothesis of dividend policy. Jensen, Solberg and Zorn (1992) 
applied three-stage least squares to examine the determinants of cross-sectional differences in 
insider ownership, debt, and dividend policy.  
 
They used a sample of 565 firms for the year 1982 and 632 firms for the year 1987. From the 
dividend equation, the insider ownership variable was found statistically significant with a 
negative sign. This implies that there is a negative relationship between insider holdings and 
dividend payments. The result of Jensen et al. is consistent with Rozeff (1982) and therefore 




Holder, Langrehr and Hexter (1998) examined 477 US firms over the period 1980 to 1990. 
They reported that insider ownership and dividend payouts are significantly and negatively 
related and that the number of shareholders positively influences payouts. In addition, they 
found support for Jensen‟s free cash flow hypothesis. Likewise, Saxena (1999) examined a 
sample of 235 unregulated and 98 regulated firms listed on the NYSE over the period of 1981 
to 1990 and reinforced the findings of the Holder et al.‟s study. Both studies are consistent 
with the agency costs hypothesis and provide evidence that agency cost is a key determinant 
of the firm dividend policy. 
 
Further empirical support for the agency cost hypothesis and in particular for the free cash 
flow hypothesis came from Lang and Litzenberger (1989). While this study pre-dates many 
of the agency costs studies discussed above, it does so from a different model of agency cost 
analysis, namely the free cash flow hypothesis of Jensen (1986). Lang and Litzenberger 
tested a sample of 429 dividend-change announcements for US firms for the period of 1979 
to 1984 and used the Tobin‟s ratio
14
 to distinguish between overinvesting-firms and value-
maximising ones.  
 
Based on Lang and Litzenberger (1989) overinvestment hypothesis, firms with less than one    
should be expected to have larger average stock returns following dividend change 
announcements. To clarify, low firms experience positive abnormal stock returns following 
dividend increase announcements because the market anticipates this as a reduction in the 
overinvestment problem (good news). That is, an increase in dividend payment reduces the 
cash flow that would have been otherwise invested in negative NPV projects. Conversely, 
dividend decrease suggests that the potential for overinvestment problems may have grown. 
 
 This prediction is consistent with the free cash flow hypothesis. They reported that the 
average stock returns for firms were significant for both dividend increases and decreases. 
They opined that dividend changes for over investing firms (where the Tobin‟s Q is less than 
1) signal information about investment policies. This argument provides evidence in support 
                                                          
14 Tobin‟s Q can be defined as the ratio of the market value of the firm‟s equity and debt to the replacement cost 




of free cash flow hypothesis and argued that the excess funds hypothesis provides a better 
explanation of share price reaction to dividend change announcements than the cash flow 
signalling hypothesis. 
 
Other empirical studies have examined the agency theory of free cash flow and have found 
little or no support for the excess cash flow hypothesis. For example, using a sample of 55 
self-tenders and 60 special dividend announcements between 1979 and 1989 Howe, He and 
Kao (1992) produced findings that challenge those of Lang and Litzenberger (1989) and 
show that there is no relationship between Tobin‟s Q and stocks reaction to one-time 
dividend announcements.  
 
Further, Denis, Denis and Sarin (1994) investigated a sample of 5992 dividend increases and 
785 dividend decreases between 1962 and 1988. They examined the relationship between 
dividend yield and Tobin‟s Q. They found the relationship to be negative and argued that this 
negative relation is attributable to a negative correlation between dividend yield and Tobin‟s 
Q.  This suggests that the market perceived this as a signal that overinvestment problems may 
be imminent. In the same vein, they examined the level of capital expenditures for low and 
high firms in relation to dividend changes and observed that firms with Tobin‟s Q  less than 1 
increased their investments following dividend increases and decreased them following 
dividend decreases.  
 
This result contradicts the overinvestment hypothesis. In addition, using a sample 419 
dividend change announcements of firms listed on the NYSE over the period 1969 to 1988, 
Yoon and Starks (1995) arrived at the same conclusion. The studies of both Denis et al. 
(1994) and Yoon and Starks (1995) thus provide support to the cash flow signalling 
hypothesis rather than free cash flow hypothesis as an explanation for the stock price 
reactions to dividend change announcements. 
 
Lie (2000) also examined the free cash flow hypothesis using a large sample of special 
dividends, regular dividend increases, and self-tender offers. He found little evidence in 
support of the agency cost hypothesis and concluded that neither small special dividends nor 
the increase in regular dividends could solve the overinvestment problem. This is inconsistent 
with the agency hypothesis of free cash flow. La Porta et al. (2000a) examined more than 
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4000 companies from 33 countries around the world and provided empirical support for the 
agency costs hypothesis. They started by dividing the countries into two categories: countries 
that provided good legal protection for minority shareholders, and countries where 
shareholders had poor legal protection
15
. Next, they analysed the effect of investor protection 
on dividend payouts and tested two alternative agency models: the “outcome” model and the 
“substitute” model. The first model implies that in countries with a more effective legal 
protection system, shareholders have greater rights and therefore can force managers to 
disgorge cash. As a result, dividend becomes an outcome of the legal protection of 
shareholders. They hypothesised that the more effective the legal protection the greater the 
rights of shareholders, and subsequently more dividends are paid. 
 
The second or substitute model, predicts that managers can use dividends to establish a 
reputation if they need to go to the capital market to raise external funds. In countries with 
weak protection of shareholders, firms may need to establish a good reputation for their 
treatment of investors by paying more dividends to shareholders. That is, dividends serve as a 
substitute for legal protection of minority shareholders. La Porta et al. hypothesised that 
higher payouts are expected in countries with poor legal protection and support the agency 
model of dividends. That is, in countries where shareholders have better protection, firms pay 
more dividends. Moreover, they found that firms operating in these countries and having a 
rapid growth rate paid fewer dividends than their counterparts with slow growth rates. This 
implies that shareholders use their legal power to force managers to disgorge cash when 
investment opportunities are low.   
 
Thus in summary, the empirical results for the agency costs explanation of dividend policy 
are mixed. The agency costs hypothesis posits that dividends mitigate the cash under 
management control, and therefore reducing the possibility that managers will use the funds 
in their own self-interest. Dividends may also curb managers‟ tendency for over investing. In 
this way, it is speculated that dividends serve to reduce conflict of interests between 
managers and shareholders. As dividend payment reduces the overinvestment problem and 
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agency costs, it may have a positive impact on stock price, which is in turn is a critical 
determinant of any mergers and acquisition particularly in the banking sector.  The overall 




The literature on dividend policy has produced a large body of theoretical and empirical 
research, especially following the publication of the dividend irrelevance hypothesis of M&M 
(1961). No general consensus has yet emerged after several decades of investigation, and 
scholars can often disagree even about the same empirical evidence. In perfect capital 
markets, M&M asserted that the value of a firm is independent of its dividend policy. 
However, various market imperfections exist (taxes, transaction costs, information 
asymmetry, agency problems, etc) and these market imperfections have provided the basis for 
the development of various theories of dividend policy including tax-preference, clientele 
effects, signalling, and agency costs. 
 
The chapter has reviewed the evolution of corporate dividend policy. It was noted that 
dividend policy has been bound up with the development and history of the corporation itself. 
The basic argument and M&M proof of dividend irrelevancy have also been streamlined and 
the chapter also explored the main theories that counter the irrelevancy proposition of 
dividend. To provide an understanding of dividend policy theories, the chapter attempted to 
explain the basic argument for each theory followed by the most important empirical 
evidence on testing of these theories. The theoretical and empirical studies discussed in this 











Analysis of Mergers & Acquisitions 
 
4.0 Introduction 
 The   issue of mergers and acquisitions hereafter refered to as M&A has captured the interest 
of many both in the business industries and academics. Several of these studies have focused 
on the banking sector due to the strategic importance of the banks in any economy. During 
the period 1997 - 2007, several M&A were initiated in many EU countries, many of which 
were either domestic or cross border deals.  This cahpter therefore reviews the roles of M&A, 
EU regulations on bank M&A and the impact of the glaobal economic impasse on banks 
mergers.  
 
4.1 The Concept of Mergers and Acquisitions 
The term mergers is often used in congruence with acquisitions. It is one of the most popular 
terms used in finance and economics. Its divergent nature has earned it a wide interpretation 
and definitions. Mergers & Acquisitions ( M&A) play crucial roles in the development and 
growth of corporate entities. They provide a substantial source of finance to several 
organisations. But some other organisations could percieve M&A as a threat to their 
independent existence  (Watson & Head, 2005). 
 
Academics often use the terms mergers and acquisitions interchangeably or refer to the 
acronym „M&A‟ without actually differentiating between the two events. In theory, the 
merger between X and Y occurs when there is amalgamation between both to form another 
legal entity Z. This contrasts with acquisition that occurs in any three ways: when X buys 
minority stake in Y( less than 50%); when X buys majority share in Y (above 50.01%) of Y 
and when X buys all the shares in Y(100%) (see, e.g. Pasiouras et al, 2005).  
 
Mergers can be defined as a reorganisation of assets into a new organisation. They often 
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involve companies with similar size. This is in order to avoid the dominance of one company 
by the other. This feature differentiates M&A from takeover which is often associated with  
companies of different sizes. The bigger company often called the „bidder‟which offers to 
acquire the smaller or target company‟s shares. This can be done by paying cash, offering 
shares in their company (equity purchase), or both. In practice though, the line between 
mergers and takeover is narrowed as one of the merging companies is often bigger than the 
other.   
 
Cybo-ottone & Murgia (2000) defined merger and acquisition ( M&A) from the economic 
perspective. They explained that M&A can be considered as an event that involved 
companies along the profit function through a change in size, scope and distance from the 
efficient frontier. This definition suggests that profit is a veritable product of M&A. They 
also suggest that evidence on the the cross section estimates of profit and cost functions may 
provide prooof of any profitability impacts resulting in a merger deal.The above definition 
further highlights that M&A is the acquisition of a stake of 50% without control, if the 
transfer is between affiliated parties or between different parties. 
 
4.1.1 Types of bank mergers 
 
Mergers can be classified into horizontal, vertical and conglomerate . Horizontal mergers take 
place between competitors, while vertical mergers occur between companies that are on 
buyer and seller relationship. Conglomerate merger is an amalgam of firms of different lines 
of operation. 
 
Horizontal mergers occurs when a company takes over another fom the same industry and at 
the stage of production process. Thus, the horizontal integration involves the combination of 
two competitors (Gaughan, 2002). Horizontal mergers  are more difficult to implement when 
the market is oligopolistic (only a few firms on the market)  and therefore can result to 
monopolistic power. In the UK, the hostile bid in 2001 by Lloyds TSB for Abbey National 
plc was prevented as this merger would have given too much power in the market to Lloyds 
TSB. It was therefore perceived as against public interest. The primary motives of a 




Vertical mergers occur when organisations acquire another with the desire to achieve scope. 
This happens where the target is in the same industry as the acquirer but operating at a 
different stage of the production chain. Depamphilis (2003) explains that vertical integration 
can better be demonstarted with the use of corporate value chain. Organisations that do not 
own operations in each major segment of value chain may choose to backward integrate by 
acquiring a supplier or to forward integrate by acquiring a distributor. Thus, vertical 
integration reduces costs of research, contracting, payment collection, advertsing, 
communication, and co-ordination of production. The synergy achieved in a vertical 
integration may produce size and cost efficiency for the integrated companies. 
 
Finally, conglomerate mergers occurs where the target is in an activity apparently unrelated 
to the acquirer although the same activities such as marketing may be related. Gaughan 
(2002) opines that a conglomerate merger occurs when the companies are not competitors 
and do not have a buyer–seller relationship. Some conglomerate mergers are motivated by 
risk reduction through diversification and to improve efficiency. 
 
4.1.2 Determinants of Bank mergers and Acquisitions 
 
Bank mergers do not happen by accidents. They are often carried out with caution and care. 
This is because of the complexities involved in a merger deal.  Berger & Humphrey (1992) 
emphasized that the stock market data produce some evidence on the impact of a merger deal 
on the shareholders of the companies. Therefore to ascertain the efficacy of a merger deal as 
at the time of it‟s annoucement can be established by splitting the sample according to the 
size, scope, geophaphy, and the legal nature of the merger. A positive impact of the merger 
can be explained by an increase in the efficency, profitability or the share price following the 
merger. 
 
Scope : The merger deal is undertaken when there is existence of economies of scope. This 
can be achieved by comparing the value of the shareholders creation effect of similar (eg. 
bank to bank) as opposed to cross product deals.   
Geography:  The geographical dimension of the deal is very relevant. Rhoades (1993) 
explained that a merger deal occurrs when a more efficient firm acquires a less efficient firm. 
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This means that a bank merger may be motivated to eliminate the duplication of activities. 
Such mergers often occur when there is a considerable overlap in the market.  
Economies of Scale: Some evidence of economies of scale effects can also be observed if the 
value creation effects are larger than the size of the deal. The size of the deal  could provide a 
rough measure of market concentration following the deal. This yardstick is usually included 
in some merger guidelines.  
 
Economies of scale occurs because the scale of operations is larger after the M&A. 
Economies of Scale are most likely to arise in horizontal acquisitions but may also surface in 
vertical acquisitions. They are common in areas such as production, distribution, marketing, 
management and finance (Watson & Head, 2005). 
 
Synergy: This happens when the assets of the operations of the companies involved in the 
deal complement each other. Thus the combined outpout after the merger is greater than the 
sum of their individual outputs.   
 
Legal:  The legal nature of the M&A gives a better understanding on the deal.  If the deal is 
prompted by desire of acquisition, it will follow from a desire to preserve the identity of the 
target by limiting intervention to the injection of capital. Whereas a desired increase in cost 
efficiency will be more likely to be related to a centralised mode of organisation like a 
merger. In reality, the legal distinction between the merger and acquisition is blurred. Some 
acquired firms are later merged with bidder companies as a result of the friendly nature of 
many acquistions, especially in the banking sector which is highly regulated (James & 
Houston, 1996).  
 
Comparing the bidders and target banks:  Another determinant feature of M&A is the 
assessment of the pre-merger performance of the banks. If  the preformance has been poor, it 
will be evident that the merger is prompted by injecting efficiency in the management of the 
bank. Watson and Head (2005) infer that a declining share price will attract potential bidders 








4.1.3 Reasons for Bank Mergers and Acquisitions 
 
There are often justifications for banks to undertake M&A.  The reasons can be classified 
under two broad categories: economic and financial justifications. Watson & Head (2005) 
enlist the economic reasons for M&A as entry to new markets, provision of critical mass, 
means of  providing growth, and increase in market power and share. The financial reasons 
range from financial synergy, target undervaluation, tax considerations and increase in 
earnings per share. 
 
Banks may wish to expand even beyond their domestic territory. Such cross border expansion 
can be facilitated by mergers. This could include the expansion into new geographical and 
business areas of the bank especially when the internal growth is not too efficient. 
 
The critical mass or size may be essential in the credibility of the bank. Mergers are 
sometimes critical in enhancing the needed attractiveness of the bank to attract such fanfare 
from the public. Given the veritable nature of their research and developments; marketing, 
investments, merging companies can put their resources together to muscle the critical mass 
and size essential to provide sufficient funds to finance such activities (Altunbas & Marques, 
2008). 
 
When a bank gets to its elastic limit, the chances of internal growth becomes uncertain. 
Mergers and acquisitions  provides a good opportunity for a bank to strategize its growth 
focus. M&A also increases the chances of acquiring market share and may strengthen the 
banks monopolistic power especially in horizontal mergers and acquistions. However, the 
vertical acquisition tightens the grip on raw materials or the distribution. 
 
Financial synergy occurs if the banks reduce their cost of capital as a result of M&A. This 
benefit can be achieved when there is an increased size following an acquisition since such 
acquisition can drastically reduce the interest rate on new debts. Rad & Beek (1999) add that 
synergies in a merger deal is more realistic when the costs of the merged firm are lower than 
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the costs of the two merging banks which again is a direct benefit of economies of scale. 
Another important aspect of merger is its use in eliminating ineffective management team at 
least cost. 
 
Another interesting reason that facilities a merger is the availability of information about the 
target bank or the information hypothesis (Hawawini & Swary,1990). This can be obtained 
when there is a correspondent-respondent relationship between the banks,  particularly in 
cross border mergers. Banks may have private information about another where there exists 
such correspondent-respondent relationship. Such privately held information can be utilised 
by the bidder banks to evaluate a merger attempt.  
 
4.1.4  Bank Mergers and Shareholders Wealth 
 
The past two decades have experienced an enormous increase in the number of mergers 
involving banks and other financial institutions particularly in Europe. The cumulative money 
value of the merger activities from 1997 to 2007, for instance is believed to be in upwards of 
96 trillion dollars (Reuters, 2009). The US dominated the world merger activities  but the 
trend has also highly infiltrated the Eurpean financial market.   
 
According to European Economic Research (1996), the number of M&A activities in the 
Eurpoean countries increases by over 50-90 deals per year . This is at an estimated average of 
15 mergers per year. The financial yield resulting from such deals amounts to about $77.9 
billion while in the US, it amounts to $193.6 billion within 1991 and 1996. Thus, till date the 
US bank mergers have been the focus of merger activities among most researchers due to the 
volumious amount of information available.  
 
There have been numerous studies relating to the impact of M&A on the profits of banks   
and shareholders waelth. Some of the studies have indicated both negative and positive 
effects on the both the bidder and target banks and their shareholders. Eckbo (1983) found 
that when a bank merger is announced, the share price of the bank tends to rise. This is either 
because the increase of market concentration improves profits of the larger players.  This 
result contrasts with some others undertaken especially in the US such as Cornett and 
Tehradnian (1992), Houston and Ryngaert (1994); Siems (1996) which found a decline in the 
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share prices of the banks after  M&A. 
 
The result obtained by Cybo-Ottone and Murgia (2000) suggest that merger increases the 
share value of the banks. This finding is notable as it streamlines a higher positive result in 
mergers involving banks and other financial institutions such as insurance firms. The returns 
on such mergers were statistically significant than in other bank-to-bank mergers. 
Additionally, the study shows that in the year following the deals‟ annoucement, there is  
higher and significant abnormal returns .  
 
The study of Rhoades (1993) on the domestic bank mergers finds some weak evidence that 
bidder bank underperforms in the market more than the targets whereas the opposite is 
claimed in cross border deals. The financial institutions have a clear pattern of significant  
under performance in the years prior to the announcement of their deal. The study also 
amplified the difference in the results of a merger as different from an acquisition. It 
compared the post merger performance of the target banks that have been acquired with 
targets that have been merged, and finds a very small and non significant under performance 
of merger targets as compared with acquisitions targets and with merger bidders. This finding 
is consistent with that of Cybo-Ottone and Murgia (2000) in that there is weak evidence that 
merger deals have a more disciplinary appeal than acquistion. 
 
The argument of Houston & Ryngaert (1994) was based on their study from a sample of US  
mergers and could not establish any significant  input on the value of the shareholders wealth 
particularly the acquiring bank. The study concludes that the shareholders wealth is in effect 
transferred from the acquiring to the target banks. However, a positive correlation between 
the value created as a result of the merger and some other factors were established; such 
factors as the acquiring bank‟s operating performance, the nature of the operating 
environment, and the mode of financing the deal. 
 
Although the issue of how much wealth is generated or reduced by merger has remained very 
contentious as well as controversial, most researchers agree that there is some impact on the 
shareholders or the banks.  Some studies attribute the wealth changes to a greater efficiency 
resulting from the merger; and the pooling together of resources (Pillof, 1996; Berger, 2000; 
Hughes et al 1999 ). While others such as Beitel et al (2004) suggest that most mergers result 
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in excess returns to the shareholders as a result of combination of both size, profitability of 
the banks and the efficiency factor. However, they concluded that the shareholders wealth 
will be higher when the target bank has a poor stock performance and the acquirer bank is 
involved in few merger deals. 
 
However, Kane (2000) adds that such wealth generation resulting from merger is likely to be 
feasible if there is a potential for increase in market concentration and where the target is a 
large depository bank and both are located in the same area. This undermines any argument 
in support of cross border M&A. Mergers involving large banks are favorably disposed as 
their share price is likely to improve.   
 
However, Becher (2000) offers an insightful finding regarding merger activities in the EU in 
the 1990s.  His findings suggest that wealth creation by banks mergers was at its peak over 
the period, and this is supported by the large increase in bank mergers and deregulations 
during the period. The number of banks mergers increased by over 2.15% over the past 
decade.  The study indicated that merger in the banking sector created more synergies and 
benefits to merging banks through time.  Using a 36 day event window, the study concluded 
that the wealth created by the merger was positively significant to the targets as well as the 
returns to the bidders. The overall effect is significantly positive and larger  than any other in 
the 1980s.  However, over an 11- day event, the result of the study produced a positive return 
to the target but negative to the bidders.  
 
The analysis captured the opinion of some previous studies which suggest a longer event 
window for the targets when calculating the abnormal returns. The study also reaffirmed the 
positive impact of deregulation on the banking sector and upheld the importance of synergies 
in M&A transactions. 
 
There is another argument about the value created by mergers.  According to the principal – 
agent theory, there is an assertion that the interest of the managers do not often represent 
those of the shareholders in the consideration of a merger deals.  This is particulary common 
where the managers renumerations are based on growth or size. Thus, managers will be more 
inclined to engage in mergers irrespective of the benefits or doubts surrounding such 
acquisitions. Roll (1988) confirms that in some circumstances, the target banks could be 
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overpayed in a display of  pride of managing a mega bank at the expense of the shareholders. 
This latter arguement is often refered to as the „hybris hypothesis‟.  
 
Bank mergers are also figured to be tools for reducing the operating expenses and thus 
increasing net profits and efficiency. However, Berger and Humphrey (1992) demostrated 
that mergers of banks with totals assets worth over $100 million have an insignificant effect 
on the operating costs of the merged banks.  In fact, some studies have failed to find any 
collaboration between mergers and economies of scale in the banking sector. Bogus banks are 
not often the most profitable firms (Boyd & Graham,1991). This tends to suggest that large 
and merged banks do not necessarily create good shareholders wealth or have as good 
efficiency as may be expected. 
  
4.1.5 Bank Mergers and Growth in Bank Formation 
 
The overall impact of mergers in the banking industry can be assessed by the number of 
functional banks existing after a merger wave. Arguments have been advanced purporting 
that consolidation results from deregulatory changes which shrink the number of banks.  The 
European Central Bank report (2004) maintains that number of EU banks fell by over 23% 
following the mergers that occurred between 1971-2003. The incidence of M&A is often 
found to be the aftermath of deregulations in the sector, technological changes, increase 
competition in the industry, introduction of the euro. As a result, inefficient banks have been 
absorbed by the more efficient ones.  
 
However, Cabral et al (2002) noted that the majority of mergers occurred among the small 
domestic institutions and among banks operating in the EU countries. Banking groups have 
been criticised for concentrating their merger activities within the domestic banks. This ploy, 
Campa & Hernando (2006) argue, is to consolidate their positions within their countries of 
operation rather than targeting their strategy to other foreign EU countries where uncertainty 
is greater and survival as a result of competition is made difficult. 
 
A significant factor in merger activity is the geographical diversification which results from 
the merger. There is also the improved competitiveness and the ability of the banks to provide 




There are different opinions on the reasons for the rise in bank mergers. Two studies 
conducted have divergent views about the impact of bank mergers on the formation of banks. 
Such divergent findings raise questions about the correlation of bank mergers and bank 
growth or formation. Keeton (2000) opined that the mergers that encourage new bank 
formation  are those that involve the takeover of small banks by the large banks or those 
involving the takeover of local banks by distant banks. This can be adduced by the 
disappearance of small banks. 
 
Results on bank merger activities in the 1990s indicate that mergers are strong factors in the 
growth of banks. Markets with high record of merger activities have higher growth of bank 
formations especially those involving the takeover of small banks by the big banks or the 
local banks by the distant banks. This can be attributed to high profitability, increased  
population and economic growth  rates and low market concentration (Amel and Liang, 
1997). 
 
The issue of bank mergers and growth came into focus with the upsurge in banks M&A 
which coincided with the growth of banks in the 1990s. This incidental increase in merger 
activity  provides a lead to the conclusion by some economic analysts that merger is a crucial 
index of such bank growth and formations. This conclusion was however challenged by the 
Seeling & Critchfield (1999) which found that heavy merger activity and new bank 
formations are not correlated. The incidence could both have increased in response to other 
factors such as high profits, strong economic growth etc. The study opined that instead, 
mergers in fact act as deterrent to bank formations. 
 
The emergence of the above findings led to further research on the issue by Berger et al 
(1999). They confirmed the popular opinion that merger activity actually increases bank 
formation. The study did not only consider similar factors examined by Seelin & Critchfield 
(1999), it also used data on mergers and new bank charters across different markets and  
controlling for other factors that could have encouraged mergers and new bank formations 
within the 1990s. 
 
Others have held bank M&A contributes to the significant reduction in the number of banks. 
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Goddard et al (2007) argued that bank consolidation had reduced the number of banks in the 
majority of the EU15 countries particularly within 1984 - 2004.  This assertion was earlier   
highlighted by Walkner & Raes (2005). In evidence drawn from the Europen Central Bank 
(2004), they examined the percentage decline in the number of domestic banks between 1997 
and 2004 which was attributed largely to merger formation in the various member states of 
EU.  Table 4.1 presents their data. 
 
Table 4.1 Trend in the Number of Banks Among EU Countries  
Source: ECB(2004) and extracted from Walkner & Raes(2005) 
 
As can be noted in the table, there  is a decrease in the number of bank branches in most of 
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the countries. In Belgium, the number declined by more than 32% while in Germany and the 
Netherlands, the number fell down by 25.1% and 46% respectively. The UK and 
Luxembourg also recorded a fall of 13.2% and 15.4% in the number of local branches while 
in Sweden, it fell by 18.2% . However, an increase in the number of bank branches rose to 
more than 31% in Greece, 19% in Italy, 14% in Portugal, 4% in Spain and 1.3% in France. 
This appears to be an inconsistent trend  as majority of the EU countries show a decrease in 
the number of bank formations.  
 
The argument for and against the effect of merger activity can be understood by considering 
the economic impact on banks. Mergers can discourage bank charters by producing 
organisations with enough local market power to discourage entry. On the otherhand, mergers 
can also encourage bank charters by creating a niche in service to small customers who are 
more concerned about their personal service. Such service will hardly be a priority of the big 
merged banks.      
 
 
4.2  Studies on European Domestic & Crossborder Bank Mergers  
 
There has been a surge in banks mergers within and across the European countries over the 
last decade. Records show that domestic mergers have maintained steady growth in relation 
to cross border or international mergers.  However, between 1985 and 2001 only about one 
fifth of all merger transactions were cross border.  The banking sector accounted for only 
13% of the such deals (Focarelli & Pozzolo, 2001). The rare occurence of cross border 
mergers has been attributed to several factors such as inefficiency, cultural issues, adverse 
regulation, communication barriers and distance which have contributed to its limited success 
in such deals. Goddard et al (2007) confirmed that cross border bank mergers  particularly 
those involving large banks have been quite unpopular within the European countries. 
Domestic banks tend to outperform international banks in terms of their efficiency 
particularly in developed economies. Amihud et al (2002) thus assert that cross border 
mergers in such respect give a picture of weak competition in the market.  
 
Most studies on cross border deals have concentrated on inefficiency, nature of the target and 
acquirer banks and regulatory framework as crucial factors in its limited success (Vander-
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Vennet, 1998; Berger et al 2000). However, Buch & DeLong (2004) added that information 
costs remain a considerable determinant of international merger deals.  This is in consonance 
with Berger et al (2001) which add that cultural differences, supervisory structures, common 
currency have inadvertently inhibited cross border mergers in Europe. 
 
Buch & DeLong (2004) applied the gravity model of foreign investment decision to diagnose 
the rationale behind cross border mergers.  The model has been previous applied to foreign 
trade-in-goods between two countries, which is a factor of the market size and the geographic 
distance between the countries.  The distance between the countries is considered to be a 
proxy for transportation costs. The expense on cost created by distance has been upheld as a 
critical issue in the growth of cross border M&A.  Other studies (Wei & Wu, 2001; Portes & 
Rey, 1999)  concur with their assertion. 
 
Another key variable in the determinant factors of cross border M&A has been the 
deregulatory environment. Countries with effective privatisation programmes have attracted 
foreign investors particularly in the fragile banking sector. Most European countries with 
privatised banking sector have been points of interest for merger deals. Bonin & Abel (2000) 
found that privatisation has been a key influence in the high market shares of foreign banks in 
the Eastern Europe.  
 
Conversely, economies with more stringent information requirements and efficient 
supervisory system will likely win the confidence of foreign interests. They often have laid 
down disclosure regulatory requirements which give vital information of their operation and 
performance.  Thus banks in countries with such high regulatory standard will be more 
attractive for international acquirers in cross border merger deals.  However, Buch & 
DeLong( 2004) caution that such high regulatory standard, if too high may be a disincentive 
and could impede foreign interest from considering cross border merger deals.  
 
Ongena and Penas (2008) investigated the determinants of the bondholders‟ wealth effects of 
the acquirers in domestic and cross border European banks mergers in the periods of 1998 -
2002 and concluded that the abnormal returns to domestic bondholders is higher than those of 
the cross border banks.  The study also indicated that the banks‟ bondsholders experience 
abnormal returns of up to 5% higher than those participating in the cross border merger when 
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the acquirers country has a strict banking policy and regulations. 
 
Other studies have corroborated the above findings. Penas & Unal (2004) find that 
bondholders of both domestic and cross border banks in the US mergers realise significant 
positive risk and maturity adjusted returns around the merger announcement month.  After 
controlling for a variety of merger and bank characteristics, the bondholders returns show 
increase in the asset size as a result of the mergers. In the same vein, Choi, Hasan & Francis 
(2007)  examined the stock market reactions to merger announcements involving cross border 
acquirers.  They find the impact to be related to cross country difference in the deposit 
insurance and investors protection but with little relevance to the supervisory regimes. The 
study however failed to state any direct  impact of the  domestic and cross border mergers  on 
the bondholders‟ wealth of the banks. 
 
Aw and Chatterjee (2004) find that UK domestic acquirers achieve better performance  than 
the UK cross border acquirers , particularly those acquiring US targets. The UK domestic 
acquirers show positive but non significant abnormal returns in the six months following the 
merger announcement. The cross border EU banks acquisitions have significant negative 
returns. This argument is supported by various studies  such as Danbolt (1995), Conn (2003) 
and Black et al (2003)  which examined cross border acquisitions of quoted targets. Conn 
(2003) finds that of the 15 cross border  merger studies reviewed, the resonant conclusion is 
the zero or negative abnormal returns which applies to both UK and EU acquirers. These 
abnormal zero and negative returns are also found in the domestic acquisitions (Sudarsanma 
& Mahate, 2003).  
 
More recent studies have expressed diverse opinions and views on the profitability, efficiency 
and wealth generation of the cross border and domestic bank acquirers.  Mangold & Lippok 
(2008) compared  the shareholder wealth created by cross border with those of domestic 
acquirers among German firms. Their findings indicate that while domestic acquirers create 
wealth, cross border banks destroy shareholders wealth. The wealth destruction by the foreign 
acquirers in explained by the difficulties in post merger integration due to cultural 
differences, legal and economic obstacles. The study also adds that mergers involving non-
EU targets result in positive abnormal returns while EU targets results in significant negative 




The above assertion is supported by the findings of Lensink & Maslennikova (2008) who 
established that domestic bank acquirers create shareholder value while cross borders 
acquirers do not.  The finding is based on the geographic and product market diversification 
hypothesis. They applied the excess demand and the barrier to entry theories (Brewer et al, 
2000) to explain how geographic deregulations might affect the cross border announcements. 
While the excess demand theory posits that as geographical restrictions to mergers are 
eliminated, the number of bidders competiting for a given target will invariably increase.  
This will in turn increase the purchase price paid by the acquirer banks. In most cases, the 
target might be overpriced with the subsequent long-run effect of underperformance in 
relation to the abnormal returns of the merged bank. The study, however, used a window of 
20 days which might not capture the essential post merger events impacting on the acquirer 
banks performance. 
 
The barrier to entry theory advance the idea that the prices paid by cross border acquirers will 
be lower  as the barriers to the merger deals are removed. The argument is that the barriers 
often provide a bulwark to the targets which inevitably attracts the abnormal returns common 
with targets. Thus, eliminating the barriers to entry increases the chances of replacement of 
the target banks and lowers the purchase or merger price premium.  This ensures that the 
target is not overvalued and the acquirers are less likely to have poor abnormal returns. The 
theory thus upholds that barrier to entry encourages abnormal returns to the acquirers. 
 
Delong (2001) studied the market reaction to a geographical diversified bank mergers and 
finds that the US stock market reacts positively to domestic acquirers as against cross border 
acquirers in a merger announcement. The reaction can be explained by the potentials for cost 
savings which is greater when the banks are exposed to similar economic situations. This 
argument is also supported by the findings of Cybo-Ottone and Mugria (2000) who find that 
domestic acquisitions create more abnormal returns to their shareholders while cross border 
acquirers show a positive but not significant returns. 
 
However, not all cross border versus domestic merger studies support the assertion that 
domestic acquirers create more value to the shareholders than the cross border acquirers. In 
fact, Bertrand and Zitouna (2008) find the EU cross border and domestic bank acquirers 
89 
 
differ significantly. The study debugs any fears cast on cross border acquirers as they help 
enhance both the shareholders value and the domestic country‟s economy. The efficiency 
gains are found to be stronger in the cross border than domestic mergers and acquisitions. 
The difference in both acquirers can be explained by the mechanism of the European 
economic integrations. 
 
For cross border acquirers to create more wealth to the shareholders, they have to be 
distinctive in size and operations. Anand, Capron and Will (2005) add that only cross border 
acquirers with multinational scope are capable of creating more wealth for the shareholders. 
The implication is that only cross border bank acquirers that are conglomerates are capable of 
inflating the returns of the shareholders. In the same vein, Ecko and Thornburn (2000) and 
Gregory and McCorriston (2004) studies both private and quoted cross border M&A but find 
no trace of significant negative returns. 
 
However, some studies have found no difference in the returns of the both the cross border 
and domestic acquirers. Lowsinski, Schiereck and Thomas (2004) remark that any difference 
in the wealth effect of the domestic and cross border acquirers may be due to market 
segmentations in imperfectly competitive markets. In a ten day window to evaluate the effect 
of the cross border acquisitions on Swiss shareholder wealth, the domestic deals recorded 
higher abnormal returns than the cross border bank shareholders. On the merger 
announcement date, the cross border acquirers indicated  positive returns while the domestic 
acquirers showed negative returns. However, the empirical result of the study showed no 
significant difference between the cumulative abnormal returns of the both acquirers. The 
study has a shortcoming of being limited to Swiss bank acquirers.  
 
The above assertion is corroborated by Hernando, Nieto and Wall (2008) who find that both 
the cross border and domestic acquirers show no much difference in their characteristics. The 
cross border coefficients variables of EU bank acquirers are positive and statistically 
significant than the domestic acquirers, while the abnormal returns to the shareholders are 
high for the cross border acquirers. However, the study finds that cross border acquirers are 
less likely to increase their market shares in the target domestic market. Cross border 
acquirers are often attracted by the possibility of having a higher rent which might be readily 




Domestic acquirers are less likely to be profitable in more concentrated markets than their 
cross border counterparts. Hernando et al (2008) also reported that domestic banks are likely 
to acquire large banks. This can be explained by the theory that large banks are more 
beneficial in achieving both diversification and enhancing market penetration. There is also a 
suspicion that supervisory authorities tend to create easier platform for the acquisition of 
large banks by the domestic acquirers. 
  
Conn et al (2005) find cross border acquirers have lower announcement but long-run returns 
than domestic acquirers. However, in the short run, the study find domestic acquirers have 
negative abnormal returns while the cross border show zero and negative postmerger returns.   
 
While cultural difference is significant in the long run merger performance of the domestic 
acquirers, such a factor has no significance in the cross border acquisitions. Also taxes, 
accounting standards, the legal system and exchange rate volatility have no significance in 
the returns and performance of the acquirers. Conn et al (2005) maintain that cultural 
difference remains an odd for the cross border acquirers especially when integration and 
acculturation are vital factors in the process. The greater the cultural gap, the worse the 
problem of the success of the deal for cross border acquirers as opposed to the domestic. 
 
4.2.1 Studies on the Performance of  Domestic & Cross Border Bank Acquirers 
 
Essentially, performance studies in mergers and acquisitions can be categorised into 7 broad 
areas: integration process performance (Bresman et al., 1999; Capron, 1999;  Datta, 1991; 
Larsson & Finkelstein, 1999; Shanley & Carrea,1992); overall acquisition performance               
(Bruton et al., 1994;  Hayward, 2002; Humburg & Bucerius, 2006; Puranam et al., 2006; 
accounting performance (Palich et al., 2000; Zollo & Singh,  2004; Feea & Thomas, 2004, 
Goddard, Molyneux & Wilson, 2004a; DeLong & DeYoung, 2007); long-term financial 
performance (Carow et al., 2004;  Harrison et al., 2005;  Palich et al., 2000); short-term 
performance (Moeller et al., 2004; Pangarkar, 2004; Seth et al., 2002; Shahrur, 2005; Walker, 
2005; Capron & Pistre, 2002; Carow et al., 2004); acquisition survival (Bergh, 2001; 
Vermeulen & Barkema, 1996; Pennings et al., 1994) and innovation performance (Ahuja & 




Examination of some operational performance studies indicate mixed results. For instance, 
Cornett & Tehranian (1992) studied the performance of 30 US bank acquirers and find a 
correlation between stock market reactions and changes in the financial performance. This 
implies that the market reacts commensurately with the level of the performance of the banks. 
This can be seen when banks announce their year profits and losses. Pillof (1996) 
investigated 48 mergers over a period of 10 years to establish the correlation between the 
abnormal returns and the financial performance of the banks and find no significant results.  
Which implies that the market speculations at the time of the merger announcements failed in 
predicting the actual results.     
 
In most merger performance studies, the acquirer banks are often found to have negative or 
no significant returns. Past studies such as Baradwaj, Dubofsky & Fraser (1992) find a 
negative returns for the acquirers in a study that involved 108 mergers for a period of 6 years. 
Cornett & Tehranian (1996)  investigated  mergers with minimum deals of $100 million over 
a period of 5 years and  find that the majority of the 30 mergers studied indicate that the 
acquirer banks recorded negative returns to their shareholders.  Even on mergers deals with 
values exceeding $500 million (or the megamerger deals) acquirers showed negative 
abnormal returns to the acquirer banks shreholders (Siems, 1996). Hart & Apilado (2002) 
developed a GARCH market model to sustain an argument that cross border acquisitions 
though  have positive stock returns, their post preformance are poor.   
 
Some others have used larger samples to arrive at the same conclusion that the acquirer bank 
shareholders earn  negative returns in comparison with the domestic acquirers.  
Subrahmanyam, Rangan & Rosenstein (1997) used 225 merger deals to support their 
arguement that acquirer shareholders have negative returns. While Houston & Ryngaert 
(1994) and Madura & Wiant (1994) examined samples of 153 and 152 of both cross border 
and domestic acquirers and find the returns negative. 
 
Studies on the evaluation of merger financial performance have produced varied results.  
While some studies have judged performance based on the reaction around the announcement 
date of the merger, others have hinged their judgement on the returns accruable to the 
shareholders. However, Olson & Pagano (1998) had indicated that any meaningful evaluation 
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of a merger should be based on the long term  of the acquirer‟s stock price perfomance rather 
than on a short term basis. Such long-term performance will include the returns to 
shareholders, dividend payout, and the share prices subsequent to the merger deal.  
 
This argument concides with Houston & Ryngaert (1994) that a veritable measure of merger 
performance is not solely the profit but should incorporate bulk elements of the returns to the 
assets. This is a cautious measure since accounting data may not provide the correct state of 
the merged bank in the short run especially in terms of costs and returns.  Therefore, it is 
understandable why an efficient market may provide a better understanding of the market 
rather than the accounting data. Their figures are mostly unbiased as against the financial 
accounting results that are often subjected to management influence.   
 
It is also claimed that the past financial performance of banks involved in mergers could play 
crucial role in the determination of the expected returns to shareholders in a merger.  
However, Berger & Humphrey( 1982) argued that a deal involving an efficient bank 
acquiring an inefficient bank may result in reduction in operating costs through the 
elimination of X-inefficiencies.  The contention is that the acquiring bank should be more 
profitable than the acquired and the revaluation of the share prices of the both banks should 
be related to the difference in their profits.   
 
However, the posture of the bidders as more profitable than the target does not explain the 
abnormal returns from such deals. This corroborates the studies of Houston & Ryngaert 
(1994) and Morck et al (1990) who find a significantly higher abnormal return in bank 
mergers involving  more profitable bidder banks. Thus suggesting that bidder banks with 
strong records of high profit profile will produce a merger deal which will be more wealth 
creative to the shareholders than those with weak profit background. 
 
Another aspect of evaluating the performance of M&A is the effect from the welfare of bank 
customers.  An expected overall impact of banks would be an improvement in the lending 
rates and access to credit facilities to customers. Study by Sapienza (2002) shows that when a 
merger involves domestic banks operating in the same geographic area, borrowers tend to 
benefit from good lending rate particularly if the acquired bank has small market shares.  The 
finding of the research tend to support the argument that small borrowers benefit more in 
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domestic M&A because the large cross border acquirer banks tend to do away with the small 
borrowers. 
 
This position differs from the claim made by Scott & Dunkelberg (2003),  that M&A have no 
noticeable effect on the ability of small firms to obtain loans but could trigger increase in 
poor service quality by small firms.  However when banks merge, the acquiring firm 
determines the banks lending policy. If the acquirer does not have a significant lending 
culture, this could impact on the small entrepreneurs who may find it difficult benefitting 
from the M&A. Peek & Rosengren (1997) argued that a significant number of small banks 
who are involved in M&A usually have a business loan portfolio. The impact of this is the 
eventual promotion of small business financing. Thus the impact of M&A is often judged on 
the amount of support given to small business lending.  
 
Kosmidou et al (2004) applied multivariate analysis using financial variables to compare 
domestic and cross border banks performance in the UK. The study reveals that on average,  
domestic banks have higher operating performance. Specifically, the domestic banks record 
high performance on the rate of their return on equity, loans to short term funding ratio and 
net interest revenue to total assets. Although, this study is not focused on M&A, it does 
however project the „home advantage hypothesis‟ which assumes that domestic banks are 
more efficient than foreign banks in their operational performance due to their knowledge of 
the local environment.  
 
The length of the event window could be very critical in the measurement of the success and 
failure of the acquirers. Short and long windows may inevitably suggest different 
performance results for the same or different acquirers. Zollo and Meier (2008) confirm that 
the short term acquisition and firm performance are often measured by the abnormal returns 
to the acquirers over a short window around the announcement period. The difference 
between the short term acquisition performance and the long term lies in the market 
expectations and actual result of the merger.  While the former is focused on the premerger 
collective financial market expectations and events, the latter window is  provides some 
knowledge of what has actually occurred during the merger process. Infact,  they represent 
the ex ante expectations and the ex post factor performances of the merging units and the 




Thus, the present study leans towards using long term window of -/+30 days (60days) in 
order to capture, not only the short market reaction of the merger announcement, but only 
using financial ratios of the merged entities to evaluate the longterm operational performance.  
Some  studies  (Harrison et al. 2005; Zollo & Meier, 2008; Barber & Lyon, 1997)  have 
confirmed that long  windows are far more realiable than the short  windows.  This argument 
is hinged on the widespread evidence of market imperfection to the announcement of M&A 
which can be reduced by a long window.  In fact, short windows are deemed to give 
misleading results since it captures dominant cognitive performance. This research therefore 
takes further steps in strengthening the long window argument; first it uses a long window in  
estimating the abnormal returns of the acquirer banks and applies some key financial  ratios 
in evaluating the performance of the banks over a period of 11 years.  Such long evaluation 
period is uncommon in performance studies. 
 
 
4.3  Mergers & Acquisitions and Bank Efficiency 
 
Walker & Raes (2005) deliberated on the different levels of efficiencies associated with bank 
M&A. These include, but are not limited to, operating profit and overall efficiencies.  Finance 
literatures are diverse with views indicating lack of visible improvements in the operating 
efficiency of merged banks. In a study by Rhoades (1994), two approaches were applied to 
explore the operations of consolidated banks using 39 empirical works. The operating 
performance approach and the event studies were simultaneously applied.  
 
The operating approach takes into consideration the financial performance of banks after 
mergers while the event studies observed the share price reactions subsequent to and after the 
merger announcements. The approaches failed to establish any significant improvement both 
in the banks financial performance and rise in the share price of the consolidated banks. This 
also corroborated the findings of Pillof & Santomero (1997) that M&A do not contribute to 
improvement both in share value and profit of banks. 
 
The above scenario has generated concerns as to possible reasons why efficiency cannot be 
improved with merger. A number of findings have been advanced by various scholars. 
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Vander-Vennet (2002) associates this to a precipitation of a takeover of a poorly performing 
bank by a relatively efficient bank. In such deals, there may be improvement in the short term  
operating profit but  not in the operational efficiency. The differences in the countries tax and 
legal systems are possible players in the unrealisation of the potential synergies particularly  
in cross border mergers. 
 
 
Another argument presented by Hughes et al (2003) is that operating efficiency may be 
lacking especially when the management of the consolidated bank seeks to build empire 
rather than consolidate on its existing valuable resources. An increased in acquired assets 
may increase or decrease operating efficiency depending on the attitude and posture of 
management.  Inordinate ambition of expansion; acquisition of more banks and other similar 
agency objectives may deter efficiency. Managers are more inclined to achieve   efficiency if 
they streamline their resources in achieving organisational objectives rather than engaging in 
other empire building course.   
 
In the US, the variation in accounting rules have been posited as a cause for the discrepancy 
in establishing operating efficiency in the M&A in the banking sector.  Two accounting 
principles: the purchasing and pooling of interest accountings, which are in use in the US 
often produce conflicting results in their methods of treating M&A. The purchasing 
accounting method triggers the rise in the consolidated banks depreciation and amortisation 
expenses. This is due to the treatment of goodwill (i.e the purchasing price of the acquisition, 
less  the book value of the target banks assets and equity) which is amortised and expensed as 
they are intangible assets.   
 
The pooling of interest method  equates the assets of the consolidated bank with the sum of 
the two merging banks. Kwan & Wilcox (1999) opined that the use of the purchasing 
accounting method will inevitably produce a negative result on the reported expenses.   Both 










4.4 M&A & The Corporate Governance of Banks 
 
The resounding opinions on the conflict of interest of managers and directors who ordinarily 
should be the stewards of banks and their shareholders. Their actions often indicate a selfish 
motive and thus portray conflicts of interests. Most mergers and acquisitions have suffered 
basically because the „agents‟ have allowed their interests go ahead of those of the „bank 
owners‟. This is particularly so with the acquiring banks, where various studies indicate  that 
their shareholders suffer deficiencies in their returns.  
 
Zalan and Lewis (2005) examined the reasons behind bank acquirers CEOs engaging in 
mergers and acquisitions, even when there is strong evidence that the result might not 
generate returns for the acquirers‟ shareholders. Their finding indicates that the managers and 
their M&A promoters have developed a non efficiency based posture. The relationships 
among the CEOs, the banks promoters and the board of directors gives a strong argument for 
the preference of mergers rather than the agency relationship with the shareholders.  In other 
words, the managers would prefer to please their promoters by engaging in unprofitable deals 
as mergers rather than considering the consequence on their shareholders returns.   
 
The above argument is further strengethened by the study of Certo et al., (2008) who found 
that directors are more concerned with the size of their pay package rather than the 
shareholders interests. They affirmed that when directors are faced with decisions including 
M&A that can lead to an increase in their pay, they would opt for their own interest. By so 
doing, they become agents rather than the stewards who ought to protect the interests bank 
owners. Aggarwal & Samwick (2003) also confirmed that managers diversify their firms in 
response to the changes in their personal benefits rather than reducing the exposure to risk of 
their firms.  
 
However, Coakley and Iliopoulou (2006) argued that although pay packages might be an 
element in the consideration of mergers and acquisitions by CEOs of bidder firms, their 
rewards however are usually tied to the success of the deal. Managerial power are more of 
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interest than agency theory on the their executive compensation. The US CEO acquirers are 
found to be more compensated than their EU counterparts on the successful execution of a 
merger and acquisition. 
 
As the agency problems become more diverse in organizations, the duties of the board in 
monitoring the activities of the management take broader dimension particularly when the 
company‟s performance is poor. A poor performing bank may be an indication of the 
inefficiency of the inside directors and could warrant the replacement of the inside directors 
with outsiders or even the removal of the CEO. 
Although the inside directors are perceived to have an understanding of the business 
operations, the independent or outside directors are professionals and can more easily achieve 
the supervisory role, reduce the occurrence of conflicts among the top management and also 
prevent the misuse of the company‟s resources, thus improving performance (Hayes, 2005). 
This implies that they exert enormous influence on the company and act to protect the 
shareholders interest. Their position as outsiders gives them the moral leverage to question 
any indiscreet acts of the top management.  
Outside directors exude some independence on the CEO. They could act independently as 
they are not in the control of the top management. Unlike their inside directors who are 
almost handpicked by the CEO; Weisbach (1988) indicates that independently dominated 
board are likely to dismiss a poor performing CEO. They are portrayed as doing more jobs to 
protect the interest of the shareholders, including decisions on engaging in mergers. Boards 




The presence of directors generally is to mitigate between the shareholders and the top 
management of the firm. Their duty is to curtail the agency problem which arises when 
management goes outside the interest of the shareholders. Fama & Jensen (1983) outlines the 
board‟s functions as including the ratification of the management decisions and the 
monitoring of the management performance. They are by law empowered to hire and dismiss 
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 A study by Rosenstein & Wyatt (1990), shows that there is a rise in the stock price of the firm at the 
announcement of an appointment of an outside director to the board. This strongly suggests that shareholders 
have high confidence in the outside directors. 
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managers and to determine their compensations. Such authority leaves the directors with 
enough powers to oversee the management.  
When a high proportion of the firm‟s shares are owned by the members of the management, 
there is a tendency that they will be more committed to benefit the shareholders and to raise 
the firm‟s share value. The presence of outside directors will thus be inconsequential as the 
agency problem is almost invisible. However, Hermalin & Weisbach (1991) opined that even 
when majority shares are held by top management, it does not signal an absence of agency 
problem.  
Such scenario points the direction of family ownership of the firm which are known for 
putting the family interest at the expense of the other minority shareholders. Top management 
or board positions could be reserved for family members, foundations can be created to 
honour family members using the firm‟s resources. Such an act even calls for a more 
stringent action, to protect the other shareholders.  
An important criterion for determining the extent and necessity of involving greater 
percentage of outside directors in the board composition of an organisation is the length of 
service of the top management and the CEO. If the management has been in office for a long 
time, it may be an indication of their good performance; otherwise they would have been 
fired by the board or even taken over. But this may not be leverage for the CEO to stay 
indefinite. Vancil (1987) states that the general consensus is for CEOs to serve less than 10 
years in order not to loose focus and will reflect a penchant of dominance by the CEO. This 
may adversely affect the performance of the firm.  
The composition of the board is definitely a concern of the CEO
17
, whose performance is 
under the purview of the board. It will therefore be an understatement to expect that the CEO 
to show serious interest on who constitutes the board. While the choice of the inside directors 
may be influenced by the CEO, the outside are independently made. They are usually 
engaged on the basis of their professional experience and directorship in other reputable 
firms. Borokhovich et al (1996) agree that the inside directors increase the value of their 
human capital by strengthening their reputations as decision control experts.  But the inside 
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 Studies have shown that CEOs are well involved in the appointment of the directors. Mace (1986) opined that 
the CEO will be interested in persons who will be less insurrogative to his decisions.  
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directors however are more concerned with maintaining their position in the firm and would 
not be involved in confrontations with the CEO. 
However, Borokhovich et al (1996) maintain that the influence of the CEO in the 
appointment of the directors may hamper the independence of the directors and will thus 
affect their keenness in protecting the shareholders‟ interest. This argument suggests that the 
directors may after all, not represent the shareholders interest. CEOs that pursue interest 
outside those of the shareholders would be interested in influencing the appointment of 
directors who will support their decisions.  
Whether the independent directors actually represent the shareholders interest has been an 
unending debate. Some studies (Gilson, 1990; Rosesnstein & Wyatt, 1990; Hermalin & 
Weisbach, 1988) affirm that outside directors represent the shareholders interests. 
Independent directors are defined as those whose relationship with the bank is the fact they 
are members of it board of directors. Cotter et at (1997) explain that an independent board is 
one with above 50% majority of members as non executive directors. They opine that due to 
the high confidence in their judgment, boards with majority of independent directors usually 
have fewer takeover bids on grounds of performance. 
Infact, the shareholders confidence in the quality of the independent directors is shown by the 
study of Byrd and Hickman (1992) which shows that the share price of the firm increases 
when the board is controlled by the independent directors and also when an outsider has been 
named as member of the board. The abnormal returns on the date of takeover announcement 
are higher when the decision is perceived to be made by the independent directors‟ dominated 
board rather than the inside.     
Various prior studies have focused on the presence of independent directors, corporate 
performance and ownership structure particularly in the banking sector (Weir, 1997 and 
Adams & Mehran, 2003). Most studies on independent directorship have focused on firm 
performance (Zhilan et al, 2005; Adams, R. & Mehren, 2003, Weir, 1997) and Rosestein & 
Wyatt (1990) and Block (1999) focused on US firms.  
The independent directors in any organization are very fundamental in the formulation of 
important policies. Board ownership especially outside or independent directors play key 
roles in effective corporate governance. Brook et al (2000) observed that independent 
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directors bear some losses during mergers as they often loose their place in a merger. Their 
equity ownership is thus considered as having greater marginal impact than those of their 
counterpart insider directors.  They are considered to be very influential in the decision of the 
board to sell or merge with other banks.  Their composition in the board is thus significant. 
In addition to the oversight functions, the independent directors are charged with substantial 
powers to ensure that corporate decision makings maximize shareholders wealth.  Some 
studies (Wyatt, 1990; Byrd & Hickman, 1992 and Cotter et al, 1997) have confirmed that 
boards with majority of independent directors soar very high in their performance, share 
value, high abnormal returns during takeover bids and generally improves the shareholders 
returns.  
Several studies have been carried out on board composition and performance particularly in 
the banking sector. Adams & Mehren (2003) compared the corporate banking structure in the 
banks with those of manufacturing and other sectors. Their findings show significant 
difference in the board size, percentage of the outside directors, frequency of boarding 
meetings, percentage of the CEO equity holdings and other such variables which were higher 
in the banking sector. The CEO equity holding, the stock option pay, salary plus bonuses in 
the banks are higher than in other sectors. 
The tenet of the agency theory spurs from the argument that the management and decision 
making is divorced from the ownership of the organization. Where the decision making is 
delegated to the agent by the principal, and if there is a discrepancy in the interests of the two 
parties, agency problems will arise. This implies that corporate governance, in addition to 
protecting the interest of the shareholders in the running of the bank, also minimizes the 
agency costs and reduces the breadth of managerial discretions (Vafeas, 1999). 
Fama & Jensen (1983) found that the composition of the board in publicly quoted companies 
provide such avenue for monitoring the excesses by the management and ensuring that 
shareholders interest prevails rather than those of the management of the bank.  While the 
difference between the UK and the US board structure in the number of directors may be 
blank, studies suggest that the difference lies in the composition of the executive and non 
executive directors. In the UK, the board is dominated by the executive or inside directors 




The directors are usually appointed based on their experience, skill and expertise. The non 
executive directors have dual function of monitoring the management and also exercising an 
oversight role over the board activities. As outsiders, they have a more neutral stand in their 
decisions. Fama (1980) opines that efficiency and values are also measured by the number of 
directorship they hold. Reasonably number of directorship in other firms signals the worth 
and experience of the directors. However, an average of three directorships is considered 
reasonable by Cadbury (1992) in order to reduce the amount of time committed to other 
functions.   
The major contribution of board structure to the performance of the organization is the 
prevention of fraudulent activities and the enhancement of smoothness of the firm‟s 
operations. Firms that have good corporate governance structure often have impressive 
operating performance. Such firms also provide useful information to the investors and their 
creditors to enhance their operations and reduce the information asymmetry (Demsetz & 
Lehn, 1985). 
The independence of the directors can be impaired or achieved by structure of the 
directorship of the board members.  Where there are interlocking directors
18
 in board of bank, 
the decision of the interlocking directors are likely to be impaired especially if the CEO of the 
bank is also an independent director in banks where they act as CEO.   
If the independent directors hold substantial percentage of the bank‟s shares, they interest to 
protect the shareholders become more intense as they are also concerned with increasing the 
shareholders wealth. Morck, Schleifer & Vishny (1989) support the argument that firms 
performance increases when the independent directors hold majority of the shares while 
Shivdasani (1993) opines that takeover bids are high where the independent directors own 
small proportion of the banks shares. 
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 An interlocking directorship occurs when a director acts as an executive director or CEO in a firm and at the 
same time, as an independent director where the CEO is an independent director. Okazaki, Sawada, &  
 Yokoyama (2005) assert that such directorship is capable of slowing opposition to the CEO irrational policies 




4.5 European Union Merger Regulations & Control 
 
All mergers and acquisitions in the EU are required to comply with the laid down rules and 
regulations issued by the Union or its affiliate institutions.  The European Commission 
(hereby referred to as the EC), is the executive arm of the European Union responsible for 
proposing legislation, implementing rules and regulations of the Union. The essence of these 
regulations is to ensure transparency and smooth M&A deals and to intervene where 
necessary when the rules are breached.  
There have been a series of periodic merger control reforms by the EC some of which have 
been very radical and with a far reaching impact on execution of bank mergers among 
member countries. These reforms and regulations are aimed at streamlining the guidelines for 
mergers involving competing firms, best practice guidelines on the conduct of merger and 
investigations in line with some jurisdictional implications. 
 
EU merger activities came under stringent control on September 21, 1990 to foster credibility 
in  M&A competition among EU countries.  The overall aim of the regulation is to protect the 
interest of consumers by encouraging the consistent existence of competition but at the same 
time, discouraging monopolistic tendencies occassioned by mergers. The regulation is 
founded on four pivotal issues: 
1) The exclusive right of the Regulatory Commision to review merger activities within 
the EU states. Such activities will also include acquisition and joint venture 
businesses. 
2) The Regulation makes it compulsory for any merger deals to be notified to the 
Commission.  The Commission has set standards regarding the size for mergers that it 
considers to be subject to mandatory notification to the Commission.  
3) The consistent application of competitive based criteria for M&A. The commmission 
considers third parties in cases of dispute to make oral presentations and encourages 
interested bodies to play active roles in EU merger regulations. 
4) The provision of a legal framework to govern any merger activities. It also enjoys 
exclusive jurisdiction on merger regulations though its decisions are subject to 




Levy (2003) asserts that since the institutionalisation of the merger regulation, the 
commission has given unconditional approval for over 1800 applications of merger related 
deals; 50 others have been have been turned down; another 50 have been referred for 
consideration by the EU member countries. While 95 merger transactions have recieved 
conditional approval during the first phase of the Commission,  during phase two of the 
Commission,  20 mergers deals have been given unconditional approval; 18 others prohibited 
with three of such prohibited overruled by a member country court and about 80 applications 
to the Commission have been withdrawn . 
 
The commission has worked towards ensuring that its enforcement standard is adhered to by 
member countries. To this end, the Commission issued a Draft Horizontal Mergers Notice to 
explain how mergers should be analysed and identifying various factors that may impede a 
fair competitive atmosphere. The adoption of this Draft has other wider implications and 
benefits to the EU states. At least, it creates a platform to achieve standard through an 
assessment of M&A transactions. 
 
Cross border acquisitions have been hampered by different regulatory frameworks across  
countries. La Porta et al (2000) posit that investor protection is highest in English common 
law colonies as well as in Scandinavian, German and French civil law territories. Such legal 
environments influences cross border acquisitions. Efficient cross border acquisitions will 
take place where an acquirer from a high investor protection country acquires a target from a 
low investors protection country. Information asymetric may also slow the performance of 













4.5.1 History of EC Merger Control Legislation 
 
The development of the EC merger control, or control of concentrations, has been solidified 
with the gradual creation of a European single market. European competition policy has 
historically revolved around articles 81 & 82 of the EC Treaty
19
. Since the EC Treaty is silent 
on the control of mergers, the supervision of concentrations was in the early stages of the 
Union restricted to the Commission‟s control of compliance with article 82. In the precedent 
set by the Continental Can case, when the European Court of Justice (ECJ) held that an 
undertaking abuses its dominant position if it strengthens its position in such a way that the 
degree of dominance reached substantially fetters competition, the way was clear for the EC 
to rule on M&A.  
The limited supervision implied by the treaty provisions was problematic since it restricted 
the control of mergers to those that were made between dominant undertakings. It is 
interesting to note, that the Commission as early as the 1960s had realized this shortcoming 
(Dauz, 2002). However, it would take another 30 years until a legal instrument dealing solely 
with concentrations was agreed upon by the EU member countries. The reason for this delay 
might partly be explained by the political importance that is linked to an instrument through 
which mergers between undertakings may be restricted or prohibited. Massive lay-offs, new 
investments or withdrawn investments are in many cases very tangible results of mergers. 
The governments of the EU were reluctant to surrender these powers to the Union. 
 As in many other fields of Community law, it was a judgement of the ECJ that put an end to 
the power squabble. In the BAT-Reynolds merger dispute, the Court conferred competence on 
the Commission to supervise mergers under article 81 of the EC Treaty (in addition to article 
82) which created an atmosphere conducive for the adoption of the Merger control 
Regulation   
It was the Regulation 4064 of 1989 that introduced the basic principles upon which the 
current merger control as contained in European Commission Merger Regulation (ECMR) 
139 of 2004 is based. Regulation 4064 of 1989 clearly spelt out the Commission‟s exclusive 
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jurisdiction to clear or prohibit concentrations with a Community dimension. It introduced 
the “one-stop-shop” mandatory notification procedure for the concentrations that fell within 
its jurisdiction as well as market-oriented, competition-based criteria. The Commission was 
empowered to impose fines and competence to restore competition by ordering the undoing 
of a prohibited merger transaction. The strict deadlines for decision-making provided for 
legal certainty for the parties to the concentration. Finally, decisions of the Commission are 
subject to scrutiny by the Community courts.   
These principles manifest themselves also in the current merger control legislation 
particularly Regulation 139 of the EC Merger Regulations (ECMR). However, developments 
in case-law and the limited resources of the Commission has led to some reforms, among 
which the most important include the possibility of referral to national authorities of 
concentrations with a community dimension under article 9 of the ECMR and a reformed 




Nonetheless, the system of ex ante administrative control of mergers and the Commission‟s 
wide powers of investigation and enforcement established by the Merger Regulation is ever 
still the foundation of the Community‟s merger control. The introduction of the merger 
regulations meant that the Commission‟s authority to supervise mergers was explicitly laid 
down in Community legislation. Similarly, the establishment of an administrative system of 
merger control has important implications on the role of the Community courts and the 
standard of judicial review they ought to apply (Murray, 2004). 
 
 If BAT-Reynolds merger dispute was the starting point for a more extensive control of 
concentrations, the merger Regulation 4064 of 1989 provided the Commission with a 
foundation to build the extended control on. However, as conventional in EC law, the 
performance of the Community Courts finally shape and determine the application and 






4.5.2 European Union Bank Reforms and Mergers Regulations Amendments   
The EU merger regulation came into effect on the 21 September, 1990 through the enactment 
of the EC which has the robust powers of enforcing Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty. The 
Treaty was enacted to prevent the perceived unfair competition and abuse of the strong 
market forces in any mergers acquisitions deals. The Articles 82 highlights what constitutes 
abuse as when there is a limit placed on the production, markets or technical developments to 
the prejudice of the consumers by an unfair trading of a member state. This also includes any 
perceived unfairness in the fixing of prices in a business transaction. 
The Article also explains that any condition that could place any party in an advantage 
condition, which at the same time disadvantages another party or places the party in a more 
competitive position, is considered „unfair‟ (Harris, 2007). 
The approval or rejection of mergers activities within the EU is usually the responsibility of 
the EC. Where a merger has been rejected, there is an internal procedure of obtaining a 













The CFI makes an independent investigation and reviews decisions either by giving approval 
to the merger or rejecting its execution.
20
 Any further remedy sought is usually referred to the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ)
21
 which serves as the court of final instance for all merger 
issues (Motta, 2000). 
The underlying principle applied by the EC in considering approval for banks mergers is 
usually based on the Commission‟s basic litmus tests: the extent of the transparency of the 
deal; availability of deterrent mechanism in place to prevent any unfair conduct by parties 
and reactions of the undertakings which do not participate in the coordination, such as the 




                                                          
20
 Several merger reviews have been undertaken by the CFI over the years. Some of these decisions have set a 
precedent in the merger rulings in EU countries. Their jurisdiction is not only limited to bank M&A but includes 
all other forms of consolidations. On July 13, 2006, the CFI made a landmark judgement by putting a stop to the 
merger of Sony –BMG, which would have been the second largest music company in the globe.  Some mergers 
that have been cleared by the EC have also been challenged in the CFI.  Also in 2003, the EC objected to the 
General Electric and Honeywell merger even when it has been cleared by the US Department of Justice. The 
companies appealed against the decision of the EC asking for the removal of the prohibition but the CFI rejected 
the appeal.  (See the General Electric V. Commission). 
21
 Levy (2003) narrates that since the Merger Regulation came into force, the EC has rendered more than 2,200 
decisions, of which over 1,800 (86%) had approved notified concentrations unconditionally; around 50 (3 %) 
had found the Merger Regulation to be inapplicable; around 50 (2 %) had referred concentrations notified under 
the Merger Regulation in whole or in part to the government of EU countries; around 95 (5 %) had approved 
transactions subject to undertakings given at the end of the initial investigative period;11 around 20 (1 %) had 
approved transactions unconditionally during phase II; around 60 (3 %) had approved concentrations subject to 
undertakings given at the end of phase II; and had rendered prohibition decisions with respect to 18 (1 %) 
transactions,12 three of which were subsequently overturned by the Community courts on appeal. More than 80 
operations had been withdrawn, of which around 20 (1 %) were withdrawn following the opening of in-depth 
investigations, in many instances to avoid prohibition decisions. Thus, around 2% cent of all transactions 
notified under the Merger Regulation have been either prohibited or abandoned in the course of in-depth 
investigations. The Commission‟s challenge rate” is broadly comparable to those of other major jurisdictions. 
22
 Motta, Polo and Vasconcelos (2007) document detail merger remedies undertaken by the EC over the past 
years.  Some of the remedies are either of structural and non structural in nature. For instance, in 1997, 188 
disputed merger cases were submitted to the Commission; 235 in 1998; 292 in 1999; 345 in 2000; 335 in 2001; 
279 in 2002; 249 in  2004; 313 in 2005 and 403 in 2007. 
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 In the US however, the procedure for approving or rejecting a merger deal seems to have  
clearer guidelines than in the EU.  The law requires the merging banks to obtain clearance 
from either the Department of Justice (DOJ) or the Federal Trade Commission (FTC).  
Unlike the EC system where third or interested parties are allowed to appeal against the 
Commission‟s decision, the US system does not make provisions for such. Infact, neither the 
DOJ nor the FTC gives aggrieved parties the opportunity to know any reasons for their 
decisions, as such decisions are not published. Harris (2007) points out that the while US are 
more precautious in handling outside merger interest through their regulations, the EU allows 
more freedom from third parties as long as sufficient interests have been proven. 
Several reforms have been undertaken by the Economic Commission to overhaul the merger 
process in the EU.  Byowitz, et al (2002) outlines some major areas of the EU Merger 
Control Regulation. Specifically, the reform includes the following areas substantive; 
procedural; jurisdictional and administrative reforms. The substantial reform is based on the 
concept of the dominance criteria used in assessing the impact and market powers of mergers.  
The EC has upheld the principle of the dominance test rather than the substantial lessening of 
competition peculiar to the US system.  The current reforms define dominance to include 
some oligopolies that raise competition issues which tend to differentiate its policy from the 
US. The merger reform gives a guideline that helps to identify grey areas in which mergers 
can be considered as anticompetitive. These include: the establishment of the paramount 
market position which arises when the combined market share is more than 50% or when 
there are reasonable grounds to believe that despite having a lower percentage share, a party 
will still exert a stronger market power.  Motta, Polo & Vasconcelos (2007) also highlight 
some remedies put in place by the EC to address any forms of anticompetitive practice or any 
merger that will create a dominant position as a result of effective competition would be 
greatly affected.  They argue that the use of dominance test rather than the US application of 
substantial lessening of competition criteria is more useful in addressing any ill competitive 
tendency.  
Another guideline is in the area of elimination of constraints on the ability of suppliers to 
unilaterally alter prices which is a form of non- collusive oligopoly. There are also reforms 
against any increased risk of coordination among competitors in the market which is a form 
of collusive oligopoly. The EC guideline is to give priority to efficiency in the consideration 
of merger analysis. The EC merger reforms consider efficiency as a vital ground for merger 
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initiation. The essence of the argument is that the consumers benefit more where the system 
is efficiently developed and are unlikely to create monopolistic tendencies. The Commission 
also proves mergers on the basis of imminent failure of the firm when the target would have 
likely been forced out of the market and where there is no suspicion of any anticompetitive 
acquirers. If the execution of a merger will help to sustain the survival of the target bank 
assets, the Commission would be obliged to grant the merger on the basis of efficiency
23
. 
The procedural reforms include the striking off of the requirement that the parties in a merger 
file intention within a week of from the conclusion of a binding agreement between the 
merging banks. The reform adopts the US style where an ex ante merger notification and also 
requires the merging parties to make a submission notifying its intents before the execution of 
a legal agreement. The procedural reforms can also extends the time periods to a further 30 
working days for the completion of the merger review where the parties have proposed 
remedies to address any  competitive concerns raised. This can also be further extended to 
additional 15 days in complex cases. 
In addition, EC reforms increased the amount of both the fines and penalties of the parties 
where they are found to have made any misleading submissions or any such issues raised 
during the Commission‟s inquiries. The Commission is also empowered to seal the premises 
of the offending parties during an investigation (Byowitz et al, 2002). 
                                                          
23 The efficiency clause has not been without controversies. Christiansen (2005) and Padilla (2004) argue that 
the introduction of the efficiencies defence is a reaction to the criticism of the old Merger Regulation. It was 
claimed that efficiencies had been falsely used as an argument against the merging parties and that welfare-
enhancing mergers had therefore been prevented.  In the sense of the "error cost approach" these would be 
„Type II errors‟. However, the empirical evidence for this claim is fairly weak. In their econometric study Neven 
and Roller (2002) detect only a few „Type II errors‟. There is no reference either to concrete cases apart from the 
General Electric/Honeywell merger and this case is questionable. The prohibition was recently upheld by the 
Court of First Instance (CFI), which would appear to argue against a false decision by the EC. Experience with 
the efficiencies defence in the US also suggests that this new rule has little relevance in practice. So far there has 
been no publicly available evidence of an approval decision based on efficiencies (Colley 2004). Hence, no 
significant reduction of errors is therefore to be expected either from the introduction of the efficiencies defence 
in EU merger control. Moreover, the concrete conditions are so strictly formulated in the Guidelines that they 
cannot be fulfilled in practice (Baker, 2002). The massive problems associated with the application of the 
efficiencies defence also need to be considered. In particular, there are information asymmetries in the 
authority's disfavour and fundamental knowledge problems. 
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The jurisdictional reforms focus on simplifying the system of referring transactions from the 
Economic Commission to the EU member countries which may be affected by the merger
24
.  
The reform therefore proposes a pre-notification system which allows the merging banks to 
seek referral of a merger transaction to any EU country involved or affected by the merger. 
The reform also permits the process of acquiring exclusive jurisdiction over any merger deals 
involving cross border parties.      
Issues included in the administrative reforms include: the creation of office of the Chief 
Competition Economist; the appointment of a peer review panel to undertake investigations, 
outside interests in a merger conflict. The reform also includes regular meetings with interest 
groups in event of conflict in the merger with a view of resolving the issue.  
 
4.5.3 The EU Merger Regulation and Political interference 
Since the introduction of the European Union merger control, analysts have spotted several 
fundamental institutional flaws in operation and procedures of seeking redress in the 
European Commission. Drauz (2004) argues that the responsibility for final decision-making   
lies with a primarily political body and its affiliate bodies (the CFI and the ECJ) whose 
members are potentially exposed to influence from firms and from governments of member 
countries). For example, firms can deliberately seek to influence antitrust proceedings at the 
expense of their competitors (Baumol & Ordover 1985).  
 
One possibility is the prevention of mergers between competitors which could lead to 
competition-relevant efficiency benefits. This constitutes a form of rent-seeking which, if 
                                                          
24 According to the Economic Commission Competition Policy Annual Report (2007), the number of merger 
cases notified to the Commission reached an all-time high of 402, a rise of more than 12% compared to the 356 
transactions notified in 2006. In the last quarter of the year the number of notifications fell both in relation to the 
previous quarters and the last quarter of 2006. In total the Commission adopted 396 final Decisions in 2007, of 
which 368 were cleared in the first phase without conditions. Of these unconditional first-phase clearances 238 
(or 65%) were adopted under the simplified procedure. A further 18 transactions were cleared in Phase I subject 
to conditions. Ten Decisions were adopted after in-depth Phase II investigations. Five of these were cleared 
without conditions, while in four case; the clearances were subject to conditions. 
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successful, results in Type II errors
25
 in the sense of the "error cost approach". On the other 
hand, political influence can be exerted, especially by national governments, aimed at 
securing approval for certain mergers despite reservations about the effects on competition. 
Under the banner of "industrial policy", Stevenson & Fillippi (2004) opine that there is a 
strong interest in building "champions" for the global markets or securing special treatment 
for sensitive industries. However, by and large, there are no sound theoretical arguments to 
justify this. Moreover, the empirical experience is mostly negative. Consequently, approvals 
granted in exceptional cases for industry policy reasons are false decisions of Type I 
(Christiansen & Kerber 2005). Hence, in both cases, there is the risk of welfare losses, which 
are highly relevant to the discussion of the "more economic approach". 
 
During the initial years of the introduction of the EU merger control, Christiansen (2006) 
argued that there were a number of questionable decisions in which influence of this kind 
played a role. For instance, in Germany during the Boeing/McDonnell Douglas merger 
dispute, it was believed that the Airbus consortium exerted influence on the Commission 
(Boeder & Dorman 2000). But there also allegations of massive intervention by the member 
state government and in some extreme cases, the members of the Commission   were divided 
among themselves (Coate & Kleit, 1998). 
 
 A sensible institutional solution to this problem would be, in the first place, to create an 
independent antitrust authority at the European level which would have sole responsibility for 
protecting competition and could build up an appropriate reputation. However, proposals to 
this effect met with massive resistance and have receded more and more into the background. 
In the present reform discussion this fundamental institutional aspect is receiving little or no 
attention. 
                                                          
25
 There basically two form of empirical errors; the Type 1 Error and the Type II Error, which are similar to the 
EC decisions on merger cases. The Type Error I which relates to wrong approval of a merger (false positive) 
while the Type II Error relates to an unjustified prohibitions or denial of a good merger deal by the Commission. 
(False negative).  The Improved decision-making quality would mean a reduction in the frequency of the two 
types of error which can arise.  In both cases, the potentially achievable level of economic welfare is not 
attained. In the first case, this results in direct welfare losses while, in the second, potential efficiencies are not 
realised. The overview shows the scenarios that are possible. According to the "error cost approach" there would 
be an improvement in decision-making quality if the new criteria lead to a reduction of errors compared with 




Admittedly, political factors have been found to play a lesser role in recent years in merger 
resolutions by the EC (Pons & Sautter 2004). But this does not suggest by any means that it is 
no longer an issue. Rather, there are two further points which need to be considered. The 
increased focus on economic analysis can be interpreted as an attempt on the part of the   
supporters of a purely competition-oriented approach within the Competition Directorate 
General to shield themselves from attempts to exert external political influence. The greater 
complexity of the economic argumentation before the reform has doubtlessly been a 
contributing factor (Levy 2003). Thus, the more economic approach oriented would lend to a 
more a logical refinement of a strategy which has already being pursued.   
 
These measures of reforms are geared at giving a transparent and fully compatible rationale 
in merger deals independent of any political-economic aspects of merger control. 
Consideration for industrial policy or other non-competitive factors would be in no way 
compatible. Perhaps in order to reduce political influence, there should be great measure of 
independence of the competition authority; this includes the stronger orientation of merger 
control to more general rules so as to reduce the room for discretionary decisions and thus the 
exposure to influence. This could also quash the contention that in its more recent decisions, 
as in the GE/Honeywell merger for instance, the European Commission is allowing itself to 
be influenced by an underlying anti-American sentiment – and thus again by non-competitive 
factors (Murray 2004). 
 
Secondly, the fact that political intervention has been successfully pushed back in recent 
years does not imply that the problem has been resolved once and for all. Rather, it has to be 
assumed that the inclination towards anti-competitive intervention at the political level will 
continue to exist, at least latently. This was clearly indicated by the initiative on the part of 
France and Germany for a pan-European industry policy while on the subject of Germany,  
there was a special ministerial powers exercised in the E.ON and Ruhrgas merger dispute or 
the heated  debate over Springer-Verlag's acquisition of Pro Sieben Sat.1 (Lingus et al 2004; 
Anon, 2005).  
 
So, for this reason, too, there is still a need to give thought to institutional safeguards to shield 
the EU merger control process from (industry policy-related) political influence. At the same 
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time, the increasing orientation towards case-by-case analysis within the framework of the 
"more economic approach" also creates new possibilities for discretionary decisions. Given 
this ambiguity the incentives for firms and politicians to exert influence could be increased 
again (Baumol & Ordover 1985). That this aspect has gone largely unnoticed to date points 
once more to an overly narrow focus of the discussions on the new approach. 
  
4.5.4 Some Principal Provisions of the EU Merger Regulations 
Levy (2003) classifies the powers of the European Commission on Merger Regulations 
(ECMR) under four basic areas namely: the exclusive competence of the Commission to 
review concentrations of Community dimension; the mandatory notification of such 
concentrations; the consistent application of market-oriented as well as competition-based 
criteria; and the provision of legal certainty through timely decision making. Infact, he noted 
the following eight cardinal provisions of the Regulation: 
 
1). The Merger Regulation applies to concentrations or changes in control of the process. The 
concept of a concentration includes mergers, acquisitions, and the formation of jointly 
controlled, autonomous, full-function joint ventures. The concept of control is defined as the 
possibility to exercise “decisive influence”. 
 
2). All concentrations that meet certain “size” tests are deemed to have Community 
dimension and, as such, are subject to mandatory notification under the Merger Regulation, 
irrespective of whether they have any effect in the Community. The Commission has 
exclusive jurisdiction over such transactions (the “one-stop-shop” principle). Transactions 
that fall below these thresholds may be subject to national competition rules. In exceptional 
circumstances, an EU member country may request either that the Commission refers a 
concentration of Community dimension to its national authority or that the Commission 
review a concentration that does not have a Community dimension. 
 
3).  Transactions must be notified on a prescribed form according to mandated time periods, a 
waiting period must be observed before notifiable transactions can be put into effect, and the 
Commission must render a decision no later than five months (90 working days) following 
notification. Fines may be imposed for failure to notify, late notifications, or the provision of 
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incorrect or misleading information. Where reportable transactions have been implemented 
prior to having received approval, the Commission may take remedial action.  
 
4.). The Merger Regulation provides considerable scope for third parties to comment on 
notified concentrations, including the right to be heard orally. The Commission encourages 
customers, competitors, suppliers, and other interested parties to play a active role in EU 
merger control.  
 
 5). The substantive test under the Merger Regulation is whether a transaction creates or 
strengthens a dominant position as a result of which effective competition is significantly 
impeded in the common market. The Commission‟s appraisal under the Merger Regulation 
has two main elements: (i) definition of the relevant market; and (ii) competitive assessment 
of the transaction. The Commission generally focuses first on unilateral exercises of market 
power and then on whether a transaction creates or strengthens a position of collective or 
oligopolistic dominance. Horizontal mergers (i.e. those involving firms active in the same 
markets) have accounts for the large majority of challenged transactions, although the 
Commission has also examined (and, on occasion, prohibited) mergers that have had vertical 
or conglomerate effects. 
 
6). The Commission is not empowered to exempt or authorise, on public interest or other 
grounds, concentrations that are considered incompatible with the common market. The 
Commission may peg its approval of transactions on undertakings or commitments offered 
during the initial investigative periods. 
 
5) An appraisal under Article 81, which prohibits anti-competitive agreements, may also be 
warranted under the Merger Regulation where a full-function joint venture gives rise to spill-
over effects between its parent companies. Non-full-function joint ventures fall outside the 
Merger Regulation and may be subject to Articles 81 or 82, which prohibits abusive conduct 
by dominant companies, as well as national competition rules. Any decisions of the 






4.5.5 The US and EU Merger Regulations 
 
There is a sharp constrast in the pattern of merger regulation and the economic environment 
of the EU and the US. Rad & Beek (1999) noted that the EU member states are very 
heterogenous. The differences in culture, legal and economic systems are substantially 
diverse than the US. But this also has some impacts on any merger transactions. It 
strengthens the diversifications caused by the loose integration in economies of member 
nations.  
 
There is also the fear that economies of scale will be difficult to exploit in an EU cross 
merger. The difference in the legal operations of the domestic country implies that in an 
occassion of a merger, the merged bank will need to readjust to the demands of the local 
legislations. However the US offers a less stringent measure in the legal requirement of 
laying off staff in event of a merger. In the EU, the labor laws are tight and almost difficult to 
allow banks to shade off their staff strength  as a costs saving measure. The protections under 
the EU regulations are thus stronger.  
 
There is also the issue of limitations on the investment ventures  businesses such as banks, 
can be allowed to explore. While the US seems restrictive, the EU is more liberal on the 
range of activities banks can undertake. For examples, banks are not allowed to undertake 
commercial and investment banking. But the EU regulations allows banks to undertake either 
or more such as insurance. This inadvertently gives EU banks a measure of economies of 
scale and scope in comparison with the US. 
  
4.6 Bank M&A  & the Current Economic Crisis  
 
The current global economic crunch has adversely affected the trend of mergers and 
acquisitions particularly in the European market. The economic impasse has hit very hard on 
the bank sector leading to cover 16 large failed, unsuccessful and cancelled mergers and 
acquisitions in the sector (Reuters, 2009).  In genral terms, the crunch has cramped the 
private equity model as there have been smaller and fewer deals.  Young (2008) observes that 
owing to the economic crunch, the number of the M&A deals reduced by half in 2008 and the 
biggest value of M&A in the chemical industry for instance, being valued at maximum of one 
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hundred and fifity (€150) million euros. Banks want much more security before giving credits 
or loans. This has slowed down the ability of the banks to lend.  
 
However, the effect of the credit crunch and the  global economic meltdown has not been so 
badly felt in all European countries.  The German banking system has shown remarkable 
resilience in the face of the global financial crisis.  Dammers (2008) observes that despite the 
collapse of the IKB Industriebank and SachsenLB  mergers which was among the earliest 
signals of the severity of the credit crunch, the Germany banking system has remained quite 
steady and resilient.  
 
But despite its steadfastness, the German banking industry has been faced with its share of 
the financial storm leading to the governemnt to introduce broad measures such as bailouts 
involving liquidity debt guarantees and recapitalisation of the banks in addition to the 
introduction of the Financial Markets Stabilisation Funds to streamline successful takeovers. 
Consolidation has been argued as the panacea to the melt down in the banking sector. Some 
German banks are also mapping out strategic models to neutralise the financial crisis such as 
geographical diversification into eastern and central European countries, scaling down public 
sector lending and increasing commercial banking for small businesses by a higher 
percentage. 
 
Interestingly, at the start of the credit crunch, some financial analysts had envisaged the 
impeding credit squeeze in the global economy which would invariably affect bank 
acquisitions. Shearer (2006) outlined that the impending credit crunch facing dealmakers in 
the M&A markets in 2006 would have dire consequences for the deals.  Tightening of the 
credit cycle, reliance on the traditional funding sources such as the leveraged loans were 
among the strategic options for the banks.  
 
The increase in the bank interests by most banks in 2006 was a move to tighten lending and 
thus signaling a severe financial crisis.  Flexibility in the M&A structures such that borrowers 
could have sufficient capital to withstand the liquidity reduction was the strategic way to deal 
with the credit crunch. The result has been the enormous pressure created on both the 
domestic, cross border and opportunistic acquisition deals in the EU banking sector                 




The impact of the global economic crisis on banks M&A has a mixed effect in the US. It has 
infact generated a process of creating thriving banks out of many troubled ones; and thus 
opened the avenue for big bank mergers. Hage (1991) had alerted that mergers could create a 
handful of megabanks with an advantaged  position of exploiting cross border acqusitions 
and thus rejuvenating the bank sector. However, consolidations alone is not a panacea to the 
credit crisis. Both the US and EU have witnessed in recent past bank consolidations leading 
to poor performance and returns.  However, costs cutting through mergers can be very 
helpful. Banks with low overheads earn higher profits and in turn attract more investors 
which incraeses the banks liquidity and laons to its customers. Two major issues in the 
banking sector are vital for the survival for the credit institution: the  reforms in the banks and 
its credit risk management system   as well as encouragement of survival of smaller banks 
who are known for their prudent lending. 
 
4.7  Conclusion 
 
The role of bank M&A in the EU economic community has been reviewed. The chapter also 
higlights different factors affecting domestic and cross border acquisitions. The domestic 
M&A are more common than cross border deals this is attributable to various factors such as 
the EU regulations and competitive advantage.  The merit of any M&A is measured on the 
shareholder wealth created. Thus it is important especially for bank directors  to ascertain that 
















Research method involves a systematic and orderly approach applied in the collection and 
analysis of data used in a study so that useful information and meaning can be derived from 
the data (Jankowicz, 2000). The object of this chapter is to explain the statistical methods and 
procedure used in carrying out the empirical analysis, as well the rationale for using such 
procedures.  
In fact, the study combines the event study approach and regression methods to examine the 
impact of the cumulative abnormal returns on dividend policy. Since the study examines 
these two very important layers in finance: shareholders returns on mergers and acquisitions 
and dividend policy, the research design adopts a combination of regression and event study 
methods. 
The study is a quantitative research. The design of the M&A aspect of the study follows the 
pattern of studies, such as  Pillof (1999), Campa & Hernando (2006), Chong et al (2006) and 
DeAngelo et al (2006), in the use of an event study methodology with daily share price data 
and employing the market model. The dividend policy design used some vital variables 
employed by Rozeff (1980) and Olson & Pagano (2005), but in a more constructive format 
tailored to amplify the M&A effect. Unlike previous studies, however, this study uses the 
standardized abnormal returns in evaluating the shareholders wealth of the cross border and 
domestic bank acquirers.  The chapter discusses the research design, data sources, sample, 







5.1 Research Design 
 
5.1.1. The Event Study  
The research methodology using the event window is very popular in the field of finance, 
insurance and accounting. The technique is particularly used in assessing the effect of market 
wide events such as regulations or government legislation, changes arising from M&A, 
sudden events in the economy such as recession or shocks in the industry. The methodology 
varies depending on the motives of the research.  
Rad and Beek (1999) emphasise that the event study method has the advantage of separating 
two types of returns: the normal and abnormal returns as a direct consequence of an event; in 
this case a merger or acquisition. The technique has been adjourned as the most reliable in 
identifying the stock price reaction to specific events such as M&A, and the impact thereon 
on the firm.  Henderson (1989) highlights among others; three major strengths of event 
studies. These include market efficiency, information usefulness and metric explanation 
studies. 
The market efficiency event studies undertake the investigation of how fast and accurate the 
market reacts to new information and development. While the information usefulness 
considers the degree to which the returns of the bank is being affected by some piece of 
information. The method is also valuable in assessing the professional conducts of managers 
and accounting staff and the impact on the reputation of the business (Cross, Davidson & 
Thornton, 1988).  
There are some identifiable problems associated with the event study method of research.  
The complexity and the intrigues of the approach create a strong demand for the justification 
of the method.  Sometimes, the outcome of events can be so obvious that it paralyses the 
efficacy of conducting an event study. Another challenge of this method is the determination 
of the event date. This is not the date of the news but the date in which the market‟s reaction 
is established. The event window is the date of the occurrence of the event plus or minus the 
period it took the market to react to the news (Henderson, 1989). 
In any case, the tenet of the method is mainly for empirical business research where 
economist and statisticians apply statistical theory to define the best approach to undertake a 
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test, often using simulations.  The process involves the following steps as outlined by 
Henderson (1989) which were applied in the study: 
a) Clear definition of the date when the market would have received the news of the event, 
b) Characterization of the returns of the banks prior to the information of the event, 
c) Estimation of the difference between the observed returns and the situation without the 
event or news; this becomes the abnormal returns, 
d) Aggregation of the abnormal returns across the banks and within the time frame under 
consideration, and 
e) Statistical test to determine the extent of significance of the abnormal returns and the time 
span.    
The above steps also incorporate some of the 8 listed procedures outlined by Seiler (2004) 
which include: 
1) Identification of the event date; this is the date on which the event occurred. 
2)  Definition of the event window 
3) Definition of the estimation period 
4) Selection of the sample of firms 
5) Calculation of the „normal‟ (non-event) returns. These are the returns that would have 
occurred in the absence of the event. 
6) Calculation of the abnormal returns. These are the actual returns that occurred 
because of the event minus the return that would have occurred without the event; the 
non-event returns. 
7) Calculation of the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs), which is the aggregate of all 
the abnormal returns (ARs). 
8) Finally, the determination of the statistical significance of the ARs and the CARs.  
   





5.1.2 The Identification of the Event Date 
The event date is the time the market first heard the news of the mergers and acquisitions.  
The news of the M&A may have infiltrated the market either formally or informally, such as 
through rumours from insiders, the media or a formal board announcements. The Reuters 
(2008) database describes such event dates as the announcement dates of the M&A deal.  
The study identifies the announcement day as the date in which the M&A information 
reached the market. The dates were obtained from the Reuters database which contains such 
data while information regarding the dividend payouts was obtained from the Bankscope 
database
26
. The market model was used in estimating an Ordinary Least Square (OLS) model 
for the periods –130 days to -29 days before applying the coefficients estimates to compute 
the abnormal daily returns for the test period (event day -30 to +30).  
In each of the events, daily frequency or stock data relating to the sample banks were 
obtained from the Yahoo finance. The use of daily stock data is preferred over weekly or 
monthly data.  Weekly data have the characteristic of infrequency and inability to pinpoint 
the exact event time which invariably has the potential of weakening the result of the 
empirical test (Seiler, 2004). 
5.1.3 Definition of the Event Window 
The event window is the length of period preceding the date in which the event (M&A) 
occurred.  This is usually stated in trading days
27
. While there is no consensus window or 
period for any study, a more specific period contributes to the strength and significance of the 
study (Seiler, 2004 & Well, 2006).  
This study used an event window of ± 30days with the event date as day zero.  Some studies 
such as Becher (2000) have used event windows as short as ± 5days. However, it is important 
that the event window should cover the entire effect of the M&A. 
                                                          
26
 Different databases are available which have information on the banks and market returns but on various 
parameters. For instance, the Reuters database holds weekly returns while the yahoo finance has daily returns on 
selected markets or stock indices. Other databases include zephyr, bankalmanac etc. 
27
 The trading days are the official trading days of the stock market. This usually runs from Monday to Friday 
and excludes public holidays and weekends. 
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5.1.4 Estimation Period 
The estimation period is used in measuring the expected or normal returns for each bank 
during the window. There are four available periods for making the estimates; these are at the 
time of the event window, after the event, around the time of the event window and before 
the occurrence of the event. In most M&A studies, the estimation period is used with a 
disclaimer clause to assure the end users of the research that the period was sufficient enough 
to avoid bias in the results (Henderson, 1989).  
This study like most other M&A studies
28
 used the period prior to the M&A to establish the 
estimation period.  Thus, an estimation period of 101 days (-130 through -29) was used in 
determining the abnormal returns for the study. This is illustrated in Fig. 5.1 below. In order 
to avoid contamination of the event, care was taken not to allow any overlap of/between the 
estimation period and the event dates. Contamination is the overlap of the estimation period 
and the event window. The idea of ensuring that the estimation period and the event dates do 
not overlap is to ensure that the estimate of the abnormal returns is unbiased; and to show 
how the stock would behave in absence of the M&A event (Seiler, 2004). 
                        101 days                                 Event date             
--------------------------------------------------0------------ 
 -130        -29 -30   +30 
     -----Estimation period-----      ---Event Window--- 




                                                          
28
  The most popular estimation technique used in M&A studies use the period before the event (Chong et al, 
2006; Cybo-Ottone & Murgia, 2000; Becher, 2000 and Houston & Ryngaert, 2004).  It is rare though to have 
estimation periods after the event except where the event was so dramatic that it changed the fundamental 
relationship between the behavior of the stock and the market. 
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5.1.5 The selection of the acquirer and target banks samples. 
Certain criteria were used in obtaining the sample banks in the study. In order to be included 
in the sample, both acquirer and the target banks had to meet the following criteria: 
i.) The M&A deal must have occurred between January 1, 1997 and December 31, 2007.  
ii.) The acquirer bank must have acquired a 10% stake
29
 or more in the target bank. 
iii.) Both the cross border and domestics acquirers banks are commercial banks as classified 
by the Reuters database. 
iv.) The acquirer banks are member countries of the European Union and have available 
financial statements for the periods 1997 to 2007. 
v.) All the banks in the sample are listed and publicly traded in the financial market 
vi.) Only deals that are classified as completed are included in the list. That means that 
pending and cancelled deals are excluded from the list. 
vii.) The M&A value must exceed €500 million
30
.  
viii.) Banks in non EU countries which are acquired are removed in the list of target banks. 
The initial total sample of the bidders was 108 banks in the EU. The sample was further 
subjected to checks as to determine whether the banks met the set out criteria and 62 banks 






                                                          
29
 The 10% is considered as the popular minimum acquisition stake in most finance studies involving M&A and 
was applied in the study. See also La Porta, et al (1999), Faccio, et al (2001) and Maury & Pajuste (2002). 
30
 This €500 million cut off is based on the value of the mega M&A stored by the Reuters database. 
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Acquisition   
Total per 
year   
   
Cross 
border Domestic     
1997 Italy 0 2 2   
1998 Spain 1 0     
  France 1 0 2   
1999 Spain 1 1     
  Italy 0 1     
  Germany 1 0     
  Austria 1 0 5   
2000 Spain 2 0     
  Slovenia 0 1     
  Italy 1 0     
  Germany 1 0     
  United Kingdom 0 1 6   
2001 France 3 0     
  Spain 1 1     
  Italy 2 0     
  United Kingdom 1 0 8   
2002 Greece 0 1     
  Belgium 1 0     
  Germany 1 0     
  Italy 1 1 5   
2003 Germany 1 0     
  France 1 1     
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  Greece 0 1     
  Italy 0 1 5   
2004 France 1 0     
  Spain 0 1     
  United Kingdom 2 0 4   
2005 United Kingdom 1 0     
  Austria 1 0     
      
  Sweden 1 0     
  Italy 2 1     
  Germany 0 1 6   
2006 Germany 0 2     
  Italy 4 1     
  France 2 0     
  United Kingdom 1 0     
  Spain 2 0     
  Cyprus 1 0     
  Portugal 1 0 14   
2007 Italy 1 2     
  Greece 1 0     
  Belgium 0 1 5   
            





5.1.6 Calculation of the normal, abnormal and cumulative abnormal returns 
The normal returns are the non-event returns that would have occurred in the absence of the 
event. The abnormal returns are the actual returns that occurred because of the event less the 
returns that would have occurred without the event.  The cumulative abnormal returns 
(CARs) are the aggregate of all the abnormal returns (ARs). 
The abnormal return (AR) is estimated using the market model as: 
  - -   * -----------------------------------------------1 
Where 
 Abnormal return on share j for each day t in the event window 
 = return on share j for each day t in the event window 
 = intercept term for share j measured over the estimation period 
 
 = slope term for stock j measured over the estimation period 
 = return on the market m for each day t  in the event window 
 
The AR was standardised to cater for the different degree of event impact. This is done by 
weighing the abnormal returns by the standard deviation. The purpose of the standardization 
is to ensure that each abnormal return has the same variance (Serra, 2002).  Thus, by dividing 
each firm‟s abnormal residual by the standard deviation over the estimation period, each 
residual has an estimated variance of 1 and thus defined by the equation: 
 
 =  ---------------------------------------------------- 2 
Where  = SAR for firm j at time t. 




    =            
Square root of the variance of the AR for firm j at the time t  equals the standard deviation of 
the AR for the firm j at the time t. 
 
And the variance is given by the equation:  




     = variance of the AR for firm j at time t. 
   = AR for firm j at time I over the estimation period 
     = number of observed trading day returns for firm j over the estimation period 
     = return on the market at time t over the event window 
      = mean return on the market at time t over the estimation period 
    = return on the market at time t over the estimation period  
 
To determine the significance of the standardized abnormal returns for each day in the event 




Z -   =     ---------------------------------------- 3 
where; 
 = Z- statistics for the each day in the event window 
 = TSAR for each day in the event window 
= number of observed trading day returns for firm j over the estimation period 
N = number of banks in the sample 
The cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) of the acquirers were obtained by first aggregating 
all the abnormal returns in the sample. This follows the suggestion of Campbell et al (1997) 
and MacKinlay (1997) that the CARs be aggregated in order to draw the total inferences for 
the event under consideration, which could be carried out through time and series. The 
cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) were calculated over event period to ascertain the effect 
on the period surrounding the announcement of the mergers.  For the purpose of the panel set, 
the CARs are aggregated across time and bank samples.  
5.2 Methods of Measuring Returns 
Both the abnormal and normal returns follow a peculiar process in their measurements. The 
methods of measuring both returns can be grouped under two broad categories: the economic 
and statistical models. While the former involves the application of statistical methods and 
assumptions, the latter rely on the reactions of the investors and do not totally lean on 
statistical proofs (Campbell et al., 1997). In reality though, it is very typical to combine both 
methods in undertaking any empirical work. 
A number of models have been developed in the measurement of the firms‟ performance. 
These include but not limited to the following: constant mean return model, the market 
model, factor model, the market adjusted model etc. 
The constant-mean-return model is the simplest model. This is perhaps because of its ability 
to give results that are similar to other sophisticated applicable models (Brown & Warner, 
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1985). The lack of the sensitivity to the choice of the model lies on the fact that the variance 
of the abnormal returns is frequently not effected by the choice of a more sophisticated 
model. The model can be applied when using daily data to measure nominal returns and when 
used in measuring monthly data. It can also be used in estimating both excess and normal 
returns. The model is expressed as: 
Rit = μi + ξit   -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 4 




Rit = the period t return on security i 
μi = the mean return for the assets i and ξit = the time period t disturbance term for  
security i  with an expectation of zero and variance ζ
2
ξi 
The market model is a statistical model which follows the return of any given security to the 
return of the market portfolio. It assumes a linear expression based on the joint normality of 
the assets returns which represent a potential improvement over the constant-mean-return 
model.  The method eliminates the portion of the return that is related to variation in the 
market model and the variance of the abnormal return. This can thus increase the chances of 
predicting the effect of the events. The merit of this model lies on the market model 
regression because the higher the regression, the greater the variance reduction of the 
abnormal returns (see section 5.1.6. for the equation of the model). 
The factor model stems from the attempt to reduce the variance of the abnormal returns by 
explaining more of the variation in the normal returns. The market model is a typical example 
of the factor model.  A multifactor model can be formed by an addition of any factor such as 
the industry indexes. The model calculates the abnormal returns by taking the difference 
between the actual return and the portfolio of the firms of similar size. However, as Campbell 
et al (1997) noted, the use of the multifactor model in event study is naïve. This is because 
the marginal explanatory power of the additional factors beyond the market factor is small; 
hence there is little reduction in the variance of the abnormal return. 
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The market adjusted model is a restricted market model which has the pre-specified 
coefficients. This implies that estimation periods are not required to obtain parameter 
estimates. The model is best used to study the under pricing of initial public offer. The model 
is most applicable when there is a restriction imposed by limited data availability. 
Following Chong et al (2006), this study adopts the market model in measuring the abnormal 
returns. A univariate comparison of the cross border and domestic acquirers is undertaken in 
order to give an insight on the characteristics and performances of each bank before the 
merger.  Then, the model is employed in determining the cumulative abnormal returns which 
are then used accordingly with other variables in regression, depending on the hypothesis 
tested. 
 
5.3 Sources of Data & Sample Period 
The starting point in the data sourcing and collection was by comparing the available M&A 
databases. The initial lists of M&A deals in the EU were drawn from Thomson Financial 
Banker One,   Reuters,   Bankers Almanac, and Zephyr.  
While each of the databases is unique in the type and range of data provided, the nature of the 
study required combination of two or more data sources
31
 at least for the comparison and 
because of the nature of the variables. The interest of this study is aligned to bank mergers 
returns and dividend policy as such; relevant data relating to shareholders‟ value, 
profitability, and dividend policy of the cross border and domestic acquirers were considered 
at the same time. 
                                                          
31
 Some studies implore different databases to fill in the gap that might be created by omission. Pillof (1999) 
used data from IDD M&A Database, Wall Street Journal index, M&A Sourcebook and the Moody‟s Banks and 
Finance Manual in constructing detailed merger histories of the banks.  Gulger (2003) combined data from two 
sources; the CDAX and the Reuters to explore the dividend payout policy among German banks while 
Valkanov and Kleimeier (2006) used data from five sources: Zehpyr, DataStream, Edgar, Bankscope and annual 
reports in studying cross border M&A. The danger though is that since the databases are provided by different 
sources, their approximations and often basis of calculation may create huge disparity in the data. Caution was 
therefore exercised in order to ensure that the difference in the databases did not adversely affect the dataset.   
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The relevant M&A list of all commercial banks in the EU was obtained from the Reuters 
database from 1997 to 2007. The list comprises basically of commercial banks to commercial 
banks deals of domestics and cross border deals. The total number of M&A deals is 62, of 
which 42 are cross border and 20 are domestic deals within the EU member countries. Table 
5.1 provides a summary of the list. 
Since the study is focused on mega M&A deals, coupled with the limited availability of 
sample of deals involving only commercial to commercial banks, the criterion on the 
minimum value of the included deals was pegged at €500,000 million.  The period of the 
deals covers from 1997 to 2007.  Most of the sample deals were obtained from the Reuters 
database while other sources were used to check for consistency (see appendix for list of 
domestic and cross border acquirers). The database stores list of the EU commercial to 
commercial banks M&A deals, as well as others. In addition, commercial banks
32
 are easily 
identified from other banking institutions such as mortgage and merchant banks.   
Some of the financial data of the cross border and domestic acquirer banks were also 
obtained from the bankscope database which contains standard and audited balance sheets, 
cash flow statements and profit and loss data. These data were used in conjunction with those 
obtained in the Reuters and FAME (Financial Analysis Made Easy) databases. In addition, 
the daily return before and the after the merger announcement was obtained from the Yahoo 
finance.  
In accordance with similar studies on mergers and acquisitions, this empirical study applies 
some profitability and accounting variables
33
 such as net interest margin, return on equity, 
                                                          
32
 In reality, the difference between commercial banks and other banking institutions seems blurred and obscure 
in some databases but this is not so in the Reuters financial database. 
33
 Different studies on M&A as well as on dividend policy have applied range of variables most of which seek 
to measure profitability, efficiency and to shareholders wealth. Pillof (1999) used personnel cost, premises & 
fixed assets expenses, total noninterest expenses, capital to assets, loans to assets and deposits to assets in 
measuring the changes in performance of shareholders wealth following bank mergers. DeAngelo et al (2006), 
Olson & Pagano (2005) and Gugler (2003) used cash dividend, payout ratio (DPS/EPS), dividend yield 
(DPS/Mkt value/share), stock dividend,cashholding/TA;TE/TA,sales growth rate, assets growth rate, profit 
/sales ratio; dividend/earning ratio; dividend/cashflow,dividend/sales and number of employees in investigating 
dividend policy in the banks. 
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cost efficiency ratio, net loans to total assets expenses, equity to total assets, loans to assets, 
deposits to assets and total assets, as well as dummies to examine the pre and post merger 
performance of the banks. On the other hand, the  dividend policy hypothesis is examined 
using two dependent variables (payout ratio and dividend yield)
34
 and other independent 
variables such as insider shareholding, stock  beta, liquidity, taxes, capital & financial 
structures, debt, equity ratio, EPS, ROE, PE , CARs and dummy variables. 
 
5.4 Data and Model  
The cross sectional regression model was used to test the profitability and dividend policy 
hypotheses.  This follows the methods applied by previous studies. For instance, Olson & 
Pagano (2006) used the cross sectional model to regress the BHAR (Buy-Hold Abnormal 
Returns) over charges in equity, risk, growth and dividend variables in following an M&A; 
Delong & Deyoung (2007) applied same model in measuring the post-merger performance 
relative to the bank CAR on announcement of merger; Cybo-Ottone & Murgia (2000) used 
the cross sectional OLS regression of weighted CARs on set of target variables.  Chong, Liu 
and Tan (2006) used the cross sectional regression model to test the impact of CARs on some 
profitability variables of forced mergers while Goddard et al (2004) compared the results of 
the cross sectional model with other models in measuring the EU bank profitability.  
The data relating to M&A were built into 4 distinct categories which comprise pre merger 
and post merger data for the domestic acquirers and same for the foreign or cross border 
acquirers.  The data set includes the financial ratios for both domestic and cross border banks 
which were extracted from the Reuters and Bankscope databases for the relevant years.  
Banks size, growth and investments ratios, debt and financial structures, risk, ownership, 
taxes, CTSAR and other such financial variables are used in the comparison of domestic and 
cross border acquirers‟ profitability.  
Different sets of data are constructed for the purpose of testing the 3 hypotheses. The dataset 
for the dividend policy consist of data extracted from their financial statements and other 
financial databases and comprises of the 2 dependent variables: dividend payout and dividend 
                                                          
34
 Chapters two and three contain detailed discussions on the two dependent variables (the dividend yield and 
dividend payout) used as proxy for dividend policy in the study. 
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yield. It also contains the CTSAR used as an independent variable in addition to other 
variables for both the cross border and domestic banks. 
The results of the regressions are also presented in different models. In most cases, up to 6 
models are constructed, each containing different independent variable(s) while controlling 
for other factors. The variables are introduced in the models in sequence (sequential 
regression) to determine the contributions each makes to the regression model and also 
controlling for any exogenous variables. For example, in the testing the profitability 
hypothesis, 4 models were constructed each containing the predictor variables. The 
coefficients, ANOVA and the result summary are all presented in the models. The dividend 
policy hypothesis is presented in 6 models, with each model painting a statistical picture of 
the regression results. 
 
 5.5 Data Analysis Techniques 
The research hypotheses and questions are analyzed using different statistics and econometric 
models. The wealth effect and geographical diversification hypothesis was analyzed using the 
total cumulative standardized abnormal returns (CTSAR). The process of obtaining the 
abnormal returns has been explained in section 5.1.6 and requires some extensive application 
of econometric models such as the market model. Both the Z statistics and the p value are 
used in evaluating the significance of the CTSAR obtained. However, the CTSAR pooled 
data was aggregated over time and bank samples to test the profitability and dividend policy 
hypotheses. 
 The analyses of the profitability hypothesis involved the use of descriptive and parametric 
statistics to evaluate the impact of specified independent variables on the financial 
performance of the cross border and domestic banks acquirers.  The return on equity (ROE) 
which is used as a proxy for measuring profitability and is designed to reflect the returns on 
the shareholders investments. The independent variables include the net interest income 
(NII), equity to total assets (EQTASS), cost to-income ratio (CIR), net loans to total assets 
(LOANTAS), Leverage, loan loss provision to net interest revenue (RISK) and the total 
assets.  The methodology applied follows similar studies such as Rhoades (1998), Vander 
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Vennet (1996), Pillof (1996), Diaz et al (2004), Olson & Pagano (2005) and Campa & 
Hernando (2006) in examining the balance sheet ratios.  
The NII measures the changes in the ratio of the net interest income to the book assets while 
the net loan to total assets gives an indication of the proportion of the balance sheet consigned 
to the lending. The loan loss provisions to total loans and the loans provisions to net interest 
revenue are indicatives of how prepared the banks are in event of credit losses (Delong & 
Deyoung, 2007). Both variables measure the liquidity of the bank. The regression model 
follows similar studies in M&A. for instance, Cornett and Tehranian (1992) used ROE and 
capital to assets. Altunbas and Marques (2008) included loan to total assets (liquidity proxy), 
total assets, while Vander-Vennet (1996) adds loan loss provision to net interest revenue 
(credit risk proxy) among the profitability variables. 
The profitability hypothesis was tested on unbalanced panel data using the specification 
below to evaluate the profitability model equation (See section 6.4 for the explanation of the 
equation variables): 
 
Profitabilityi =    + β1 NIIi + β2SIZEi +β3EQTASSi  +β4CIRi + β5LOANTASi +β6RISKi  
                                   + β7PROVTASi + β8CTSARi + β9Dummyi + ei  
 
Where: NII is the net interest income, SIZE is the total assets, EQTASS is the equity to 
total assets ratio, CIR is the cost to income ratio, LOANTAS is the loan to total assets, 
which is a proxy for liquidity, RISK is the loss provision to net interest revenue, indicating 
the ratio of risky lending, PROVTAS is the Loan provisions to total assets; this represents the 
liquidity of the bank, CTSAR is the cumulative total standardised abnormal return, proxy 
for M&A, Dummy 0 for pre-merger and 1 for post-merger events + e is the error term. 
The results are then presented in tables and analyzed using their ANOVA values. The 
standardized beta coefficients were used to estimate the contributions of each of the variables. 
The variables with higher standardized beta coefficients are adjoined to exert more influence 
and thus affect the models. The p values of the variables are set at 5% and 1% degrees of 
freedom to test their significance. 
135 
 
The sequence is repeated for both the domestic and cross border acquirers.  The difference in 
the significance of results of both samples (cross border and domestic acquirers) and 
highlights the common differences in their respective performances following the M&A 
events.  A regression combining both sets of data is obtained using the appropriate dummy 
variables distinguishing between domestic and cross-border M&A, as well as cash and non-
cash acquisitions. 
The univariate statistics and hierarchical regression were used to test the CTSAR and 
dividend policy hypothesis which follows similar pattern as with the profitability analyses. 
Two dependent variables; the dividend yield and payout are used as proxies for dividend 
policy and regressed against the CTSAR and other independent variables of the cross border 
and domestic acquirers.  The predictor (independent) variables include the beta, liquidity, 
insider shareholdings, taxes, equity to total assets, total assets, debt to equity, earnings per 
share, return on equity, price earnings and the dummies variables
35
.  
A further check on the results identified in the regression is undertaken to convincingly 
establish that the effects exhibited by the predictor variables on the dividend policy of the 
merged banks were not just by chance. Thus, the Granger Causality test was applied to 
rigorously examine that there is a temporal cause-and –effect relationship among the CTSAR 
and the dividend policy variables.  The equation of the CTSAR and dividend policy 
hypothesis is as stated
36
:  
DivPolicy = β0 – β1Betai + β2Liquidityi - β3Insideri + β4Taxi - β5Cap&FnSti + β6Sizei + 
                  β7Profiti – β8Growthi + β9CARsi + ξi 
where:  Beta is the estimated beta coefficient of the banks (with negative sign to indicate its 
expected effect), Liquidity is the availability of physical cash in the bank measured as the 
                                                          
35
 Due to collinearity problem, only 2 of the dummy variables, the DumGeoCARs, which measures the domestic 
acquirer‟s CTSAR and the PreDumTass, which measures the premerger total assets of the domestic acquirers 
were finally used in the analyses. The DumGeoCARs takes the value of 1 for cross border acquirers and 0 for 
the domestic acquirers. The issue of collinearity has been explained in section 5.7 (test of multicollinearity).   
36
 See section 7.2 for the explanation of the variables used in the dividend policy regression model. The 




dividend/net cash operating, Insider is the percentage of insider shareholdings in the 
acquiring banks (with expected effect being negative) , Tax is the  total tax liabilities of the 
banks as well as the relevant tax ratios, Cap&FnSt  the bank‟s capital and finance structures 
measured by the Debt/Equity ratio (capital structure) while the finance structure is debt + 
equity/total assets, Size the natural log of the total assets is used as the proxy for size of the 
bank,  Profit is the profitability of the bank as measured by the ROE and EPS, Growth is the 
price earnings (PE),(with negative expected effect on dividend policy),CTSAR is the 
Cumulative total standardized abnormal returns (CTSAR) is a proxy for M&A and ξ is the 
error term. 
The inclusion of these variables in the dividend model follows the pattern of other studies. 
For instance, Gugler (2003) and Casey & Dickens (2000) models include percentage of 
institutional ownership (insider) as well as bank beta and tax variables. Pattenden and Twite 
(2008) used profitability, size, taxes, and credit risk in their dividend policy models. Other 
studies that have applied similar variables include McManus et al (2004) and Anil and 
Kapoor (2008) respectively. 
 
5.7 Test of multicollinearity 
The regression variables were subjected to a multicollinearity test in order to ensure that the 
results do not suffer from the mishaps of multicollinearity.  The problem usually occurs 
among explanatory variables that have linear relationship. Multicollinearity represents the 
extent to which the effect of any variable can be explained by the other variables in the 
analysis. It diminishes the ability to determine the right effect of the variable on the model 
(Hair et al, 2005). In practice, the symptoms of multicollinearity include false signs of 
coefficients, smaller than expected t-values and larger than expected insignificant p values 
(Albright, Winston & Zappe, 1999).  
The preliminary analyses include the collinearity diagnostics test; the residual statistics and   
The Cook‟s Distance in the Residual table were cross checked to ensure that the maximum 
value is not more than one (1). Tabachnick & Fidell (2001) suggest that values more than one 
(1) may constitute some problems in the analysis.   
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Since the coefficient represents the impact of the independent variables on the model in 
addition to the effects of the other variables in the regression equation, it was imperative to 
ensure that there is an established correlation among them. Tabachnick & Fidell (2001) 
advise that a correlation coefficient above 0.7 or below 0.3 may be worrisome. Therefore, 
variables that show signs of „improper correlations‟ were eliminated from the list.   




The scatter plot was used in detecting the outliers while the residual and collinearity statistics 
were employed to examine any further multicollinearity in the result. The Coefficient Tables 
6.6 and 6.15 (Chapter 6) contain the collinearity statistics (see the top right section of the 
tables) to help check that the results are free of any multicollinearity. Multicollinearity 
problems are usually detected by the VIF (variance inflation factor) and the Tolerance values. 
The Tolerance value measures the extent of the variability of the specified independent 
variables which are not measured by the rest of the independent variables and calculated as   
1 – R
2
 .  Any value less than 0.10 indicates high correlation with other variables and 
indicating a multicollinearity issue.  The VIF is the inverse of the Tolerance value. Pallant 
(2006) advised that the VIF value should be below 10.00 for a reliable result. All the 
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 The data were collected and compiled from different sources. The major sources include the websites of the 
banks, Bankscope, Reuters, Thompson Financial and financial analysis made easy (FAME). In some cases, the 
differences in the values of data are so wide that the data is treated with suspicion or totally eliminated as an 
outlier in the analyses.  Some data were removed due to the multicollinearity problem. One of   the dependent 






Data Analyses and Discussion of Results  
 
6.0 Introduction 
This chapter presents the empirical analysis undertaken in the study and discusses the results 
obtained. Many studies on mergers and acquisitions have over the decades preoccupied the 
financial literature, but the approaches to the studies have often been methodological and 
focused on identifying gains to shareholder wealth. This study has adopted the approach of 
pairing the subject of M&A not only to shareholder wealth and the profitability of acquirers 
but also to the controversial issue of dividend policy.  
Different studies have diagnosed a multitude of reasons for mergers and acquisitions. 
Financial institutions, particularly banks, are very central to the economy of countries and 
therefore decision to undertake a merger is usually considered with utmost seriousness. 
Chapter 4 discusses some reasons for M&A and problems and challenges of merged entities. 
For the empirical work, this study has focused on issues related to domestic mergers as well 
as foreign or cross border mergers. To this effect, three testable hypotheses, discussed in 
Chapter 1, are tested and analysed in this and the next chapter.  The hypotheses and the 
expected outcomes are listed in Table 6.1 below. 
Table 6.1   Research Hypotheses, Proxies and their Expected Outcomes.   
Hypothesis          Proxies     Expected outcome 
  The wealth effect &       CTSAR: Cumulative total standardised   Positive (cross border)  
geographical                      abnormal returns of both domestic &          Negative(domestic) 
diversifications                    cross border merged banks                      
hypothesis                       
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
  The profitability hypothesis of cross  
border and domestic acquirers.   ROE: Return on equity                     Positive (cross border) 
                                                                                                                     Negative (domestic) 
 
   Dividend policy hypothesis   - Dividend Yield &                   Positive (both) 
                                                       Dividend Payout 
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6.1      The Wealth Effect and Geographical diversification Hypothesis                                        
This section tests the wealth effect and geographical diversification hypothesis using the 
standardized abnormal returns of the cross border and domestic acquirers. It also discusses 
the result obtained from the market model of the event study. The event study method was   
described in Chapter 5 of the research methodology.  
 
The AR was standardised to cater for the different degree of event impact. This is done by 
weighting each abnormal return by their standard deviation. The purpose of the 
standardization is to ensure that each abnormal return has the same variance (Serra, 2002).  
Thus, by dividing each firm‟s abnormal residual by the standard deviation over the estimation 
period, each residual will have an estimated variance of 1 and thus defined by the equation: 
 
 =  ---------------------------------------------------- 1 
Where  = SAR for firm j at time t. 
            = AR for firm j at time t. 
 
     =         
Square root of the variance of the AR for firm j at time t = the standard deviation of the AR 
for the firm j at time t. 
6.1.1.   :  The wealth effect and geographical diversification hypothesis:  In contrast to 
domestic acquisition, cross border acquisitions will not create more value. Where 
diversification and possible reduction in financial distress is achievable, foreign acquisitions 
are not expected to outperform domestic acquirers.   
The above hypothesis was tested using the results of the cumulative total standardised abnormal 
returns (CTSAR) of both the cross border and domestic bank M&A, as shown in Table 6.2.  
The shareholders value, proxied by CTSAR of the cross border (international) acquirers is compared 
with the domestic acquirers. 
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The results obtained provide empirical insight on the pattern of the returns. The cross border 
acquirers show significant negative CTSAR, while the domestic acquirers have insignificant 
CTSAR. Using 61 days window (30 days before and after plus the event day), it can be 
established that many of the significant returns of the cross border occurred after the 
announcement of the M&A. Only few significant returns occurred before the mergers 
announcement date. The domestic banks show no significant returns throughout the event 
window. 
Out of the 21 significant results, 5 occurred prior to the mergers while 16 occurred after the 
merger event. Some reasons can be adduced as to why there are more significant abnormal 
returns of the cross border banks after the announcement date. The public confidence may 
have been affected which may trigger upward shock in the share price of the banks. Since the 
cross border bank samples are made up of large international banks, it is apparent that their 
targets would be similar banks with substantial market share. The news of the M&A would 
either build or decrease the confidence in the public. Table 6.2 shows the significant results 
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*Significant at 0.05. Only significant returns are shown in the table.                                                            
#Figures in parentheses are for domestic M&A                                                                                             
+CTSAR (cumulative total standardized abnormal returns). 
 
The graphs of the abnormal returns are represented in Figures 6.1 and 6.2. Note the rise and fall 
in the slope of the curves of the cumulative total standard abnormal returns after the event date.    
Figure 6.1 illustrates the curve of the cross border acquirers. The graph slopes down deep into 
negative CTSAR to about -41.5%, just after the mergers but with an initial rise after the 10
th
 day 
before falling back. But prior to the M&A, the CTSAR was 29.02% which occurred on the 25
th
 
day before the merger news infiltrated the market. The abnormal returns were at peak just before 












The graph depicts the nature of the CTSAR of the cross border acquirers. There are more 
significant results as shown in the Table 6.2, most of them are negative abnormal returns. The 
news of the mergers triggered an initial increase but with a subsequent fall in the cumulative 
total standardized abnormal returns before the event day.  The CTSAR of the cross border 
continues to fall even after the mergers.  
Figure 6.2 gives a similar illustration of the shape of the graph of the domestic mergers. 
However, the graph of the domestic CTSAR shows a more sustained positive growth. This is 
paradoxical as the growth shown in the graphs is not significant. Note also that the news of the 
merger triggered an initial growth in the curve of the CTSAR before its lowest fall on the event 









Figure 6.2 The Graph of the Domestic Cumulative Total Standardized Abnormal Returns 
 
 
The graphs do not reflect the significance of the results but shows the growth trend in the 
abnormal returns of the bank domestic acquirers. It shows that the slopes of the domestic 
acquirers move faster above zero (positive) than the cross border acquirers. Though, the latter 
has more negative significant results than the former. 
 Domestic acquirers have been adjudged to possess more knowledge of the local market than 
foreign acquirers. This may explain the jump in the CTSAR before the mergers 
announcement news infiltrated the market prior to the eventual fall. Das & Sengupta (2001) 
averred to asymmetric information as an underlining variable for the disparity in the growth 
of the abnormal returns of the domestic and foreign acquirers.  The domestic banks are likely 
to know more about the preferences of domestic consumers than would the cross border 
acquirers. Their presence in the domestic market in related lines of activity often results in 
greater experience regarding household income and expenditure patterns, and household 
preferences for new products and brands. All of this adds up to private information in the 
possession of the domestic banks and their advantageous position in the market during the 
144 
 
merger period. Some studies have asserted that the growth in abnormal returns is hugely 
influenced by the method of payment and the influence of tax in the M&A deal
38
.  
    
The result obtained from the event study in relationship to the wealth effect and geographical 
diversifications hypothesis confirms that although the cross border acquirers have more 
negative significant CTSAR, on aggregate basis, the domestic acquirers bring relatively better 
returns to their shareholders. Some of the returns of the cross border acquirers are in high 
negative while those of the domestic are in relatively low negative CTSAR. 
Table 6.3    Cumulative Total Abnormal Returns (CTSAR) in Quartiles  
 




 quartiles are in 




 quartiles are in the post merger periods. The quartiles are split into 60days 




























-12.26 0.07 -21.84 -0.69 -38.70 -13.55 -24.66 -11.61 
0.41 4.30 -22.46 0.44 -34.43 -4.07 -41.48 -8.60 
13.23 4.71 -32.38 -4.20 -37.79 -6.79 -34.14 -10.35 
-9.28 2.07 -38.19 -6.01 -39.14 -6.53 -25.97 -6.62 
20.78 1.87 -25.38 -6.31 -41.11 -0.88 -34.34 -7.57 
29.02 5.14 -28.92 -7.36 -32.65 0.80 -27.37 -5.86 
20.32 7.08 -13.86 -7.96 -35.47 4.41 -33.82 -7.39 
13.85 8.98 -24.81 -6.95 -36.70 -0.65 -25.37 -8.85 
19.45 3.87 -5.44 -11.79 -39.20 -4.98 -21.50 -8.99 
20.18 2.54 -11.74 -11.67 -32.30 -4.63 -28.09 -9.10 
17.00 3.03 -15.14 -17.83 -32.03 -5.57 -26.61 -11.63 
22.80 5.47 -27.68 -15.16 -34.81 -8.50 -30.57 -14.62 
9.10 9.16 -29.84 -17.78 -38.60 -12.90 -39.90 -16.86 
15.61 2.87 -39.77 -16.42 -27.32 -11.43 -38.41 -18.34 
-4.35 2.24 -41.58 -20.09 -28.18 -11.93 -25.23 -21.44 
AVG 
CTSAR 175.43 63.40 -379.03 -149.75 -528.43 -87.21 -457.47 -167.83 
 
                                                          
38 Huang and Walkling (1987) observe that the larger abnormal returns for cash acquisitions are consistent with 
tax explanation. That is, target shareholders are taxed for capital gains in cash mergers, but the taxes are 
deferred in mergers involving stock transactions. A cash offer would have to be larger than a stock offer to 
offset the tax liability.  However, Davidson & Cheng (1997) conclude that a cash offer is not inherently more 
valuable than a share exchange that offers the equivalent amount of shares.  Cash contains no additional 
information, provide no additional value, and do not seem to alleviate the asymmetric information problem any 
more than offers made with payments of stock. Cash offers are the source of larger returns only because cash 
targets received larger payments from bidders and concluded that the link between abnormal returns and 






Table 6.3 shows the CTSAR values in quartiles. The pre M&A periods constitute the first 
two quartiles while the post M&A periods are in the last two quartiles. The result indicates 
that the 1
st
 quartile produces the highest CTSAR of 174.43 for cross border acquirers‟ 
shareholders followed by the 2
nd
 quartile with a CTSAR value of 63.40 for domestic 
acquirers.   
The worst period for the cross border acquirers is in the 3rd quartile with a CTSAR of             
-528.43.  The domestic acquirers recorded their lowest CTSAR in the last quartile with a 
CTSAR value of -167.83. The results therefore corroborate the earlier argument that the 
CTSAR of the cross border acquirers fall at a greater speed than those of the domestic 
acquirers. This thus reduces the wealth effect or benefits of their shareholders from such 
M&A. 
Thus, based on the result of the acquirers in Table 6.2, the null hypothesis that the cross 
border acquirers do not create more values than the domestic acquirers is thereby accepted.  
The result obtained is though similar to some other studies on cross border and domestic 
acquirers but it uses the CSTAR as against the traditional cumulative abnormal return which 
is common in many studies. The findings concurs with Lensink & Maslennikova (2008) that 
domestic transactions create more value than the cross border.  Using a window of 41 days, 
they found that the cross border acquirers never created value to their shareholders.  Mangold 
et al (2008) concludes that cross border acquirers destroy wealth while domestic acquirers 
create value. Some studies (Anand, Capron & Will, 2005 and Conn et al, 2005) have also 
found that both acquirers exhibit similar pattern or have no statistical difference in their 








6.2 Descriptive Analysis of the Financial Performance of the Cross Border and 
Domestic Bank Acquirers 
The descriptive analysis of the financial performance of both domestic and cross border 
acquirers is measured by their profitability. The summary statistics is presented in Table 6.3 
and makes comparison of the cross border and domestic acquirers using key profitability 
variables as well as their CTSAR.   
Table 6.4   Summary Statistics of the Abnormal Returns and Merger Performance of the Domestic 
and Cross Border Banks for the period 1997 -2007. 
 
The table presents the summary statistics of the acquirers‟ financial performance using key ratios. The profitability is measured 
using the traditional measures of Return on Equity (ROE) which is a key profitability variable. Others include the Net interest 
income (NII) and the Cost to- income ratio or the cost to income ratio (CIR) which show the profitability arising from the savings 
due to the banks efficient operations. The Equity/total assets (EQTASS) and the) measure the contribution of the capital structure   
of the bank to its performance. It also explains the profits arising from the quality of the banks‟ assets. Net loans to total assets 
(LOANTAS) and the Loan loss provision to total assets (PROVTAS) measure the liquidity of the banks. They capture the banks 
financial position, investments strategy and funding methods. The Loan loss provisions to net interest revenue (RISK) pictures the 
risky nature of the banks loan and the net effect on its liquidity and profitability while  the  total assets indicates the size of the 
banks. 
Panel A: 
Pre-merger performance of domestic banks 
N Minimum Maximum Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Return on Equity (ROE) 86 -18.36 34.06 9.35 8.28 
Net interest Income (NII) 85 -10.01 4.85 1.73 2.20 
Equity/total assets(EQTASS) 85 1.71 15.14 6.74 3.95 
Cost to-income ratio(CIR) 86 41.44 94.72 66 18.48 
Net  loans to total assets(LOANTAS) 81 5.41 85.21 52.18 19.80 
Loan loss provision to total assets (PROVTAS ) 
83 0.80 8.78 2.40 1.23 
Loan loss provisions to net interest revenue (RISK) 88 -1.51 99.42 19.57 15.27 
Total assets 





CTSAR 30 -20.09 9.16 -2.88 8.68 
Panel B: 
Post-merger performance of domestic banks N Minimum Maximum Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Return on Equity (ROE)  130 -42.80 23.76 8.92 10.79 
Net interest Income (NII) 129 0.68 4.51 2.06 0.94 
Equity/total assets(EQTASS) 128 1.42 11.13 6.15 2.54 
Cost  to -income ratio(CIR) 130 30.85 116.83 62.02 15.65 
Net loans to total assets(LOANTAS) 129 10.65 94.49 60.28 20.32 
Loan loss provision to total assets (PROVTAS) 129 0.71 15.30 4.08 3.44 
Loan loss provisions to net interest revenue (RISK) 128 -14.31 26.11 25.45 32.34 
Total assets 








The table makes a comparison between the financial performance of the domestic and cross 
border acquirer samples in the study. Using key performance variables, the result shows a 
reduction in the ROE, EQTASS and CIR of the domestic acquirers. The mean of the ROE fell 
after the M&A from 9.35% to 8.92% and the EQTASS reduced from 6.74% to 6.15% while 
the CIR fell from 66% to 62.02% after the merger process.  
The decrease in ROE indicates that on average, the market investors did not efficiently price 
the bank mergers during the period. This is a phenomenon based on previous merger 
performance studies. This decline is not surprising as on average, the post merger financial 
performance of banks as measured by the ROE rarely improves (Delong & DeYoung, 2007).   
The fall of EQTASS is very marginal and therefore does not paint a gloomy picture in terms 
of the equity structure of the merged entity. 
Panel C: 
Pre-merger performance of Cross border 
banks N Minimum Maximum Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Return on Equity (ROE) 129 0.09 45.92 14.71 7.30 
Net interest Income (NII) 130 0.72 3.71 2.27 0.69 
Equity/total assets(EQTASS) 132 2.59 11.54 5.52 1.75 
Cost to –income ratio(CIR) 127 45.88 93.52 64.40 9.20 
Net loans to total assets(LOANTAS) 130 26.76 82.18 52.27 11.85 
Loan loss provision to total assets (PROVTAS ) 
130 0.28 5.97 2.68 1.34 
Loan loss provisions to net interest revenue (RISK) 
126 -4.46 52.37 15.71 9.86 
Total assets 131 85,966 288,454 153,414.44 83,444.89 
CTSAR 30 -41.58 29.03 -6.79 21.95 
      
Panel D: 
Post-merger performance of Cross border 
banks 
     
Return on Equity (ROE) 326 -18.47 28.72 11.20 9.36 
Net interest Income (NII)) 331 0.49 4.33 1.54 0.79 
Equity/total assets(EQTASS) 302 2.57 10.67 5.38 2.25 
Cost to –income ratio(CIR) 315 44.56 112.67 64.83 12.04 
Net loans to total assets(LOANTAS) 325 27.33 87.02 51.86 15.42 
Loan loss provision to total assets (PROVTAS) 326 0.07 4.87 2.39 1.43 
Loan loss provisions to net interest revenue (RISK) 333 -1.78 54.01 16.97 12.90 
Total assets 321 6,427.80 968,733 393,055.04 284,477.90 
CTSAR 30 -41.48 -21.50 -32.86 5.70 
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CIR is the cost to-income ratio and shows a substantial decline. This is an indication of more 
efficiency in the control of costs and expenses. Since mergers are often set out to achieve 
palpable reduction in costs and increase in efficiency, thus reduced expenses would be 
expected to translate into higher profitability though reported incomes do not often reflect the 
actual earnings (Pillof, 1996).  The table shows a significant increase in the NII of domestic 
acquirers from 1.73% to 2.06%. The NII measures the difference between the revenues on the 
assets and the cost of servicing the liabilities. This increase could be attributed to a higher 
interest charge on loans which increased substantially after the M&A. It represents the interest 
payments received by the banks on loans and those made by the banks on customers‟ deposit 
and reflects the success of core intermediation activity (Vander Vennet, 1989). 
The variables LOANTAS, PROVTAS, RISK and the total assets of the domestic acquirers 
also shows increases after the merger process. LOANTAS rose from 85.21% to 94.49%, 
PROVTAS 8.78% to 15.30% while the RISK increased from 19.57% to 26.11% respectively. 
LOANTAS shows an increase in the amount of loan held by the banks which can be 
explained by the proportional increase in NII and depicts the assets quality of the banks 
(Pillof, 1996).   
The variables PROVTAS and RISK measure the exposure to credit risk of the banks after 
mergers. Banks use loan loss provisions to create reserves to cushion the expected losses in 
their loan portfolios (Perez et al, 2006). The increases are indications that the mergers invoked 
anticipations in loan losses to customers and thus creating further provisions in bad and 
doubtful debts after the mergers. However, these increases are by no means accidental but 
suggest that the mergers have a significant shift in the debts and investment strategy of the 
banks.   
The post merger profitability variables of the cross border acquirers also show similar pattern 
except in the variables NII, CIR, LOANTAS and PROVTAS. NII fell from 2.27% to 1.54%, 
LOANTAS dropped from 52.27% to 51.86% while PROVTAS decreased from 4.08% to 
2.39% respectively. However, CIR records a marginal increase from 64.40% to 64.83%. The 
fall in NII has an adverse effect on the overall profitability of the bank. The net interest 
income is presumed to be inversely related to the level of interest rates. Thus the decrease can 
be attributed to as the variation in net interest income resulting from interest rates volatility 
(Albert & Pamela, 2007).   
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CIR of the domestic acquirers shows a marginal increase; which represent less managerial 
efficiency in the control of costs.  It measures how effective the banks cost operations are.  It 
remains the traditional measure of banks efficiency and measures non-interest expenses as a 
proportion of operating revenue. The costs include salaries, technology, buildings, supplies, 
and administrative expenses. While revenue includes net interest income (interest revenue less 
interest expenses) plus fee income revenue (Finerran, 2006). Thus the increase in CIR is a 
negative signal in the management of cost.  
Studies (Ahmed at el, 1989; Beaver et al, 1989) have shown that the decrease in LOANTAS 
and PROVTAS has a signal effect and portrays that the banks as weak. This is consistent with 
the signalling hypothesis and provides support that LOANTAS and PROVTAS are used as 
capital management and smoothing techniques. In comparison with the domestic acquirers, 
cross-border acquirers show weak financial position in their LOANTAS and PROVTAS.  The 
increase in the total assets of both the domestic and cross border acquirers is not surprising as 
mergers expand the size of the banks assets base. 
The mean of the CTSAR of the domestic acquirers sloped down from -2.88 to -8.50 after the 
M&A. This is better when compared with those of the cross border which plummeted deep 
into negative from -6.79 to -32.86.  This result leans support to the rejection of the wealth 
effect and geographical diversification hypothesis (H1,) and provides further evidence that 
domestic acquirers at aggregate create more value to their shareholders than their cross 
border counterparts. 
 
6.3 Performance Analysis of the Domestic Acquirers 
The starting point of the performance analysis was to ascertain the extent of correlation 
among the financial performance variables (ROE, NII, CIR, EQTASS, LOANTAS, 
PROVTAS and   total assets used as a proxy for SIZE).  A correlation matrix was performed 
using the Pearson product moment correlation coefficient. Tables 6.5 and 6.6 shows the 
results of the correlation matrix of the pre and post M&A performance variables of the 




The pre merger profitability correlation matrix table also show some significant correlation 
among the profitability variables and the ROE. Both the NII and the EQTASS variables have 
a correlation of -0.223 respectively with the ROE.  The LOANTAS and RISK correlate with 
the ROE at -0.193 and 0.196.  The negative correlations of the variables imply that the higher 
the profitability of the domestic acquirers, the less is the NII, EQTASS and LOANTAS 
values. RISK has a positive relationship with ROE; implying that a high performance attracts 
a higher RISK. This findings leans support to previous profitability studies (Zhou & Wong, 
2008; Delong & Deyoung, 2007, Deyoung, 1999).   
However, the post merger profitability correlation matrix Table 6.6 shows that the CTSAR 
does not have significant correlation with the profitability variables of the domestic acquirers 
after the M&A. The implication of the result is that while the merger announcement could 
influence the financial performance of the domestic acquirers, it does not have similar 
influence after the merger.  Interestingly, there are remarkable changes in the correlations of 
Table 6.5  Correlation Matrix of Cumulative Total Standardised Abnormal Returns (CTSAR) with the Pre Domestic   
                 Performance Variables 
 




ROE 1.000         
NII -.035 1.000        
EQTASS -.212 .762
**
 1.000       
CIR -.472
**
 .207 .264 1.000      
LOANTAS -.012 .118 .220 -.450
**







 .258 .080 1.000    
RISK -.733
**
 .025 .039 .099 .177 .480
**





-.055 -.027 -.028 -.045 -.023 .069 .062 .053 1.000 
**significant at 0.01 levels, *significant at 0.05 levels. 
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NII, EQTASS and LOANTAS with ROE as all diminishes to insignificant values after the 
M&A.  
 
RISK shows a significant negative correlation of -0.733 with ROE after the M&A. This 
indicates that there is a relationship between profitability and risk, as high risk investments 
will commonly be expected to yield a higher profit. CIR and PROVTAS indicate a high 
negative correlation with ROE at -0.561 and -0.733 respectively. This is not surprising as the 
liquidity of the bank (proxied by PROVTAS) and effective costs savings (CIR) are key 
variables in the banks financial performance. This finding confirms existence of a 
relationship between bank liquidity and profitability. In fact, Goddard, Molyneux & Wilson    
(2004b) assert that banks that maintain high liquidity are more than likely to record a low 
profitability.  This also impairs growth as cash assets are not invested into productive projects 
and therefore rendered dormant.  
 ROE NII EQTASS CIR LOANTAS PROVTAS RISK SIZE CTSAR 
ROE 
 
1.000         
         
NII -.223
*
 1.000        





 1.000       
         
CIR -.142 -.002 .185 1.000      
         
LOANTAS -.193
*
 .054 .143 -.086 1.000     
         
PROVTAS -.174 .166 .122 .045 .051 1.000    
         
RISK .196
*
 -.011 -.022 -.008 -.015 -.157 1.000   
         






 -.074 1.000  




 .181 -.157 .239 1.000 
**significant at 0.01 levels, *significant at 0.05 levels. 
 
      
      
Table 6.6 Correlation Matrix of the Cumulative Totals Standardised Abnormal Returns (CTSAR) with the Post 
                    Domestic Performance Variables 
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In summary, M&A influences the performance of NII, ETQASS, CIR, LOANTAS and 
PROVTAS of the domestic acquirers. However, it would appear that the decrease in the 
profitability reduces CTSAR of the banks. 
 
6.4    Test of Hypothesis on Financial Performance of Bank Acquirers 
H2: The financial performance of cross border acquirers is significantly correlated with 
M&A, and significantly higher than the domestic acquirers.   
Given their access to capital through their foreign partners and investments, cross border 
bank acquirers are expected to outperform domestic acquirers. The cross sectional regression 
model is used to test the above hypothesis and examine the contributions of the independent 
variables to the financial performance of the merged banks.  
Using profitability (proxied by ROE) as the dependent variable, the regression equation is 
more generally specified as:  
 
 =    - β1 NIIi + β2SIZEi +β3EQTASSi  +β4CIRi + β5LOANTASi +β6RISKi  
                                   + β7PROVTASi + β8CTSARi + β9Dummyi + ei  
  Where:   
Β0 = intercept term 
NII = Non interest Income which measures the percentage of profits from off-balance sheet 
operations. 
SIZE = proxy for total assets 
EQTASS = equity over total assets 
CIR = Cost to- income ratio, indicating the efficiency in management of expenses relative to 
income. 
LOANTAS = Loan deposits over total assets to show the percentage of deposits that are 
returned to the banks through loans. 
RISK = Loan loss provision to net interest revenue, indicating the ratio of risky lending. 
PROVTAS = Loan provisions to total assets; this represents the liquidity of the bank. 
CTSAR= Cumulative total standardised abnormal returns, proxy for M&A. 
Dummy = 0 for pre-merger and 1 for post-merger events. 








 were used to determine the contributions of the SIZE, EQUITY, 
LOANTAS, RISK, PROVTAS, CTSAR and dummy variables on the financial performance 
of the merged banks.  The results are shown in Tables 6.7. 
 
The table provides an indication of the significance of the regression used in assessing the 
domestic acquirers‟ financial performance.   Model 1 shows that two variables (NII and 
SIZE) contribute 15.1% to the performance variance and Model 2 makes a 5.2% contribution 
to the variance. Models 3 and 4 explain 33.4% and 49.1% of the variances of the financial 
performance of the domestic acquirers respectively. These are indicated by the value of the 
Adjusted R Square  which are used in determining the level of effect exerted by all the 


















                                                          
39
 The essence of the segmentation was to assess the impact of each of the independent variables on 
performance. At the same time, the multiple regressions allow for ease of control for some factors or variables 




Table 6.7          Model Summary of the Hierarchical Regression of Financial Performance of 
                          Domestic Acquirers 
 
The model summary shows the beta value and the t-values (in parentheses) of the profitability variables. 
Independent variables for the first model consist of the NII and the SIZE. In the second model, an additional 
variable; EQTASS was added. Three further independent variables i.e. CIR, LOANTAS & RISK were also 
included in the third model. While the fourth model has in addition to the above, PROVTAS, CTSAR and 
DUMMY variables. 
 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Tolerance VIF           
            
NII -0.224* -0.164 -0.157 -0.141 0.692 1.445 
  (-2.318)# (-1.456) (-1.424) (-1.239)   
SIZE -0.142 -0.12 -0.137 -0.117 0.854 1.171 
  (-1.472) (-1.216) (-1.417) (-1.144)   
EQTASS   -0.118 -0.077 -0.128 0.528 1.892 
    (-1.026) (-0.682) (-0.984)   
CIR     -0.378 -0.381** 0.736 1.358 
      (-1.859) (-1.940)   
LOANTAS     -0.095 -0.101 0.813 1.230 
      (-0.989) (-0.673)   
RISK     0.174 0.189 0.967 1.035 
      -1.829 -1.757   
PROVTAS       -0.403** 0.490 2.040 
        (-0.764)   
CSTAR       -0.208 0.821 1.115 
        (-1.411)   
DUMMY       0.006 0.711 1.406 
        -0.054   
Constant 4.478** 4.594** 4.591** 3.537**   
Mean Sq 326.08 247.75 242.83 188.92   
F-Value 13.77 12.86 92.97 97.28   
Sig. ANOVA 0.027* 0.041* 0.000** 0.000**   
Change Statistics 
    
  
R Square 0.17 0.08 0.356 0.496   
R Sq Change 0.17 0.082 0.377 0.406   
Adj. R Sq. 0.151 0.052 0.334 0.491   
Std. Error 9.306 9.303 9.046 9.11   
Sig.F Change 0.027* 0.307 0.000** 0.000**   
Df1 2 1 3 3   
Df2 100 99 86 94   
# Figures in parentheses are t-values,*significant at 0.05 level. 





The Model Summary also shows that Model 3 variables make a high contribution of 35.6% to 
the financial performance as indicated by the R Square. Three variables: CIR, LOANTAS 
and RISK were introduced while controlling for NII, SIZE and EQTASS.  The R Square 
Change indicates that the 3 variables introduced in the model made an additional input of 
37.7% to the performance variance. This is quite significant as the Sig. F Change is p=0.007. 
It is thus apparent from the Adjusted R Square that Model 4 exerts the most influence on the 
performance of the acquirer banks as it makes the highest contribution of 49.1% of the variance. 
Three variables, PROVTAS, CTSAR and DUMMY, are additional variables of interest. The R 
Square Change indicates that these variables explain an additional 40.6% of variance in the financial 
performance after controlling for NII, SIZE, EQTASS, CIR, LOAN and RISK.  
The overall regression result is significant as confirmed by the Sig. F Change value.  Table 6.6 of the 
ANOVA statistics also confirms the significance Model results. 
The beta coefficient values   in Table 6.6 provide further insight on the extent of contribution made by 
each of the variables of the domestic acquirers. This is determined by the beta
40
 value of the variables. 
The beta values of PROVTAS, CTSAR and DUMMY in Model 4 are 40.3%, 20.8% and 0.6% 
respectively. The results clearly indicate that PROVTAS makes the highest significant 
contribution to profitability. Thus, PROVTAS is confirmed as the most significant variable in 
the financial performance of the domestic acquirers. 
Further examination to ascertain the percentage contribution of other significant variables 
was undertaken. The beta values show that CIR has a significant beta value of 38.1% in the 
model.  Other LOANTAS and RISK have insignificant betas of   10.1% and 18.9% 
respectively.   The Sig. shows that the CIR is significant at p=0.005 while the others are not. 
 
 
                                                          
40
 Beta values are generally used in finance to examine the risk and thus the expected returns. Similarly, in 
statistics, this measure could specifically be applied in measuring the extent of contribution or the effect exuded 
by individual variables in an equation. Though used as a measure of systematic risk, it also employed in 
equating specific returns relative to the overall regression (Seiler, 2004). The higher the beta value, the more 
contribution and thus impact of the variable on the regression result. 
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Thus, in summary, the regression result shows that PROVTAS and CIR are the most 
significant variables affecting the financial performance of domestic bank acquirers.  This 
implies that the bank‟s liquidity, including its financial position, investments strategy and 
funding methods proxied by PROVTAS, are critical to its post merger performance. Merged 
bank entities with good liquidity level and well thought out investment strategy are more 
likely to outperform those banks with poor liquidity level. Controlling bank expenditure 
pattern in relation to the bank income, as measured by the CIR, is also essential if the 
domestic merged banks are to strive in their financial performance. As indicated by the 
significance of CIR, costs should be matched with the income level of the banks to generate 
good performance. The efficiency in management of expenses relative to income is thus 
important. 
 
6.4.2   Performance Analysis of Cross Border Acquirers 
As in the case of domestic acquirers, the initial stage of the financial performance analysis of 
cross border acquirers was to determine the extent of correlation among the performance 
variables using the Pearson moment correlation coefficient and to test for any 
multicollinearity
41
 in the regression. 
Tables 6.8 and 6.9 show the correlation coefficients of the performance variables of the cross 
border acquirers. The pre-merger correlation matrix shows significant high correlation of 
ROE with CIR and LOANTAS at -0.639 and -0.305 respectively.  These depict that the 
higher the profitability of the cross border acquirers, the lower the CIR (used as proxy for 
cost to income ratio) and the LOANTAS.  
The result shown on the Table 6.8 indicates that the profitability variables do not correlate 
with pre merger CTSAR of the cross border acquirers. This simply implies that the events 
leading to the M&A announcement do not strongly affect the financial performance of the 
cross border acquirers.  This position however changes after the merger event. The 
coefficients of the post cross border acquirers (Table 6.9) indicate that CTSAR has a 
significant correlation at -0.425, 0.574, 0.397 and -0.453 respectively with ROE, CIR, 
LOANTAS and SIZE of the bank as measured by the total assets.  
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This indicates that there is a relationship between abnormal returns and thus shareholders 
wealth and cost to-income of the acquirers (CIR) as well as the liquidity of the banks 
(LOANTAS). However, such increase in CTSAR attracts a reduction in the profitability and 
the total assets of the cross border acquirers.  In the same vein, profitability (ROE) is related 
to the level of CIR, RISK and CTSAR as each significantly correlates negatively with the  
Table 6.8  Correlations of the Cumulative Total Standardised Abnormal Returns with Pre 
                    Cross Border Performance Variables 
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CTSAR  -.105 .009 -.058 .101 .130 -.157 -.132 163 
 
1.000 
          






 ROE at -0.473, -0.469 and   -0.425 respectively .The beta values are used in assessing the 
contributions of each of the independent variables in predicting the financial performance of 
the cross border acquirers. Table 6.10 shows the beta coefficient results and empirically 
evaluates the percentage contributions of each of the variables as measured by the level of 
their betas. 
Table 6.10 shows the beta values and the t-statistics in parentheses of the cross border 
profitability variables.  Four models were used to examine the contribution of NII, SIZE, 
EQTASS, CIR, LOANTAS, RISK, PROVTAS, CTSAR and dummy variables in the 
regression. Model 1 contains two variables; NII and SIZE. Model 2 has, in addition, 
Table 6.9  Correlation matrix of the Cumulative Total Standardised Abnormal Returns with 
                     Post Cross border Performance Variables 
Variables ROE NII EQTASS CIR LOANTAS PROVTAS RISK SIZE CTSAR 
 
ROE 1.000          
         
 
NII .061 1.000        
         
 
EQTASS .061 1.000 1.000       




 -.287 -.287 1.000      
         
 
LOANTAS -.302 .142 .142 .476
**
 1.000     
         
 
PROVTAS -.069 .064 .064 .067 .377
*
 1.000    




 -.176 -.176 .084 .078 .413
*
 1.000   
         
 






 1.000  










 -.238 -.146 -.453
*
 1.000 




EQTASS and Model 3 has three more variables; CIR, LOANTAS and RISK. The final 
Model has PROVTAS, CSTAR and DUMMY in addition to all the previous variables.  
Whilst the Adjusted R Square measures the contribution of the models, the R Square 
Change estimates the impact of each of the variables in the model. The variables in model 1 
make a 33.9% impact on the model result while the additional variable in model 2 which is 
EQTASS makes a 10.5% contribution to the model result. The additional 3 variables; CIR, 
LOANTAS and RISK make a total of 8.5% in model 3. The final model contains in addition, 
PROVTAS, CTSAR and DUMMY made a 15.2% contribution to the regression result. 
The significance of each of the variables is determined by their beta values shown in the 
coefficient table.  
This result implies that the models are all significant and thus highly influence the financial 
performance of the cross border acquirers. However, it is important to further evaluate the 
extent of contribution in the variation of each of the variables by isolating their beta values.   
Not that the variable with the highest beta value makes the most significant impact to the 
model result.  The interpretation of the result is based on the model 4, which is the 


















Table 6.10     Model Summary of Hierarchical Regression of Cross border Acquirers  
 
The variables were introduced in a sequential order. The Model summary shows profitability variable of the 
cross border acquirers, change statistics and ANOVA. The R Square shows that Models 1 and 2 make 33.9% 
and 44.4% contribution respectively to the dependent variables while Models 3 and 4 explain 45.8% and 51% 
respectively of the variance in the dependent variable (ROE). These contributions are very significant as 
depicted by their Sig. ANOVA values.   
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
          Tolerance VIF 
NII 0.084 0.286** 0.287** 0.212* 0.603 1.657 
  (0.981)# (3.096) (3.034) (2.240)     
CIR -0.553** -0.561** -0.521** -0.618** 0.621 1.611 
  (-6.437) (-7.075) (-5.713) (-6.634)     
EQTASS   -0.382** -0.356** -0.387** 0.614 1.628 
    (-4.246) (-3.676) (-4.132)     
LOANTAS     -0.073 -0.141 0.677 1.477 
      (-0.826) (-1.582)     
PROVTAS     0.044 0.082 0.825 1.212 
      (0.528) (1.011)     
RISK     -0.092 -0.059 0.939 1.065 
      (-1.174) (-0.783)     
SIZE       (0.222)* 0.77 1.298 
        (-2.685)     
CSTAR       -0.217* 0.825 1.287 
        (-3.012)     
DUMMY       -0.139     
        (-1.647) 0.758 1.319 
Constant 7.656 9.077 7.968 7.432     
Mean Sq 1126.77 982.7 507.49 423.45 
  F-Value 24.88 25.51 13.11 11.83 
  Sig. ANOVA 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 
  Change Statistics 
      R Square 0.339 0.444 0.458 0.51 
  R Sq Change 0.339 0.105 0.085 0.052 
  Adj.  R Sq. 0.325 0.426 0.423 0.467     
Std. Error 6.729 6.206 6.222 5.983     
Sig.F Change 0.000** 0.000** 0.479 0.011*     
Df1 2 1 3 3     
Df2 97 96 93 91     






The beta values of the variables depict their level of predictions. Thus, Model 4 shows that 
CIR has the highest beta value of 0.618. This is followed by EQTASS with beta of 0.318; 
SIZE with beta of 0.224; CTSAR with beta of 0.217 and NII with a beta of 0.212 
respectively. 
The significance of the models is corroborated by the ANOVA which shows   the overall 
significance of the models. Each model in the ANOVA is significant. This is an indication 
that each of the performance models of the cross border banks has a significant level of effect 
on its profitability. However, the level of contribution or significance of each variable is 
measured by the beta value in the coefficient table.  
This significant level shows that in the order of predictability, CIR followed by EQTASS is 
the strongest predictors of financial performance of the cross border bank acquirers. The 
relative contributions and significance of their betas (0.618 and 0.387 respectively) in Table 
6.10 which are confirmed by the sig. value of 0.000.  This result indicates that controlling 
expenditure pattern in relation to the banks income, as measured by the CIR, is essential if 
the cross border merged banks are to improve their financial performance (same result was 
also obtained in the case of the domestic acquirers).  As indicated by the significance of CIR, 
costs should be controlled at the level of the banks earnings, if good financial performance is 
to be achieved. Management must strive to be efficient in their control of expenses in the 
merged entity.  
Profitability will also be achieved when the banks are able to use its capital effectively. The 
significance of EQTASS is an indication that profits‟ arising from the quality of the banks‟ 
assets is an important variable in enhancing the performance of the cross border acquired 
banks. This finding leans support to Goddard, Molyneux & Wilson (2004a) which assert that 
an increase in capital-to assets ratio (CAR) will subsequently increase the profitability of the 
banks. 
Interestingly, CTSAR also impacts significantly on the financial performance of the cross 
border acquirers. This implies that the abnormal returns consequent on the merger 
announcement affects the financial performance of the merged entity. The significant of the 
variable highlights the sensitivity of the news of the mergers to the operations and financial 




6.4.3 Summary of Analyses on the Financial Performance 
The empirical analysis shows that CTSAR of the cross border acquirers rose to above 20% 
after the announcement date but fell to its lowest of -40% on event day. It does not show any 
substantial rise thereafter but maintained a steady trend of between -20% and -38%. The 
domestic acquirers show a more volatile trend in their CTSAR. The CTSAR rose fast after 
the announcement to about 10% but fell to about -20% on the event date. The fall is followed 
by a fast recovery to about 5% before plummeting downwards to about -23% within the event 
period. This indicates that the cross border acquirers have higher as well as steep returns for 
their shareholders than domestic acquirers.  
The cross border post merger profitability variables (ROE, CIR, LOANTAS, SIZE) show 
more significant correlation with CTSAR compared with the few domestic post merger 
profitability variables (EQTASS and LOANTAS ) which also significantly correlate with the 
CTSAR. The cross border acquirers also show greater significance with profitability 
measures as well as more significant correlation with CTSAR than the domestic acquirers.  
The highest abnormal returns occurred in the 1
st





 quartiles give the most negative returns for the post cross border and domestic 
respectively.   
The CIR, with a beta of 38.1% makes the strongest impact to the financial performance of the 
domestic merged entities.  The fact that the CIR appears significant in both the cross border 
and domestic acquirers indicates that management of costs remains a significant variable in 
the financial performance particularly after M&A which reflect the investors‟ expectations. 
Thus, the regression result shows that cross border acquirers on aggregate, show higher 
profitability than their domestic counterparts. CIR, SIZE and the EQTASS are the most 
significant variable affecting financial performance of merged banks.  In addition, the 
CTSAR of the cross border acquirers significantly affect the financial performance of the 
merged banks whilst the domestic CTSAR has no significance on the banks performance. 
Thus, the null hypothesis (H2) that the cross border acquirers have better financial 
performance and show more significant correlation with the CTSAR, than their domestic 






Factors Influencing Bank Dividend Policy and the M&A Effect 
 
7.0 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to apply the results of the cumulative total standardized 
abnormal returns (CTSAR) of the cross border and domestic M&A in measuring the impact of 
shareholders perception on the dividend policy of bank acquirers. The dividend yield and 
payout are used as proxies for dividend policy of the acquirer banks. Other variables such as 
agency costs, bank liquidity, profitability, growth & investments, beta (risk), taxes, debt & 
financial structures, ownership, size and geographical factors affecting dividend policy are also 
analysed. The results of the summary statistics are presented into different panels while the 
regression results are based on different specification of the models. 
 
7.1 The Descriptive Analysis 
The dividend payout ratio represents the proportion of the earnings that the banks pay out to 
shareholders in the form of dividends. It is usually the net profit after taxation and after the 
preference dividends announced during the period; expressed as a percentage. The dividend 
yield relates the cash return from a share to its current market value. This is often stated at the 
grossed up rate. 
The descriptive statistics on the measures of dividend policy
42
 of the sample commercial banks 
are presented in Table 7.1 below. The table compares the key dividend policy measures 
                                                          
42
 The concept of dividend policy has been dealt with in the chapter 2. It is important to re-emphasize that in 
finance literature, different dividend policy measures have been applied depending on the perspective of the 
researchers. However, three measures; yield, payout and EPS have commonly been used in part or jointly to 
describe dividend policy.  Chen et al (2005) used payout and yield; Gugler and Yurtoglu (2003) used payout; 
while La- Porta et al (2000) used series of dividend ratios such as dividend to sales, dividend to earning  etc as 
instruments of measuring a firm‟s dividend policy. This study uses the dividend yield and dividend payouts to 
measure dividend policy, as these are the most commonly used.  
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(dividend payout and yield) of the pre and post mergers of both the domestic and the cross 
border sample of commercial banks during the period 1997 to 2007. The table shows a decline 
in the two dividend policy measures of dividend payout and yield   in the cross border merged 
banks. For instance, the mean of the dividend payout fell from 6.63% to 5.44% while the 
dividend yield also fell from 0.59% to 0.23% after the mergers. 
This result suggests that cross border banks are often under difficulty to increase dividend after 
mergers. The length of time to consolidate and recapitalise the banks in an effort to gain 
market share may be factors for this decline in the dividend policy. Foreign acquirers would 
usually require building a solid capital base in a new market to compete favourably. This may 
account for the reduction in the returns and earnings available to the shareholders.  
The results for the cross border sample are contrasted with the results of the domestic 
acquirers.  The means of the dividend policy measures indicate an increase in both the 
dividend payout and yield. The dividend payout rose from 7.15% to 8.33% and the dividend 
yield also grew from 0.05% to 0.80% respectively.   
     Table 7.1   Descriptive Statistics on Measures of Dividend Policy for Domestic & Cross border 
 M&A  (1997-2007) 
                                                                  Cross border  M&A  
        










Pre-mergers      
Dividend  payout % 77 0.04 56.00 6.63 13.03 
Dividend yield 64 0.00 5.11 0.59 1.22 
      
Post-mergers      
Dividend  payout % 79 0.03 25.32 2.87 5.44 
Dividend yield 72 0.01 3.29 0.23 0.58 
Domestic  M&A 
        
Pre-mergers 
   
Observations Minimum Maximum Mean Standard Dev 
Dividend  payout % 57 0.05 86.60 7.15 13.59 
Dividend yield 22 0.02 0.12 0.05 0.03 
      
Post-mergers      
Dividend  payout % 43 0.00 58 8.33 15.81 




The rise in the dividend payout and yield in the case of domestic bank M&A may be a bold 
attempt to consolidate in the domestic market. Since dividend has a signalling effect, a rise will 
be an indication of positive growth and a reassurance to the shareholders
43
. The trend in payout 
and yield over time are often used to evaluate the potential of a business. Atrill & McLaney 
(2004) assert that increase in profit through shareholders investments does not necessarily imply 
that the dividend yield will rise as a result. 
Dividend policy cannot be considered in isolation. Other factors affecting dividend policy must 
be considered in tandem to evaluate the effect of merged entities on dividend policy. Table 7.2 
gives a summary of the merged entities‟ dividend policy and the various factors
44
 affecting it.   
It is important to note that the coefficients of variations
45
 (CV) in the two dividend policy 
measures are similar though their means differ. While the CV of the dividend payout is 0.426 
the yield shows a variation of 0.551. This implies that the probability differences of the mean of 
the variables from their standard deviation lie on the same range.  In addition to the dummy 
variables, the PE ratio (PER), FNST and the DebtEquity also show same pattern in their 
coefficient of variations of 0.496, 0.58 and 0.493 respectively. The beta variable has a mean of 
1.108 and a CV of 0.213. 
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 The signalling effect of dividend was discussed in Chapters 2 & 3 on the review of dividend policy literature. 
However, some studies have revealed that increase in dividend does not necessarily indicate better performance 
of the firm. Management often sticks to a pattern of dividend payout. This can be explained by the signal 
conveyed by an alteration in dividend payment of the company particularly for new foreign banks. A cut in 
dividends will give a negative signal to investors on the future prospect of the company (Hutchinson, 1995). 
This might affect the share price of the company. Thus Chang and Rhee (1990) added that financial leverage is a 
crucial factor in dividend policy of firms. A firm that has a high financial leverage tends to have a high dividend 
payout ratio. 
44
 The factors affecting dividend policy are quite huge in finance literature.  These include cash flow; voting 
rights of shareholders, share ownership, Tobin‟s Q, debt ratio, corporate size (Gulger & Yurtoglu, 2003).  
Others are civil laws, dividend tax advantage (La Porta et al, 2000), profitability, ownership structure, 
investment and growth opportunities, and the assets structure of the firm (Myers and Majluf, 1984; Rozeff, 
1982; Jensen et al 1992; and Barclay et al, 1995 and Fama & French, 2000).  Baker & Powell (2000) also 
classified them into economic and industry specific factors, McManus et al (2003) add beta (risk) factor while 
Anil & Kapoor (2008) consider earnings (current and future), liquidity, corporate tax. See chapter 2 for 
discussion on factors affecting dividend policy. 
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Ta  Table 7.2       Univariate Statistics of Measures and Factors Affecting Dividend Policy 
          The table presents the results of the univariate statistics of factors affecting dividend policy. The variables are  
          presented in different panels. These include dividend , profitability, CTSAR, risk, taxes, debts & financial   
 S      structure, growth & investment, size, ownership and liquidity variables.  
 





Panel A:  Dividend 
Policy Variables       
Dividend Payout ratio Payout 5.79 100 50.78 21.663 0.426 
Net Dividend Yield Yield 2.3 27.25 9.015 4.968 0.551 
       
Panel B: Profitability       
Earnings Per Share EPS -4.26 41.2 3.224 4.929 1.528 
Return on Equity ROE -42.8 45.92 10.942 9.489 0.867 
       
Panel C:  Cumulative 
total standardized 
abnormal returns CTSAR -48.14 29.02 -11.274 15.986 -1.418 
       
Panel D: Risk       
Beta Beta 0.6 1.55 1.108 0.236 0.213 
Panel E: Taxes       
Tax Tax 0.01 8.62 1.108 1.3 1.173 
Pre-Tax  Operation/ 
Average Assets Pre -5.56 67 1.055 5.207 4.935 
Non operation item & 
Taxes/Average Assets 
Nonoptax/ 
Ass -2.36 1.6 -0.134 0.389 -2.908 
Panel F: Debt & 
Financial Structure       
Debts + equity/total 
assets FNST 0.07 15.14 5.289 3.072 0.58 
Total Debt/Equity DebtEquity 1.34 16.17 5.761 2.842 0.493 
 
Panel G: Growth & 
Investment       
Price Earning Ratio PER 0.35 15.96 5.958 2.956 0.496 
Market to Book Value 
Ratio MBR 0.06 40.79 3.94 9.937 2.522 
       
Panel H: Size       
Nat. Log of Total Assets NLTOTASS 0.01 7.43 0.42 0.98 2.33 
Nat. Log Total Cap. Capitalisation 0.03 10.37 1.999 2.848 1.424 
       
Panel I: Ownership       
% Insider holdings INSIDER 0.07 68.5 30.116 21.617 0.717 
Panel J: Liquidity       
Net Cash/Total Assets NetcashASS -39.88 62.19 -0.14 8.034 -57.066 
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The CTSAR shows a negative mean of -11.274 and a CV of -1.418. This result implies that 
the banks CTSAR make no significant contributions to the dividend received by the 
shareholders from the merger activities. To verify the assumption, the results are subjected to 
further analyses.  
 
7.2   Test of the Hypothesis of the Effect of M&A on Dividend Policy  
H3: The dividend policy hypothesis: There is no significant difference in the shareholders 
perception of dividend policy of cross border and domestic bank acquirers following a 
merger or acquisition. 
     
There are no known studies which have focused on the impact of M&A on the dividend 
policy of banks, although there are many studies that have devoted enormous strength in 
researching on different aspects of M&A as well as dividend policy. 
 
The hypothesis was formulated using key dividend variables from known studies (Rozeff, 
1982; Casey & Dickens, 2000; Chang & Rhee, 1990; DeAngelo, DeAngelo & Stilz, 2006; 
Chen et al, 2005) and applying CTSAR as a proxy for bank M&A effect.  The dividend yield 




The regression model on the effect of M&A on dividend policy has the following 
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DivPolicy =  - Betai + Liquidityi - Insideri + Taxi - Capst + β7FnSti +  β 8Sizei  
                       +   β9Profiti  -  β10Growthi + β 11CTSARi + ξi 
 
 
Where the effect of each of each explanatory variable is positive except where otherwise 
indicated: 
 - intercept term; 
 Beta - Estimated beta coefficient of the banks (with negative sign to indicate its expected 
effect)  
Liquidity – the availability of physical cash in the bank measured as the dividend/net cash 
operating, 
Insider – the percentage of insider shareholdings in the acquiring banks (with expected 
effect being negative); 
Tax – the total tax liabilities of the banks as well as the relevant tax ratios; 
CapSt - bank‟s capital and finance structures measured by the Debt/Equity ratio. 
β6FnSt – the finance structure is debt + equity/total assets; 
β7Size – the natural log of the total assets is used as the proxy for size of the bank; 
β8Profit – the profitability of the bank as measured by the ROE and EPS; 
β9Growth – the price earnings (PE), which also represents the market to book ratio (MBR) 
which is a proxy for Tobin‟s Q measure future growth and investment of the bank (with 
negative expected effect on dividend policy); 
 β10CTSAR – the Cumulative total standardized abnormal returns (CTSAR) is a proxy for 
M&A; 











Table 7.3  Model Summary of Hierarchical Regression of Dividend Policy 
 
The two dependent variables (DVs); dividend payout and dividend yield, were used to regress against a 
number of dividend policy factors, and the using the CTSAR as the independent variable (IV). The IVs were 
introduced in sequence to identify 5 different models. The figures in parentheses are for the values obtained 
using the yield as the dependent variable while the others are for the values obtained using the payout as the 
dependent variable. 
 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
      Insider 0.033 0.035 0.043 0.029 0.008 
  (-0.017) (-0.077) (-0.088) 
(-0.098) 
 (-0.131) 
Liquidity -0.087 -0.090 -0.098 -0.132 -0.09 
  (0.299) (0.383)** (0.362)** (0.325)* (0.325)* 
Beta -0.131 -0.145 -0.149 -0.158 -0.143 
  (0.452)** (0.491)** (0.523)** (0.519)** (0.538)** 
Tax   0.055 0.057 0.036 0.04 
    (-0.304)* (-0.275)* (-0.291)* (-0.308)* 
TaxToTass   -0.039 -0.041 -0.02 -0.062 
    (0.328)* (0.314)* (0.337)* (0.377)** 
NonTAX   -0.03 -0.024 -0.004 -0.019 
    (-0.084) (-0.053) (-0.028) (-0.010) 
FnSt     -0.028 -0.042 -0.044 
      (-0.324)* (-0.328)* (-0.370)** 
TotalAss     0.055 0.075 0.04 
      (-0.017) (0.003) (-0.009) 
CapSt     0.005 0.034 -0.045 
      (0.001) (0.025) (0.060) 
EPS       0.07 0.035 
        (0.126) (0.155) 
ROE       -0.164 -0.144 
        (-0.159) (-0.170) 
PE       -0.054 -0.046 
        (-0.046) (-0.056) 
CTSAR         0.097 
          (0.250) 
Constant 1.372 1.336 1.191 1.281 1.245 
  (1.277)# (1.539) (2.013) (2.003) (2.093)* 
Mean Sq. 10.295 6.059 4.513 5.914 7.315 
 
(17.525) (15.501) (12.349) (9.798) (9.266) 
F-Value 0.429 0.237 0.164 0.204 0.246 
 
(4.633) (5.449) (4.937) (3.851) (3.662) 
Sig. ANOVA 0.733 0.962 0.997 0.997 0.996 
 
(0.008)** (0.001)** (0.001)** (0.002)** (0.003)** 
Change Statistics 
     R Square 0.028 0.033 0.037 0.065 0.094 
 
(0.290) (0.513) (0.613) (0.649) (0.665) 
R Sq Change 0.028 0.005 0.004 0.028 0.029 
 
(0.290) (0.223) (0.100) (0.035) (0.016) 
Adj. R Sq. -0.038 -0.108 -0.191 -0.255 -0.290 
 
(0.228) (0.419) (0.489) (0.480) (0.483) 
Std. Error 4.896 5.059 5.244 5.384 5.458 
 
(1.945) (1.687) (1.582) (1.595) (1.591) 
Sig. F Change 0.733 0.975 0.984 0.790 0.595 
 
(0.008)** (0.008)** (0.087) (0.484) (0.267) 
Df1 3 3 3 3 1 
Df2 144 141 138 135 134 





Table 7.3 shows the Summary Model of the hierarchical regression models and compares the 
results of both the payout and yield. The yield results are in bracket which indicates the 
extent of significant impact of the regression model. The results of the regression are 
presented in 5 different models, by including additional variables into the successive models. 
This serves as a robustness check by evaluating the specific impact of any variable added to 
the model. 
The Model Summary table shows that at a glance, the R values of the dividend yields are 
quite higher than the dividend payout. The R value shows the linearity in the correlation 
between the observed and the model predicted values of the dependent variables. A larger 
size will indicate a stronger relationship. Thus the independent variables show a higher effect 
with dividend yield than they do with the dividend payout.   
This position is further highlighted by the R Square, which shows that more than half of the 
variation of the dividend yield is explained by the model. For instance, the R value of the 
dividend yield is 0.665 (the Model 5 of the Model Summary table). This indicates the strength 
of the model fit and is corroborated by the low Standard Error of the Estimate of the dividend 
yield which is below 2. 
The discussion of the results follows a sequential order by examining each of the independent 
variables in the models. Since CTSAR is in Model 5, which is the proxy for M&A and the 
variable of main interest to the hypothesis, the discussion of the results begins with that 
model.  
 
7.3   The Effect of CTSAR on the Dividend Policy 
The behaviour of the abnormal returns as hypothesized in the study is a reflection of 
investors‟ expectations about dividends. Thus, the accuracy of such expectations is tested by 
the dividend regression results. Dividend policy here is measured by the dividend yield rather 
than dividend payout
47
. The Model 5 results show that the introduction of CTSAR in the 
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 Dividend payout as a measure of dividend policy is excluded from discussion here because most of the 
explanatory variables are insignificance in the regression models. The Coefficient table (Table 7.5) also shows 
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regression had a slight improvement on the strength of the relationship and accounts for 25% 
of the variance in the model. The R Square barely changed from 64.9% to 66.5%. The Sig. F 
Change shows that the contribution is insignificant at P= 0.267. Specifically, the CTSAR 
makes just a 0.003% impact on the model as shown by the R Square Change after 
controlling for the effect of the other variables. 
However, the ANOVA result in shows that Model 5 as a whole is very significant at 
P=0.003. This shows the acceptability of the model from a statistical perspective, though it 
does not directly address the strength of the relationship of each of the individual independent 
variables. This relationship is determined by the beta coefficient values. 
Since model 5 makes a significant contribution to the regression, it is important to isolate the 
impact of the individual variables particularly the CTSAR. The last model
48
 summarises the 
contributions of each variable. The Beta of the standardized coefficients of CTSAR is 0.250. 
This indicates, however, that the contribution
49
 of CTSAR in the overall model development 
is insignificant and the null hypothesis that shareholder perfection from M&A (which uses 
CTSAR as a proxy) has no significant effect on the dividend policy (measured by the 
dividend yield) of banks is therefore accepted.   
 
7.3.1. Robustness check of the Merger Effect on Dividend Policy 
The Granger Causality effect is applied to check more vigorously the existence of any temporal cause 
and effect relationship between two variables (Seiler, 2003); in this case, the dividend yield and the 
CTSAR. Therefore, a Granger Causality model is employed to check the presence of any 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
that several of the dividend payout predictors are not significant, thus indicating that the variables do not 
contribute much to the model. 
48
 Model 6 is a summary of the results of the variables used in the regression. It specifies the contribution and 
thus the significance of the predictor variables. Thus, the analyses of the variables are based on the data in 
Model 6. 
49
 The Beta of the Standardized Coefficients offers an indication of the relative strength and contribution of the 
predictor variable to the model. A high Beta value indicates that the variable exerts more influence on the 
model. Beta values of at least to 0.300 generally make significant contributions (Pallant, 2004).  
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causality relationship between the CTSAR variable and the dividend policy.  The result is 
shown in Table 7. 4.  
 
Table 7.4             Granger Causality Test Result  
Pairwise Granger Causality Tests 
Samples: 1/1/1997 – 31/12/2007 
Lags: 5 
Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistics Probability 
CTSAR does not Granger Cause Dividend yield       155           1.9650          0.1231 
 
The p-value (probability) of the result shows a value of 0.1231 which is not significant. In 
statistical terms, this implies that the banks‟ dividend policy is not significantly affected by 
the share price reaction from the news of mergers and acquisitions. 
This result concurs with the results of the regression model. Thus, the null hypothesis that 
announcement effects of mergers & Acquisitions have no impact on dividend policy is 
accepted. 
The rest of the discussion focuses on the other dividend variables used in the models; to 
ascertain the extent of their individual impact on the dividend policy of the banks. 
 
7.3.2. The Impact of Insider Shareholdings (Agency Costs), Liquidity and Beta on 
Dividend Policy 
The result of Model Summary in Table 7.3 indicates that the insider shareholdings percentage 
(which is a proxy for the agency costs) is an important variable in the determination of the 
dividend policy. The Model 1 result (which contains in addition to the Insiders variable, 
Liquidity and Beta variables) has an R Square Change of 29% and significant p-value of 
0.008.   This signifies that the combined set of variables in the model exert a significance 
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impact on the dividend policy of the banks. This position is further supported by the ANOVA 
result which shows that the model shows a significant p-value of 0.008. 
 
However, to obtain the actual contribution of the agency costs variable. The variable Insider 
shows a standardized beta coefficient value of -0.131.  This is insignificant and shows that 
although the overall Model has a significant impact (ANOVA of 0.003) on dividend policy, 
the Insider variable does not make any significant contribution to the model.  
Although the initial expectation predicted by the model is that the Insider would make a 
significant impact on the dividend policy, however the result obtained is totally not 
surprising. Finance literatures
50
 have been agog on the issue of agency costs and its impact on 
dividend policy of firm.  Rozeff (1982) found that agency costs (Insider) and beta have no 
significant effect on the dividend of banks. This result corroborates Casey and Dickey (2000) 
who also found that Insider makes no impact to the dividend policy of banks. Others, such as 
Baker, Gary & Powell (2000) and Johnson, Lin & Song (2006) also confirm that the 
percentage of Insider has no bearing on the dividend policy of firms.  Dempsey & Laber 
(1992) add that while the dividend yield is negatively related to the Insiders, it has a positive 
significance to the proportion of the ordinary shareholders. 
However, there are also quite a number of opposite findings asserting that agency cost is a 
significant element on the dividend policy of firms.  Results obtained by Wei, Zhang & Xiao 
(2003) and Gugler (2003) indicate that the agency costs is an influential variable in dividend 
policy considerations.  Brunarski, Harman & Kehr (2000) assert that a higher number of 
insider helps to curtail the wasteful spending and channel funds towards positive projects and 
thus determine greatly the dividend policy. Additionally, a recent study by Cornett, et al 
(2008) affirms that the number of insiders is an important variable in the dividend decisions 
of public banks.  
It is therefore apparent that the extent of the insider influence on dividend policy decisions is 
inconclusive as well as debatable.  Any position taken must be justified in conjunction with 
other variables. 
                                                          
50
 Many studies on the role of insiders on dividend policy have been undertaken over the past three 
decades. Short (1994) and Gugler (2003) present an extensive survey of studies in dividend policy 
cum agency costs.  
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The ANOVA and the Model Summary results also confirm that at P=0.008, the Liquidity
51
 
variable in Model 1 is a significant factor in the dividend policy of banks. The strength of its 
contribution is denoted by its beta coefficient of 32.5.  Model 5 summarises the contributions 
of each of the variables, shows that liquidity makes a significant contribution to the dividend 
policy decisions of the banks.  
The result obtained is consistent with the majority of findings on the impact of liquidity or 
cash flow on dividend policy. Lie (2000) asserts that cash dividend declaration is positively 
related to the firm‟s level of liquidity.  Gugler (2003) attributes the liquidity of a firm as very 
fundamental in its dividend payout. While La Porta, et al (2003) affirm that the cash position 
of the firm is very crucial in its dividend decision.  
A recent study by Anil & Kahoor (2008) also confirm that good liquidity position increases a 
firm‟s ability to pay dividend as those firms with unstable cash flows are less likely to have a 
regular dividend.  The aforementioned studies thus confirm that the result on the liquidity is 
in conformity with previous studies. 
The table also shows that the Beta variable, which is a proxy for risk, is a very significant 
factor in the dividend policy of bank acquirers. It has a significant standardized beta 
coefficient of 0.538. The result finds support from previous studies such as Rozeff (1982), 
Blume (1980) and Massa & Zhang (2009) all of which found the effect of risk represented by 
beta very significant in dividend policy. 
Pang, et al (2008) posit that the dividend yield always follows the pattern of the beta and   
employ the coefficient of variation to measure the stability of the yield. This procedure 
highlights the importance of the beta variable. Pandey (2001) using 1729 Malaysian firms in 
a panel data analysis found that beta is significant in measuring the dividend yield.  Watson 
& Head (2004) affirmed that firms such as banks that operate in high business risk ventures, 
which are susceptible to cyclical swings in profit, tend to respond by paying low dividends in 
order to avoid the risk of reducing dividend in the future.  
                                                          
51
 The liquidity is measured as the dividend / net cash operating. It denotes the cash available after all capital 
expenditures have been undertaken before payment of ordinary dividend. The ratio does not take into account 
stock dividend payments as those do not require cash and previous period under/over provision payments.   
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However, the issue of the role of beta in dividend is no less contentious in finance studies. 
There have been a number of opposite findings. Casey and Dickens (2000)
52
 found no 
significance in the role of beta in dividend policy of banks and challenged the earlier findings 
of Rozeff (1982). In the same vein, Chen, Grundy & Stambaugh (1990) investigated the cross 
sectional relationship between the dividend yield and market risk (beta) using the market and 
changing risk premium approaches and found that none has a significant effect on the other in 
both methods. Despite the above opposing views, most contemporary studies are in 
agreement that beta is an important variable in dividend decisions.  
 
7.3.3. The Impact of Taxes on Dividend Policy 
Apart from the actual tax paid, two additional tax variables are included to provide a robust 
check
53
 on the actual tax effect on dividend policy. The additional variables include the Pre-
tax operation income to Average assets (TaxToTass) and the Non operational items & taxes 
to Average assets (NonTAX). 
The Model Summary table shows that after controlling for the effect of the previously 
considered variables (insider, liquidity and beta), taxes are very significant at P=0.008. This 
is further confirmed by the ANOVA table of P=0.001. To determine the strength of each of 
the tax variables in the Model 2, the beta coefficient shows that the actual Tax and 
TaxToTass liabilities of the banks all make a significant input -0.308 and 0.307 respectively. 
The NonTAX variable showed no significance. The result is not surprising as taxes generally 
influence the dividend payout of firm, hence dividend are usually paid from profit after tax 
(PAT).  
                                                          
52
 Much of Casey & Dickens (2000) findings was a cross examination of the earlier study by Rozeff. They used 
similar variables as Rozeff and found differences in the results. Three outstanding variables were particularly of 
interest in their findings (the firm‟s growth rate, insider, and beta) all of which were insignificant and opposite 
of Rozeff‟s findings.  
53
 Both the TaxToTass and NonTAX were incorporated to assess the operational and non operational impacts of 
incomes before the provision and payment of taxes by the banks. It is expected that the 2 variables will balance 
off any differences resulting from the fluctuations in the tax regimes.  
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However, previous studies relating to the tax effect on dividend decisions have produced very 
conflicting results
54
.  Casey & Dickens (2000) affirmed that taxes have significant impact on 
the dividends of commercial banks in the US. Their findings concurred with an earlier study 
by Rozeff (1980). The assumption is that the lower the taxes, the higher the dividend payout. 
In addition to the dissident findings, Anil & Kapoor (2008) maintain that the imposition of 
taxes on dividend has no significant impact on the dividend policy of any organisation.   
Wu (1996) investigated the impact of eliminating the preferential capital gain tax treatment of 
1986 in the US and found some structural changes in the pattern of dividend which coincides 
with changes in the tax laws. The study concludes that such a shift significantly affects the 
aggregate corporate dividend payout. Wilkinson, Cahan & Jones (2001) recommended a 
reduced tax policy for firms in New Zealand as a strategy for dividend imputation.  In a 
recent study, Pattenden & Twite (2008) evaluated the tax effect on dividend policy in 
Australia under different tax regimes for the period 1982-1997. They found that the increase 
in dividend payout and initiation differ among different firms. However, the study affirms 








                                                          
54
 La Porta, et al (2000) & Poterba & Summers (1985) chronicled various studies and highlight the various 
divergent views among economists of the tax effect on dividend policy. The traditional views assert that high 
taxes (either on personal or corporate bases) particularly in the US often serve as a bulwark to dividend 
payments. But this position is not without objections. Miller & Scholes (1978) held that investors employ 
various dividend tax avoidance techniques that make them escape from taxes. The „‟new view of dividends and 
taxes‟‟ proponents such as Harris, Hubbard, and Kemsley (1997), assert that taxes do not deter dividend 
payments. They agreed that cash must be paid out as dividend to shareholders at some point so, the payment of 
such dividends imposes no great burden on the shareholders.     
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7.3.4. The Impact of Capital & Finance Structures and Size on Dividend Policy 
The capital structure (CapSt) generally refers to the composition of the debt and equity in the 
banks‟ financial statements. The variable consists of the total debts/ total shareholders‟ equity 
(DebtEquity) ratio
55
. Model 3 contains in addition to the capital structure, the finance 
structure and size variables. The Model Summary shows that all three variables combined 
make an insignificant impact on the dependent variable. The R Square Change of Model 3 
makes 0.100 (10%) of the regression total model.  
However, the ANOVA table shows that all the 3 variables (debt/equity structure, capital 
structure and size), while controlling for the earlier variables in the Models 1 and 2, have a 
significant value of 0.001.  The beta coefficient provides a clue on the individual significance 
of each of the variables and shows that the CapSt has a standardized coefficient beta of 0.060 
which is insignificant. This means that the level of debt/equity does not influence dividend 
policy; the higher the debt, the higher the dividend yield. 
The result concurs with the findings of Baker & Powell (2000) and Brunarski, Harman & 
Kehr (2004) that the leverage level of firms has no significance on the level of their 
dividends. Their argument is based on the principle of the information content of dividend 
which opines that a reduction in the dividend may send a signal of cash flow problems to the 
public.   
The debt structure of firms has constituted a platform in finance for divergent arguments. Not 
all agree to the non significance of a firm‟s leverage on dividend policy.  Gugler (2003) and 
Pattenden & Twite (2008) affirm that leverage greatly influences the dividend pattern of the 
firms. The composition of the debt structure is thus very important.  Due to the cost of raising 
equity, banks that have higher proportion of external financing than equity capital are likely 
to pay more dividends.  
In fact, Kanatas & Qi (2004) posit that the firms‟ debt financing can be greater or less than 
the funding needs if the difference is paid to shareholders. A low debt structure increases the 
                                                          
55
 The ratio fundamentally provides a fundamental test of the financial strength of a company.  Its purpose is to 
create a picture of the measure of the mix of funds in the balance sheet and to make a comparison between those 
funds that have been borrowed (debts) and those that have been supplied by the owners (equity). As debts cost 
less than the equity funds, the inclusion of debts could improve profitability, add value to the share price, 
increase the wealth of its shareholders and develop greater potential for growth (Walsh, 2008). 
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firm‟s value and increases the cash available for disbursement as dividend. Conversely, a 
default in meeting up the debt obligations of the firm may trigger the suspicion of their 
lenders to inspect the firm‟s debt covenants; any serious violation on the part of the firm may 
jeopardise its going concern.  
The finance structure of the banks as measured by the (debt + equity) / total assets (FnSt)
56
, 
makes a significant impact. This implies that the banks‟ finance structure is significantly 
important in the dividend decisions.  The variable has a beta coefficient of -0.370, which is 
statistically significant.  
Most past studies on the role of finance structure and dividend lean support to this finding. 
Brunarski, Harman & Kehr (2004) and Pattenden & Twite (2008) investigated the optimal 
finance structure of firms and assert that the assets and equity composition of the finance and 
capital structures as well as its fixed and current proportions are very important in its 
decisions on dividend.  When the equity/ asset ratio increases, the dividend decisions will be 
reviewed upwards. As the number of shareholders increase, their stake also increase in the 
organisation, thus this affects the review of the dividend policy of the banks. 
 
The TotalAss, which is used as proxy for size, shows a non significant value and a 
standardized beta coefficient value of -0.009.  This indicates an insignificant contribution and 
points out that size of a bank is not a sinquanon in its dividend policy.  Chang & Rhee (2003) 
and Johnson et al (2006) argued in support, that the size does has no bearing on the dividend.  
Pattenden & Twite (2008) found the same result and observed that large firms, with their high 
level of debts, do not necessarily pay better dividend. Also firms with many high equity 
capitals do not guarantee a higher dividend policy. The result however is inconsistent with 
the findings of Reeding (1997) and Fama & French (2001) that large firms are likely to pay 
dividends.   
 
 
                                                          
56
 This is often confused with capital structure. It refers to the financing of the firm‟s assets based on the totals 
of the short-term borrowing, long-term debts and owner‟s equity. The capital structure is primarily focused on 
the long-term debt cum assets.    
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7.3.5. The Impact of Profitability and Growth on Dividend Policy 
Two variables, ROE and EPS, are used as measures of profitability
57
.  The PE variable is 
used as proxy for growth. The Model Summary Table 7.3 shows that the three variables 
combined make no significance difference to the model, given their significance of P=0.484. 
The R Square Change is 3.5% while the ANOVA indicates however, that in combination of 
the previously considered independent variables, Model 4 turns significant at P=0.002. 
Furthermore, Model 5 of the coefficient Table 7 shows that EPS and ROE have beta values 
of 0.155 and -0.170 respectively while the PE has a beta value of -0.056. Both the 
profitability and growth variables show no significance as dividend policy measures.  
The result is contrary to the conventional wisdom, as profit is expected to influence the 
dividend decision of the banks and growth reduces the total amount of dividend available to 
the shareholders of the banks. However, previous studies have found similar results. In fact, 
there are two schools of thought on the influence of profitability on dividend policy. One 
opposes the hypothesis that profitability affects dividend while the other supports it. 
 
Studies opposing profitability as a determinant of dividend, and thus giving credence to the 
result obtained in the study include Change & Rhee (1990), Baker & Powell (2000) and Anil 
& Kapoor (2008). The justification of their argument lies in the fact that a reduction in 
dividend due to a decrease in profit gives a bad signal about the bank. Banks would maintain 
a sustainable level of dividend such that a downturn in the organisation would not lead to a 
reduction in dividend. In fact, these proponents believe that firms would rather increase their 
leverage than reduce their dividends. 
                                                          
57
 Different measures of profitability have been used in profitability studies. The earnings per share (EPS) relate 
the earnings generated by the bank which is available to the shareholders to the number of shares in issue. It is 
measured by the after tax profit less any preference dividend divided by the number of ordinary shares. The EPS 
measures the absolute return delivered to the shareholders. Growth in the EPS indicates the progress and profit of 
the bank.. It is a very powerful indicator of financial performance of a firm (see also studies by Kumar & 
Sopariwala, 1992 and Kaufmann, Gordon and Owers, 2000).  At the level of the individual firms, the ROE keeps 
in place the financial framework for a thriving and growing enterprise and drives industrial investment, growth in 
GNP, employment, government tax receipts at the macro economic level (Walsh, 2008). Apart from the ROE and 
EPS, the ROCE, returns on net worth and net profit margin are also profitability measures (See Chander and 
Priyanka, 2007). 
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Findings supporting profitability as an influential element in dividend policy include Gaver & 
Gaver (1993), Fama & French (2001, 2002), Gugler (2003) and Pattenden & Twite (2008).  
Azhagaiah & Sabari (2008) also found profitability as an important element in the dividend 
decision of Indiana chemical industry.  The argument portrayed in these studies is that profit 
is directly related to the dividend. Thus, a fall in profitability will amount to a decrease in the 
amount of dividends declared and paid, thus a decline in the dividend yield. The argument 
does not however take into consideration that a reduction in dividend due to a fall in profit 
would send a wrong signal to the public and could thus jeopardise the growth of the bank. 
The growth variable
58
, PE ratio, is also not significant. It has an insignificant standardised 
beta coefficient of -0.059.  The negative beta coefficient implies that the banks‟ growth and 
dividend are negatively correlated. An increase in the bank‟s growth will decrease the 
dividend.  
Baker & Powell (2002), Anil & Kapoor (2008), Chang & Rhee (1990), Pattenden & Twite 
(2008) and Casey & Dickens (2000) are all in agreement that growth of a firm has no 
significance on its dividend policy.  The dividend signal hypothesis eliminates any idea of 
dividend reduction. Thus, the argument is that when a bank grows, it increases both capital 
and finance structures at the same level with its dividend policy.  
However, like in many other studies, there are contradictory findings against this view. Some 
studies (Gaver & Gaver 2003, Grullon, et al 2002, Fama & French 2002 and Brunarski, 
Harman & Kehr 2004) have found that increase in growth would potentially drain the 
earnings available to shareholders and thus reduce dividend.  Rozeff (1982) and  
Gugler (2003) add that the significance is negative as the increase in one causes a reduction 
in the other. However, this argument does not lean support to the market reaction to any 
significant negative impact on dividend.    
 
                                                          
58
 Different growth proxies that can be used include retained earnings as a percentage of owners‟ equity, current 
assets/ sales; retained earnings/sales (Walsh, 2008). But most studies agree that the PE ratio is a credible 
measure of growth of a firm. The ratio measures the future earning growth of the firm. A modified ratio, the 
PEG also measures the firm‟s growth by dividing the PE by the short term earnings growth rate. Increases in 
sales and total assets are also often used to measure growth (Easton, 2004). The argument is that when a bank 
grows, it requires capital for expansion. Such funds will thus reduce the available sum set outside for dividend.  
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7.5. Summary of Discussions 
Thus in summary, CTSAR does not affect the dividend policy of the both the domestic and 
cross border acquirers. The coefficient result shows that it has an insignificant impact on the 
dividend policy of the sample banks. This finding is corroborated by the Granger causality 
test result, which showed that M&A does not affect the dividend policy of banks. 
CSTAR is insignificant on both measures of dividend policy used in the study (dividend yield 
and payout). The insignificance of the cross border and domestic CTSAR variable implies 
that the dividend policy is not influenced by the geographical locations or national boundaries 
of the banks and remains same even after the event. In the same vein, the profitability, capital 
structure (debt/equity), size (total assets), growth (PE) do not also influence the dividend 
policy of both the domestic and cross border acquirers.  
However, other variables such as the beta, liquidity, taxes, equity to total assets and the 
finance structure of the acquirers are significant variables in the formulation of the dividend 
policy of the banks.  These findings confirm the results of previous studies on dividend 
policy. The beta, which a proxy for risk, is the most significant factors affecting the dividend 
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    List of Domestic Acquirers   
        
  
Announcement 
Date Acquirers Acquirer country 
1 16/12/2002 Sacam Developpement SAS [and others] France 
2 15/11/2005 Commerzbank AG Germany 
3 25/10/2005 Deutsche Postbank AG Germany 
4 23/01/2006 Deutsche Postbank AG Germany 
5 30/06/1999 Deutsche Postbank AG Germany 
6 18/12/2001 Piraeus Bank SA Greece 
7 23/06/2003 Piraeus Bank SA Greece 
8 26/08/2006 Banca Intesa SpA Italy 
9 20/05/2007 Unicredito Italiano SpA Italy 
10 09/10/1998 Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena SpA Italy 
11 18/07/1997 Banca Popolare di Verona SpA Italy 
12 25/03/2003 Sanpaolo IMI SpA Italy 
13 15/07/2002 Unicredito Italiano SpA Italy 
14 04/12/2006 Banche Popolari Unite Scpa Italy 
15 03/01/2000 Skb Banka Dd Slovenia 
16 19/02/1998 Banco Santander SA Spain 
17 31/12/2000 Banco Santander Central Hispano SA Spain 
18 27/06/2001 Banco Santander Central Hispano SA Spain 
19 16/09/1997 Banco Santander SA Spain 
20 26/01/2000 Royal Bank of Scotland Group PLC UK 
        
        
        
        
        
        









     List of Cross Border Acquirers   
 S/N 
Announcement 
Date Acquirer Acquirer country 
1 20/08/2005 Raiffeisen International Bank-Holding AG Austria 
2 29/10/1999 Erste Bank der Oesterreichischen Sparkassen AG Austria 
3 28/09/2007 KBC Groep NV Belgium 
4 19/04/2002 KBC Bancassurance Holding SA Belgium 
5 20/09/2006 Cyprus Popular Bank Public Company Ltd Cyprus 
6 13/06/2006 Credit Agricole SA France 
7 24/03/2006 Societe Generale France 
8 14/05/2001 Societe Generale France 
9 07/01/2001 BNP Paribas SA France 
10 03/05/2004 Societe Generale France 
11 14/01/2001 Societe Generale France 
12 26/09/2002 Societe Generale France 
13 03/03/1998 Societe Generale France 
14 03/11/2003 Societe Generale France 
15 22/07/2000 Bayerische Hypo-und Vereinsbank AG Germany 
16 15/02/2002 Unicredito Italiano SpA [and others] Germany 
17 09/11/2003 Commerzbank AG Germany 
18 01/08/2007 National Bank of Greece SA Greece 
19 06/12/2005 Unicredito Italiano SpA Italy 
20 01/09/2007 Unicredito Italiano SpA Italy 
21 23/03/2006 Unicredito Italiano SpA Italy 
22 08/04/2004 Unicredito Italiano SpA Italy 
23 06/12/2005 Unicredito Italiano SpA Italy 
24 20/01/2003 Unicredito Italiano SpA Italy 
25 15/06/2001 IntesaBci SpA Italy 
26 04/01/2002 Unicredito Italiano SpA Italy 
27 13/04/2000 Unicredito Italiano SpA Italy 
28 21/03/2001 Unicredito Italiano SpA Italy 
29 04/05/2006 Banco Comercial Portugues SA Portugal 
30 23/07/2004 Banco Santander Central Hispano SA Spain 
31 06/12/2006 Banco Bilbao Vizcaya  SA Spain 
32 29/12/2002 Banco Santander Central Hispano SA Spain 
33 02/10/2000 Banco Santander Central Hispano SA Spain 
34 06/12/2006 Banco Bilbao Vizcaya  SA Spain 
35 21/01/1999 Banco Santander Central Hispano SA - BSCH Spain 
36 09/08/2005 Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB Sweden 
37 23/09/2004 Barclays PLC UK 
38 01/10/2005 Standard Chartered PLC UK 
39 28/10/2003 HSBC Holdings Plc UK 
40 17/07/2006 Standard Chartered PLC UK 
41 20/09/2001 HSBC Holdings Plc UK 
42 14/05/2001 Societe Generale France 
        
     
 
